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*ECCLESIASTES.**

WITH respect to its enigmatical character, its sceptical uncertainty, and its tone of pessimistic sadness, Ecclesiastes may be called the *Hamlet* of the Bible. And, like Shakespeare's drama, the great Biblical enigma has long presented special attractions to the student. In a similar manner, also, scholarly devotion to its study has borne fruit in an abundant literature. But the parallel between the two works is certainly not in all respects perfect. For example, in times past Ecclesiastes can scarcely be said to have been a popular book. Probably its great author did not intend it to be such. Its unbending individuality, its gnarled and unsymmetrical form, show little of those arts which are wont to please the populace. Instead of courting popularity, its motto would rather seem to be—

“Odi profanum vulgus et arceo.”

“Me raris juvat auribus placere.”

Nevertheless, in our own day Ecclesiastes appears to be

* *Ecclesiastes ; or, The Preacher. With Notes and Introduction.* By E. H. PLUMPTRE, D.D., Professor of New Testament Exegesis, King's College, London, Prebendary of St. Paul's, Examining Chaplain to the Archbishop of Canterbury. Cambridge : At the University Press ; London : Cambridge Warehouse, 17, Paternoster-row. 1881.

attracting attention more widely, and attaining greater prominence in the public view, than heretofore. If the book is not already popular, it is in a fair way towards becoming so. Reasonable causes for this change are not very difficult to discern. The foundations of cherished creeds are loosening and yielding. And the spirit of the age is thus in harmony with that of the book, in its sceptical questioning and restless, fluctuating uncertainty. The atmosphere is clouded with gloom. The self-confident optimism of the last century, which has, especially in this country, through the influence of the economists, so long protracted its power, is tottering to the fall, or is already fallen. Wealth in huge accumulations, ostentatious frivolity, and luxury worthy of imperial Rome, cannot stifle and subdue, or even conceal, that inner sadness which contemporary art and poetry embody and express. The age can adopt as its own the utterance, "I looked on all the works that my hands had wrought, and on the labour that I had laboured to do : and, behold, all was vanity and vexation of spirit, and there was no profit under the sun." Science boasts vaingloriously of her progress, yet mocks us with her grand discovery of progress through pain, telling of small advantages for the few purchased by enormous waste of life, by internecine conflict and competition, and by a deadly struggle with Nature herself, "red in tooth and claw with ravin," greedy to feast on the offspring of her own redundant fertility. The revelations of Geology and Astronomy deepen our depression. The littleness of our lives and the insignificance of our concerns become more conspicuous in comparison with the long and slow procession of the æons which have gone before, and with the vast ocean of being around us, driven and tossed by enormous, complicated, and unresting forces. A new significance is thus given to the words, "One generation passeth away, and another generation cometh ; but the earth abideth for ever ;" " All things are full of labour ; man

cannot utter it : the eye is not satisfied with seeing, nor the ear filled with hearing ;" " There is no remembrance of former things ; neither shall there be any remembrance of things that are to come with those that shall come after ;" " In much wisdom is much grief ; and he that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow ;" " Vanity of vanities, saith the Preacher ; vanity of vanities ; all is vanity."

But, besides the causes just mentioned, in an age of restless inquiry, the enigma of Ecclesiastes could scarcely fail to attract special attention. The impracticable knot must now at last be untied—or cut. From another point of view, also, Ecclesiastes has been recently regarded with peculiar interest. Theologians, generally distinguished for conservative orthodoxy, have, with respect to the authorship of Ecclesiastes, assented to the conclusions of modern criticism, and abandoned the traditional opinion that the book was written by Solomon. It is not unreasonable, therefore, that there should have been a strong desire aroused to defend the Solomonic authorship. If this, ostensibly the weakest point, can be rendered impregnable, the defence of traditional opinion as to the age and authorship of certain other Old Testament books need occasion little anxiety. To this end a rather bulky volume on 'The Authorship of Ecclesiastes' has been lately put forth. But the writer of this volume—who does not give his name—is defending a desperate and hopeless cause. The negative verdict which has been pronounced is not likely to be changed or reversed.

In England, during recent years, besides German commentaries introduced in an Anglicised dress, the number of works published, dealing more or less completely with Ecclesiastes, has been somewhat remarkable. This number would be considerable even in Germany, that land of Biblical research. Lately there has been added to the list a commentary on the book from the pen of Dr. E. H. Plumptre,

Professor of New Testament Exegesis in King's College, London. Since the publication of this commentary, Dr. Plumptre, we are glad to find, has been appointed to the Deanery of Wells—an instance of preferment worthily bestowed, though perhaps it may admit of question whether Dr. Plumptre's numerous and long-continued services may not fairly claim a still higher reward.

The present article will be mainly concerned with some of the subjects discussed in Dr. Plumptre's Introduction; and there are in relation to Ecclesiastes three especially fundamental questions:—(1) When was the Book written? (2) What is the meaning of the name *Koheleth*?—a name which the Authorised Version translates “The Preacher;” and (3) Is the so-called Epilogue an integral part of the Book, or a later addition? If we can answer these questions, we shall have proceeded far towards solving the enigma which Ecclesiastes presents.

I.

When was the Book written?

Until a comparatively recent period there was a general agreement among both Jewish and Christian writers that Ecclesiastes was the work of the great Hebrew monarch, Solomon. Opinions adverse to the traditional belief had been expressed by Luther, and subsequently by Grotius; but it was long before the belief appeared much shaken. At length, however, critics of widely divergent theological views admitted the soundness of Grotius's judgment that the diction of Ecclesiastes is inconsistent with the alleged Solomonic authorship. The recognition of Aramaisms and later Hebrew words did not, however, fix the date of the book with even tolerable precision. With a copious and continuous literature for comparison the case might be otherwise; but great difficulty results from the paucity of

Hebrew literary monuments for a long period previous to the birth of Christ. Nor was the chronological question solved by the assertion that there are in the language of Ecclesiastes indications of Greek influence. If this assertion had been well supported, the mere fact of such influence would still permit a good deal of doubt as to the exact date. It might be argued, indeed, that the book must probably have been written after the Eastern conquests of Alexander the Great. Still there would be nothing to prevent our placing its origin very much later, and assigning it, for example, with Dr. Graetz, to the time of King Herod. The critical sagacity of Hitzig enabled him to fix the date at about the end of the third century B.C., a conclusion which was, as sometimes happens, a good deal better than the arguments by which it was supported. Hitzig was followed by Van Gilse,* and by the distinguished theologian, Dr. Kuenen, of Leiden, who placed the date not very far from 175 B.C. The present writer arrived at a similar conclusion, before he had recognised the facts on which, as it now appears to him, the conclusion must chiefly rest.

It has been said that Ecclesiastes gives forth a sound out of harmony with the general tone of the Biblical books. Such a remark, while just with respect to the book in general, would be, perhaps, especially true of that portion which may be called "The Catalogue of the Times and Seasons," iii. 1—8, "For everything there is an appointed time, and a season for every matter under heaven; a season for giving birth and a season for dying," &c.† These verses, so singularly untheocratic and unbiblical, if it is allowable to use such expressions, take the place, in Ecclesiastes, of the Mosaic Law, or the Decalogue; and

* Mentioned by Kuenen, *Historisch-kritisch Onderzoek*. Third part, p. 183.

† Previous quotations have been borrowed from the Authorised Version. This and following quotations usually differ therefrom.

having introduced them at the beginning of the third chapter, the author probably never afterwards loses sight of them (Comp. iii. 12, 17; viii. 6; xi. 9, 10). That there is some analogy between the Catalogue of the Times and Seasons and the moral law of the Stoics, "Live conformably to Nature," seems tolerably manifest. These remarkable verses may be regarded as a setting forth of that law with some detail, giving a compendious statement of the particulars which make up human life, and for each of which there is in Nature a pre-determined season. Man must "live conformably to Nature," observing in every action the allotted season, since "for everything there is an appointed time, and a season for every matter under heaven." Taking into account the period when Stoicism originated—Zeno, the founder of Stoicism, having died probably towards the middle of the third century B.C.—the conclusion previously suggested that Ecclesiastes was written about 200 B.C. thus acquires a better basis on which to rest. Moreover, other evidences of Stoic influence are lying not far off. According to the Stoic physical philosophy, the course of things in Nature proceeds in a predetermined order, and with invariable sequence, like an ever-revolving wheel or circle. When one cycle is completed, the procession of events begins anew, to repeat in its minutest particular what has gone before. This teaching appears pretty obviously reflected, when we read, "I perceived that, as to all that God doeth, it is to be for ever: there is no making addition to it; and there is no taking away from it" (iii. 14). "Whatever hath been, it had been long ago before, and what is to be, already hath been; and God will seek after what hath gone before" (iii. 15). These words receive an easy explanation if the course of things in the world was conceived of, according to the ideal of the Stoics, as being like a revolving wheel or circle. Parts of the circle, or objects upon it, which may have passed out of

view, are ever brought back again in precisely the same order as before. "God will seek after what hath gone before," or, more literally, "what is pursued," for objects thus revolving seem to pursue or chase one another. The same doctrine of the cycles appears also in the first chapter: "What hath been, that it is which will be; and what hath been done, that it is which will be done; and there is nothing new under the sun. Let there be a thing as to which one saith, Behold this; it is new: it hath been long ago in the olden time which was before us" (i. 9, 10).

The evidence just given is perhaps sufficiently clear and conclusive. Scarcely less cogent is the accordance of our book with the Stoic doctrine that folly is madness; that fools are mad. And in the class of fools, and consequently of madmen, the Stoics included all except the philosophers, the truly wise (see Horace, *Sat.* ii. 3; Diog. Laert. vii. 124). Thus we read, "I gave my heart to know wisdom and knowledge, *madness and folly*" (i. 17); "And I turned to behold wisdom, and *madness and folly*" (ii. 12); "I proceeded, I and my heart, to know, and to explore, and to seek out wisdom and a plan, and to know *the depravity of obduracy and folly, even madness*" (vii. 25). The "madness" thus spoken of as opposed to wisdom, and associated with folly, or identified with it, is manifestly not mental derangement or insanity; and the way in which the word is used is perplexing or inexplicable till we apply the Stoic doctrine above mentioned. This gives us an easy solution of the difficulty. Indeed, to some readers the way in which the word "madness" is employed may possibly appear to yield more striking and conclusive proof of Stoic influence than that previously adduced relating to the Stoic moral law and the doctrine of the cycles.

The evidence thus furnished as to the date of Ecclesiastes is greatly strengthened when we find evidence, not only of the influence of Stoicism, but also of the contrasted, though

contemporary, doctrine of Epicureanism. Two passages may be selected in which the influence of Epicureanism is especially noteworthy—iii. 18—22, and v. 18—20. The first passage may be given thus :

I said in my heart, with respect to mankind, God meaneth to test them, and to see that they are beasts, even they themselves; for the lot of mankind is also the lot of beasts, and there is one lot to them. As is the death of the one, so is the death of the other; and there is one spirit to them all, and pre-eminence of man over the beasts there is none; for they are all vanity. All are going to one place: all were from the dust; and all are returning to the dust. Who knoweth as to the spirit of mankind, whether it goeth up on high, or as to the spirit of the beasts, whether it goeth down beneath to the earth? And I saw that there is nothing better than that man should be glad in his works, for that is his portion; for who will bring him to look upon what will be after him?

In this passage we have the Epicurean denial of man's immortality expressed with a good deal of emphasis. Men are but as beasts. All alike have come from the dust, and are returning to the dust. God has no special regard for man, whose only portion is the enjoyment which he can obtain while his fleeting life continues; none will bring him back again to behold the world as it will be after he is gone. But the Epicurean character of this passage becomes most clearly apparent when it is compared with the Stoical teaching of the two verses (iii. 16, 17) which immediately precede, and with which the sequel, as just quoted, comes into sharp opposition :

And further, I saw under the sun the place of judgment, there was wickedness; and the place of righteousness, there was wickedness. I said in my heart, God will judge the righteous and the wicked; for there is a season for every matter, and for all the work, *there*.

These verses manifestly set forth the Stoic conception of an order in Nature to which man is required to conform in

"all the work" that he executes. This order being divinely appointed, it naturally follows that disobedience and failure to observe it will be followed by judgment and punishment. The author is manifestly looking back to the Catalogue of Times and Seasons as embodying and exemplifying the course of Nature. It is to this that the final word "there" refers. "There is a season for every matter, and for all the work, *there*." This is shown also by his again using in part the very formula which he had employed to introduce the Catalogue: "There is a season for every matter." In contrast with this Stoical view of the world and man, the Epicurean character of the verses following becomes more clearly apparent.

The second passage above cited, v. 18—20, not only gives the Epicurean idea of life, but also introduces at the end what may be called an Epicurean technicality, which, in some sort, may be placed on a level with the Stoical identification of folly and madness already mentioned :

Lo, that is what I have seen good, what I have seen suitable, to eat and to drink, and to experience enjoyment in respect of all one's toil which he toileth under the sun, during the number of the days of his life which God hath given him ; for that is his portion. Also as to every man to whom God hath given wealth and treasures, and hath given to him power to eat therefrom, and to receive his portion, and to rejoice in respect of his toil ; as to this, it is the gift of God, so that *he remembereth not much the days of his life, for God is making answer to the joy of his heart.*

The "not remembering much the days of one's life," as they glide on calmly and peacefully, answers perfectly to the Epicurean *ἀταραξία*, the perfect tranquillity which it was especially the object of the Epicurean philosophy to secure. But the concluding words, which are above translated, "God is making answer to the joy of his heart," have been in time past a source of no small perplexity to the commentators. There is, however, one special Epicurean notion

which throws a very remarkable light upon them. It was supposed by the Epicureans that the fitness of things involved a balance or analogy between gods and men. The felicity of the gods consisted in a tranquillity and calm enjoyment like that which it was the object of the Epicurean philosophy to attain. The Epicurean gods lived the life of philosophers. The Epicurean philosophers lived as gods among men. Gods and men might thus be spoken of as harmonious or responsive choirs. And in this way we get an easy explanation of the perplexing words, "God is making answer to the joy of his heart." Taken together with the previous representation of Epicurean tranquillity in what is said just before of the "not remembering much the days of his life," the evidence of Epicurean influence becomes extremely cogent and convincing.

With regard to the fact of Epicureanism being introduced among the Jews, there is corroborative evidence of no small importance. The name "Epicureans" was of not very infrequent use, appearing even in the Mishnah. In one passage (*Berakoth* ix. 5) we are told that the Epicureans corrupted the Jewish faith, asserting that there is but one world. Perhaps still more important is the account given of Antigonus of Socho in *Aboth* i. 3. This Antigonus, who, it would appear, lived in the third century B.C., is the first Jew of whom we have any knowledge as bearing a Greek name. He is also particularly distinguished as having taught that men should not serve God like hirelings impelled by the hope of a reward. Another account (*Aboth of R. Nathan*) connects Antigonus with the Sadducees, through his two disciples, Boëthus and Zadok. These disciples are said to have reiterated the teaching of Antigonus—a course pursued, moreover, by successive generations of disciples; whence it arose that, in the course of time, the future state and the resurrection of the dead were called in question. The resemblance between Epicureanism and the doctrine of the

Sadducees is sufficiently obvious; and it is remarkable that the Sadducean teaching is connected genealogically with a Jew bearing a Greek name, and living, moreover, just about the time that Epicurus was founding and establishing his sect of the Garden, namely, in the first half of the third century. The Sadducean denial of immortality in Ecclesiastes, taken together with the historical indications just mentioned, is quite in accordance with the position that the Book was written at the end of the third century, or about 200 B.C., though alone it would not fix this date.

A very powerful argument in favour of this date is furnished, however, by the fact that the book, with its indications of Greek influence, thus comes into accord with the known facts of Jewish history, and especially with the outburst of Hellenism which occurred in the time of Antiochus Epiphanes; when Greek customs of various kinds were adopted; and when the priests themselves were so affected by the Hellenising mania as to disregard even their ministrations in the Temple. We are too much inclined, perhaps, to think of Epiphanes as thrusting on the reluctant Jews new ideas and new customs. It is a better supported opinion, and one which, apart from direct evidence, would not be improbable, that the king was encouraged in his enterprise, or stimulated to it, by the sympathies of a portion of the people, and by no means an inconsiderable one, already pervaded by the Hellenising spirit, and anxious to sweep away and abolish customs and institutions which had now become distasteful. (See 1 Macc. i. 11—13.)

Jewish history presents us also, in the Maccabean war, with a limiting boundary, after which it becomes unlikely that Ecclesiastes would have been written. Subsequently to this powerful conservative reaction such an exhibition of Stoic and Epicurean philosophy would scarcely have been made. At least, the outward form of the book would have been, we may well believe, a good deal modified. Greek

thought, no doubt, had obtained too firm a lodgment in Judaism to be driven out even by the Maccabean reaction. But such thought, as it appears in Ecclesiastes, seems to be still in great part on the outside, or at least not to have been as yet fully incorporated and assimilated. But, if this view is just, we may with probability place the date of the book at some time previous to the accession of Epiphanes, though not very far distant, or, as before mentioned, about 200 B.C.

There is, however, another important aid towards determining the date furnished by the indications of acquaintance with Ecclesiastes to be found in Ecclesiasticus. One of the most remarkable of these is furnished by a comparison of Ecclesiastes vii. 13—15 with Ecclesiasticus xxxiii. 13—15. The first-cited passage may be given thus:—

Behold the work of God; for who can straighten what He hath made crooked? In the day of good enjoy thyself, but in the day of evil behold. God indeed hath set the one over against the other, because man findeth nothing after him. I saw all in the days of my vanity; there is a righteous man perishing in his righteousness, and there is a wicked man prolonging his life in his wickedness.

And the passage from Ecclesiasticus:—

As a potter's clay in his hand—all its ways according to his good pleasure—so men in the hand of Him who made them, to render to them according to His judgment. Opposite to evil is good, and opposite to death is life; so opposite to a pious man a sinner. And so look at all the works of the Highest—two and two, one over against another.

At first sight the resemblance may not appear so very striking, though it may become convincing when the two passages are more fully pondered. Both passages are concerned with the same subject; the earthly condition of men, and the dispensations of Providence. "Behold the work of God," in the one, answers to "look at all the works of

the Highest" in the other. The first passage speaks of the impossibility of straightening what God hath made crooked, while the second compares the Divine control over human destiny to the power of the potter over the clay which he moulds "according to his good pleasure." In Ecclesiastes "the day of evil" is contrasted to "the day of good." In Ecclesiasticus we have "opposite to evil is good." A more subtle analogy may be detected by comparing what is said in the one passage of the "righteous man perishing" and the "wicked man prolonging his life" with the words of the other, "opposite to death is life, so opposite to a pious man a sinner." In the one passage the righteous man perishes, while the sinner prolongs his life; in the other, taking the words in the order of their occurrence, "death" in the one clause corresponds to "a pious man" in the other, and "life" to "a sinner." For this seemingly inverted order the comparison of the two passages gives a probable reason. But perhaps the most important resemblance is seen when the words of Ecclesiastes, "God indeed hath set the one over against the other," are compared with the concluding words of the passage from Ecclesiasticus, "Look at all the works of the Highest—two and two, one over against another." The words of Ecclesiasticus appear as if, in part, a direct translation from the Hebrew of Ecclesiastes.

This resemblance—and other instances might be adduced in corroboration—points to the conclusion that Ecclesiastes was already in existence when Ecclesiasticus was written. We may place the composition of Ecclesiasticus approximately at 180 B.C., before the Maccabean war. The date of Ecclesiastes will have to be placed between this time and the origin and diffusion of Stoicism and Epicureanism. Probably no date can be found more likely, and answering better to all the conditions, than that already mentioned, about 200 B.C.

With respect to the influence of Greek thought on Ecclesiastes, Dr. Plumptre goes considerably beyond what has been said above. Thus he says at p. 32, "It is throughout absolutely saturated with Greek thought and language." In support of this position Dr. Plumptre adduces numerous references; but the Catalogue of the Times and Seasons of iii. 1—8, he refers, not to the Stoic moral law, "Live conformably to Nature," but rather to the Greek sense of seasonableness and opportuneness. It seems, however, pretty conclusive against Dr. Plumptre's opinion, that acting unseasonably is spoken of as "wickedness," and as exposing the delinquent to the Divine judgment (iii. 16, 17). Here there is evidently something involved a good deal deeper than an æsthetic avoidance of the indecorous and unseemly. Dr. Plumptre considers, on the whole, that the evidence of Greek influence "compels us to admit that the book could not well have been written before the schools of the Garden and the Porch had obtained a prominent position—i.e., not earlier than B.C. 250." This evidence, taken together with other indications, brings Dr. Plumptre to the conclusion that Ecclesiastes was written between B.C. 240 and B.C. 181—that is, about B.C. 200.*

II.

What is the meaning of the name Koheleth?

The name Koheleth, which the Authorised Version translates by "the Preacher," has given rise to most divergent explanations. Dr. Graetz, in despair, apparently, of finding

* This conclusion regarding the date of Ecclesiastes, based on the relation of the book to Ecclesiasticus, and the manifest influence upon it of the Stoic and Epicurean philosophies, was given by the present writer in a pamphlet, entitled *Some New Evidence as to the Date of Ecclesiastes* (1872); and afterwards more fully in a commentary on the book, with the title, *Ecclesiastes; A Contribution to its Interpretation, containing an Introduction to the Book; an Exegetical Analysis; and a Translation with Notes*. (London: Williams and Norgate, 1874.) His obligation to this work Dr. Plumptre very handsomely acknowledges.

any sense suitable to his Herodian hypothesis, admitted the possibility of its being a sort of nickname. Interpreters generally regard the word as expressing the idea of collecting, or of convening, or addressing an assembly. But to regard the word as meaning the Collector, or the Convener, is not in harmony with grammatical requirements; and we cannot arrive at the sense "one addressing an assembly," or "the Preacher," by any process which can be fairly sustained. Dr. Plumptre changes "the Preacher" into "the Debater," and attains this meaning not directly from the Hebrew, but through the rendering of the Greek and Latin versions, *Ecclesiastes*. He supposes that the word *Koheleth*, which is found only in this book, and nowhere else in the Bible, "was coined because the writer wanted a word more significant and adapted to his aim than any with which his native speech supplied him; *possibly, indeed, because he wanted a word corresponding to one in a foreign language that was thus significant.*" It would thus seem, in Dr. Plumptre's view, that the author of our book first thought of the Greek ἐκκλησιαστής, and then formed, as a translation of it, the Hebrew *Koheleth*. But this suggestion, however ingenious, would be, under any circumstances, too purely hypothetical to be readily admitted. If, however, we waive this objection, it must still be apparent that, to a writer having a considerable familiarity with the Greek language, and who wished to express the idea of one speaking, debating, or questioning, other words would, without much difficulty, suggest themselves which would suit his purpose much better than ἐκκλησιαστής. An ἐκκλησιαστής was "a man of an assembly," "a member of an assembly," though not necessarily a speaker, orator, or debater. But assent can scarcely be given either to Dr. Plumptre's explanation or to his method of attaining it. We must, on the contrary, begin with the Hebrew, which the Greek, in accordance with the common exigencies of

translation, may or may not fully represent. The true view of the matter appears to be this: *Koheleth* is a participle, but, like various other verbal forms, it is what grammarians call *denominative*, or derived from a noun, the noun in this case being *kahal*, "an assembly." *Koheleth* may thus be translated, "one who is an assembly." This explanation may seem at first sight strange and improbable; but it is open to no valid objection on grammatical grounds; and it has the great advantage of exactly suiting, or even being required by, certain important and perplexing phenomena which the book presents. Throughout the book, from i. 2 to xii. 8, the discourse of one speaker only is reported. Thus, in a passage already cited (iii. 16, 17), *Koheleth* said in his heart that God will judge the righteous and the wicked; and immediately afterwards we are told that *Koheleth* also said in his heart that men are but beasts, like them coming from the dust, and returning to the dust. The variety of opinions expressed has given rise to the opinion that the book contains the report of a discussion in a learned or philosophical assembly. But, in accordance with what has been said, we certainly have, from i. 2 to xii. 8, the words of *one* *Koheleth*. The solution of the difficulty is to be found in regarding *Koheleth* as a personified assembly. This explanation allows the required combination of unity with variety and multiplicity. Many philosophers, Stoic, Epicurean, and others, speak by the mouth of the one *Koheleth*.* *Koheleth*, moreover, as a collective unity, as

* Dr Kuenen, writing in the Leiden *Theologisch Tijdschrift*, in a generally favourable *critique* on the present writer's *Ecclesiastes*, yet strongly objected to the explanation given of the name *Koheleth*. If the name in question, an active participle, meant "an assembly," what, asks Dr. Kuenen, must have been the sense of the preterite *kahal*? It may be replied that if, in accordance with the explanation given, *Koheleth* meant "one who is an assembly," or "she who is an assembly"—if it were of any use to do so—there would be no difficulty in suggesting a congruous sense for the preterite as a denominative. If in Isa. xviii. 6 *kuts* and *kharaph* mean, as denominatives, "to pass the summer," and "to pass the autumn or winter," in neither case is this the normal and radical sense.

personifying an assemblage of philosophers, becomes a personification of Wisdom or Philosophy in the concrete; and Wisdom thus conceived of, as a collective unity, was identified also with the great King Solomon, whose comprehensive intellect may thus have been regarded as having embraced all the wisdom of the philosophical Koheleth—as having been a sort of microcosm of Philosophy. This identification was probably suggested by the fact that in “The Proverbs of Solomon” it appears to be now Solomon and now Wisdom that is represented as speaking (Prov. i.—ix.), if, indeed, the utterances of Wisdom and Solomon can be always distinguished.

The view thus given of the name Koheleth is not, however, in accordance with Dr. Plumptre's opinion that the book contains an autobiographical confession; that it is a record of its author's personal experience; and that seeming contradictions indicate oscillations of sentiment and opinion, by which his struggle towards truth was marked and accompanied. This view, previously presented by Dr. Plumptre in Smith's ‘Dictionary of the Bible,’ is now given anew with great amplitude of illustration in the Introduction and Notes of his Commentary. It has been so modified, moreover, that it meets, to some extent, an objection which had been urged by the present writer, that, “if the author of Ecclesiastes had never been ‘king over Israel in Jerusalem,’ if he had never lived in that princely magnificence described in the second chapter, we cannot, with any approach to certainty, determine that we have elsewhere only a record of his personal experience” (*Ecclesiastes*, &c., p. 49). We have now, in the third chapter of Dr. Plumptre's Introduction, a skilfully-drawn “Ideal Biography” of the author of Ecclesiastes. Dr. Plumptre meets by anticipation “the charge of evolving a biography out of one's inner consciousness,” by asserting that the veil which the author of Ecclesiastes has thrown over his character is so slight “that

the task of portraying the lineaments that lie beneath is comparatively easy." There is reason to fear, however, that Dr. Plumptre will scarcely avoid the charge of making not infrequent excursions into "the cloudland of imagination," to use his own expression.

Koheleth, we are told, was the only son of wealthy parents living in a country town in Judæa. In the synagogue school of the town he received the usual rudimentary education. He had little sympathy with his mother, who came under the influence of a coterie of hypocritical pretenders to piety. Advancing onward from childhood he was required by his father to take part in the labours of the cornfield and the vineyard, days spent in which he afterwards looked back upon regretfully. As he grew up to manhood, however, he became dissatisfied, and, wishing to see the world, directed his steps to Alexandria. He had obtained from his father a large share of property, which "enabled him to surround himself with a certain magnificence; and he kept before himself the ideal of a glory like that of Solomon's." Like the prodigal son of the parable, "he wasted his substance in riotous living, and devoured his wealth with harlots." Such a life naturally tended to "the bitterness of a cynical satiety." He hated life itself, declared it to be intolerable, yet shrank from death. But "the utter weariness and satiety, the mood of a *blasé* pessimism into which he fell, was as the first stepping-stone to higher things." For the time, however, his despondency was deepened by the falsehood of a woman whom he had loved "with a passion fiery and fond as that of Catullus for Lesbia." But he was saved from despair by the influence of a faithful Israelite, who proved himself "one of a thousand." Still his heart-wound was not easily healed; and to quiet his perturbed heart and intellect he betook himself to the stores of Greek literature and philosophy which were available to all students in the Alexandrian

Library. He imbibed pessimism from the Greek poets, and found their utterances in accordance with his own feelings. But it was the works of the Stoic and Epicurean philosophers that he studied with the greatest eagerness. Eventually, however, he made choice of Epicureanism, though, as carried into practice by him, the Epicurean system would seem to have led to somewhat unusual results (see pp. 48, 49). From the Library of Alexandria, Koheleth passed to the Museum, and enjoyed the high honour of becoming "a member of the august body who dined in its large hall at the public expense, and held their philosophical discussions afterwards." Here Epicureans and Stoics, Platonists and Aristotelians met; and in this *ecclesia*, he became an *ecclesiastes*, or *debater*. Under these conditions, though the gold was still debased by much alloy, Koheleth found life brighter and more cheerful than before. He even looked forward to domestic felicity, with wife and children around him. But the dream was not to be realised. Pleasure and revelry, study and debate, had drained so far the springs of life that "there crept over him the slow decay of a premature old age; of the paralysis which, while it leaves consciousness clear, and the brain free to think and muse over many things, attacks first one organ of sense or action and then another." The "days of darkness" were many, the "long struggle with disease" continuing some six or seven years. There were, moreover, additional sources of disquietude. He had no son to inherit his estate; and the deep draughts he had taken from the fountain of Greek philosophy did not prevent his being a good deal troubled about the place and conditions of his burial. His faithful Israelite friend continued, however, to visit him, and partly, it would appear, as the result of his influence, Koheleth experienced "a religious reaction." "The voice within once more spoke in clearer notes than ever." The old faith reasserted itself. And now, notwithstanding

standing his weakness, he was induced "to put on record the results of his experience." Regardless of fame, he composed his book under the pseudonym of Koheleth. And as other writers had employed the names of Aristotle, and Plato, and Hippocrates, so he thought himself justified in speaking in the character of Solomon—a character for which, indeed, the magnificent surroundings amid which he had lived had in some sort prepared him. "He still thought in the language of his fatherland, and therefore in that language he wrote."* "The close of the book all but coincided with the close of life." After his death the book was "brought by the grandson of Sirach, or some other seeker after truth, from Alexandria to Palestine, and translated by him into Greek."

Dr. Plumptre's biographical edifice displays no small amount of artistic skill; though to take a just view of it the reader must see it for himself in Dr. Plumptre's pages. But, after all, there is reason to feel some regret that it has been composed. It may be doubted whether it will advance the interpretation of Ecclesiastes. Of the several particulars and incidents of which the ideal biography consists, few, at most, can be regarded as probable; and a biography woven from possibilities is of little avail. We are to take it, for example, that Koheleth was an only son, because in iv. 8 it is said, "There is one, but there is not a second; moreover, he hath neither son nor brother." It is difficult to see how the required sense can be attained. With as much, or as little, probability he may be considered as having been one of a very numerous family, since we read in iv. 16, "There is no end to all the people." His parents were wealthy; probably because of the wealth and magnificence described in the second chapter. It would be quite as likely that he was born of poor parents, and had

* But ought not the Book in this case to have been written in Aramean, and not in Hebrew?

suffered severely from the strain of poverty, the *res angusta domi*, because we have brought before us in the ninth chapter "a poor wise man" who was neglected and despised. And so we might go on. The fact is, that, treated in this way, the verses of Ecclesiastes become a good deal like the fragments of glass in a kaleidoscope, which may be made to assume an almost endless diversity of forms.

Does the philosophical portion of the book (i. 2 to xii. 8), exhibit on the whole a gradual advance towards a firmer faith? In opposition to the view of Dr. Plumptre, the present writer would be disposed to answer this question decidedly in the negative. If a gradual advance is manifest at all, it is an advance in scepticism, and in dissatisfaction with the state of things in the world. Thus in viii. 14, it is said that "there are righteous men to whom it happeneth according to the work of the wicked," implying that this occurs in the case of only *some* righteous men. But in ix. 2 we read, "All is alike to all: there is one lot to the righteous and to the wicked." And so near the end of the book as xi. 9, the Stoical law of the Times and Seasons, which had been previously set forth as foreboding judgment to the unjust and wicked, comes to be so applied, as under a similar sanction, to enjoin indulgence in youthful pleasure, thus outstripping even Epicureanism. Moreover, the picture of old age in chap. xii. seems too gloomy and appalling to suit such a view as Dr. Plumptre's, notwithstanding the poetical power with which the picture is coloured. And as to the future state, while xi. 8 points apparently to the shadowy and insubstantial condition of the dead in Hades, described by the classic poets, xii. 7, would seem—in accordance with a form of Stoical opinion—to denote the re-absorption of the soul into the Deity, as the dust mingles again with the earth.

An important question is, however, started by Dr. Plumptre

with regard to the influence on our book of Alexandria, and the contact between Judaism and Greek thought which occurred in that city. This question may be viewed apart from Dr. Plumptre's Alexandrian life of Koheleth. If Alexandrianism exercised at the time a potent influence on the Judaism of the fatherland, this influence may well have been extended to Ecclesiastes. But, to judge from such memorials of Judæo-Alexandrian literature as have come down to us, it may be confidently declared that Ecclesiastes was not a product of the Alexandrian School, but that its affinities are with Palestinian Rabbinism. On the whole, the book looks towards the Talmud, and not towards Philo, or Aristobulus, of Maccabean times; and it is, perhaps, more likely that the Stoicism and Epicureanism which appear in the book have come from Greece through Asia Minor than through Egypt.

Regarding, then, as inadequate to explain the phenomena of the book the idea that it presents a varied personal experience, with great oscillations of thought and sentiment, it appears to the present writer the only probable opinion that Koheleth is, as already stated, the personification of an imaginary assemblage of philosophers, Stoics, Epicureans, and others, and that this idea is represented by the name.

It has been already intimated that to Luther is due the honour of a pioneer in calling in question the Solomonic authorship of Ecclesiastes. The great reformer also in his *Table-talk* assigned the book to the time of the Maccabees, connecting its origin with the Alexandrian Library; a suggestion which, as we have seen, Dr. Plumptre has followed. Luther seems also to have detected the composite character of the book, its being the voice, as it were, of an assembly, for he speaks of it as being "like a Talmud, brought together out of many books." Whether or not Luther suspected that Talmudic tendency of the book which will be adverted to in the sequel, the expression *wie ein Talmud*, taken

together with what is said in the context on the abrupt style of Ecclesiastes, seems to point to something beyond the variety by which the book is characterised.

III.

Is the so-called Epilogue an integral part of the Book, or a later addition?

The Epilogue may be given thus :—

And moreover, since Koheleth was wise, he still further taught the people knowledge; and he paid attention, and investigated; he set in order many proverbs. Koheleth sought to find pertinent words, and what was written was right, words of truth. The words of wise men are like goads, and those of the editors of collections, like nails driven in: they were given by one Shepherd. And further, be admonished, my son, by these; as to the making of many books there is no end; and much close study is a wearying of the flesh.

The conclusion of the discourse, the universal law, let us hear. Fear God, and keep His commandments; for this is the universal law for man. For God will bring all the work into judgment,* concerning everything hidden, whether it be good or whether it be evil (xii. 9—14).

Dr. Plumptre, however, assents to the opinion of those who regard the Epilogue as beginning with verse 8—"Vanity of vanities, said Koheleth; all is vanity." The chief, or longer, portion of the book thus ends with what is said, in verse 7, of the spirit returning to God who gave it. And indeed, if Dr. Plumptre and others were right in their opinion that what is thus said declares or implies the doctrine of personal immortality, the "vanity of vanities" might seem a good deal out of place, tacked on so closely to the "return to God." But, on the other hand, what has the "vanity of vanities;

* Or, with a slight change in the pointing of the Hebrew, "For all God's work will He bring into judgment;" a rendering which, perhaps, accords better with what Koheleth had previously said of the anomalous and unintelligible condition of things in the world.

all is vanity," to do with what follows? If it be said that the Epilogist, whoever he may have been, prefixed this formula as summing up the teaching of Koheleth, how then, it may be asked, could this teaching end and culminate in a declaration of personal immortality? * The more reasonable opinion would seem to be that the words in question conclude the longer portion—the philosophical portion—of the book, and that they were added by the original author to reiterate what he had said at the beginning, and to give the outcome and result of the intervening discourse.

Obviously, however, if the discourse i. 2 to xii. 8 (or in Dr. Plumptre's opinion xii. 7) were an autobiographical confession written by Koheleth himself, then the Epilogue must be, in all probability, a later addition. The words, "And, moreover, since Koheleth was wise," can scarcely be regarded as written by Koheleth just after the self-revelation of his inner conflict and struggle towards truth. But the idea of such a self-revelation having been made need not be here further considered.

The fact that Koheleth in the Epilogue is *spoken of*, furnishes no valid objection to its having been written by the original author. Koheleth is spoken of, also, in the previous part of the book; as in i. 2, "Vanity of vanities, said Koheleth;" and in vii. 27, "See, this I found, said Koheleth," &c.; and where the words "said Koheleth" are not inserted, Koheleth and his experience are usually placed in the past. In fact, the discourse i. 2 to xii. 8 is, probably, to be taken as if it were the report of an oral discourse written out subsequently by Koheleth himself. In accordance with this fiction, the Epilogue may be regarded as written by the original author, as though editor of the work. Analogous examples from literature

* Dr. Plumptre's notes on xii. 7, 8 should be consulted. They are too long to be here transcribed. See also at p. 55, "'Return to God'—that was his last word on the great problem."

may suggest themselves to the reader without much difficulty.

There is still one other source of difficulty which requires particular mention. The exhortation to "fear God and keep His commandments," in ver. 13, seems to differ so very greatly from what has gone before, that considerable doubt may arise—at least, on a superficial view—as to the identity of authorship. The conclusion of the book, however, appears to have had great influence in preventing its being excluded from the Canon. And the Rabbins who decided on retaining it because of its ending with words of the Law were doubtless right. The relation of the conclusion to the previous discourse may be thus given. Having set forth the fruitlessness of philosophical investigation by exhibiting the contradictions in which such studies had resulted, the author concludes by giving the positive lesson for which the previous discourse was intended to prepare the reader. The injunction to fear God and observe His commandments is not introduced as given *by Koheleth*; and, indeed, if we are right in regarding Koheleth as a personification of Philosophy in the concrete, that is, of philosophers Stoic, Epicurean, and others, it will easily appear that the final injunction could scarcely come from the mouth of Koheleth. Possibly the conclusion may indicate, on the part of the author of Ecclesiastes, a recantation of Greek philosophy, and a renewed adherence to the Jewish law and ritual. But even such an inference as this with regard to the author's life cannot be looked upon as altogether certain. Admitting, as we must do, that the work is, to a large extent, a work of fiction, it is scarcely possible to determine the relative limits of fiction and of fact.

A strong argument in favour of the genuineness of the concluding verses, and of the unity of authorship, is furnished by the book being thus brought into harmony with the conditions of the period to which, as we have seen,

there are preponderant reasons for assigning it. If, in accordance with what has been already said, the book was intended to dissuade its readers from philosophical speculation, and to recall them to the ancient faith of Judaism, or to confirm those who were vacillating, such an intention is precisely what might be expected in a book written about 200 B.C., in opposition to Hellenistic tendencies already in vigorous operation, though these tendencies may not as yet have resulted in much outward apostasy. And, with regard to the view thus presented in Ecclesiastes concerning philosophical studies, it is important to observe that the presentation of philosophy is included within the circle of the "vanity of vanities; all is vanity," formed by i. 2, and xii. 8.

An objection may, however, be drawn from the seeming disproportion which would thus arise between the extended philosophical discourse (i. 2 to xii. 8), and the brief religious exhortation of xii. 13, 14. And it may be said that Koheleth's presentation of philosophic doctrines is characterised by too much of impressiveness, by too intense earnestness and self-devotion, to allow of our thinking that his intention was merely to warn his readers against the study of philosophy, and then to recommend the sacrifice of the intellect. Had he been an enemy of all philosophical study, he would not have sent forth his philosophical arguments like brazen knights in armour of dazzling brightness, so that he might come at last to so poor a conclusion, and one, moreover, which he himself had previously done so much to contradict and refute.*

This objection is specious, and may seem at first of no small weight. But with regard to the vivid interest

* So Dr. Siegfried, in a review of the writer's commentary on Ecclesiastes, in Hilgenfeld's *Zeitschrift*, though in other important respects Dr. Siegfried expresses his assent to the opinions set forth in that work, as with regard to the influence of the Stoic and Epicurean philosophies on Ecclesiastes, and the meaning of the name Koheleth.

seemingly manifested in philosophical doctrines, this may be accounted for, if the author of Ecclesiastes had previously been a warm adherent of one of the philosophical sects. A further and fuller answer to the objection is, however, to be found in what may be called the Talmudic tendency of Ecclesiastes. Closely connected, as the book appears certainly to have been, with the learning of the Jewish schools, it shows already in its language—to an extent exhibited by no other of the Biblical books—an affinity with the Hebrew of the Mishnah. This tendency towards Mishnic Hebrew is to be seen in a marked manner in the last verse but one (xii. 13), where the words of the original translated above, "this is the universal law," admit, apparently, of no reasonable or probable explanation, till they are viewed in the light of that very frequent formula of the Mishnah *zeh hakkelal*, meaning, "this is the general principle," or, "this is the universal law," and used to introduce the law or principle by the enunciation of which a discussion is commonly closed. And the unexpectedness of the transition in Ecclesiastes, together with the seeming want of balance, is quite in accordance with the characteristics of the Talmud. The Talmudists delight, apparently, to surprise the reader by a sudden transition, and to task his ingenuity in discerning a subtle thread of connection. The late Emanuel Deutsch observed in his celebrated essay on the Talmud, "We can understand the distress of mind in a mediæval divine, or even in a modern *savant*, who, bent upon following the most subtle windings of some scientific debate in the Talmudical pages—geometrical, botanical, financial, or otherwise—as it revolves round the Sabbath journey, the raising of seeds, the computation of tithes and taxes—feels, as it were, the ground suddenly give way, the loud voices grow thin, the doors and walls of the schoolroom vanish before his eyes, and in their place uprises Rome the Great, the Urbs et Orbis, and her million-voiced life. Or

the blooming vineyards round that other City of Hills, Jerusalem the Golden herself, are seen, and white clad virgins move dreamily among them." The transition in Ecclesiastes is of a different nature; but though such, perhaps, as to give no small disappointment to the philosophical student, yet it may be doubted whether we are justified in regarding the closing verses as a poor conclusion.

Viewed in relation to the Talmud, not only is an explanation found for the abrupt transitions of Ecclesiastes, but also for its love of enigma and its uneven style. Moreover, the sacrifice of the intellect, so far as this is implied in observance of the law without philosophical inquiry as to its inner meaning and intention—"the spirit" lying beneath "the letter"—this was, on the whole, especially characteristic of Talmudic Judaism, the tendency towards which already in Ecclesiastes exists in the germ. But, with regard to the injunction, "Fear God and keep His commandments," it is not easy to define precisely the significance, so as to infer from it what view the author of Ecclesiastes took of the Mosaic law and, it may be added, of the Prophets. There are, however, in our book some probable indications that, in interpreting the Biblical narratives, the allegorical method was sometimes employed, whether from real or supposed difficulties connected with the direct and literal interpretation, or from whatever other cause. On this subject, the present writer has said elsewhere, "It would certainly appear probable that we have in vii. 26 a generalised application of the account of Samson and Delilah in Judges xvi. Instead of Delilah and her wiles, we have 'the woman who as to her heart is nets and snares.' The binding of Samson is represented by, 'whose hands are bonds;' his escape at first, while he retained his Nazariteship, by 'he who is pleasing to God will escape from her;' his being taken by

the Philistines when his locks had been shorn, and the LORD had departed from him, by 'the sinner will be caught by her;' and the words, '*I find a more bitter thing than death*' represent the voluntary death by which Samson finally escapes from Delilah and her pernicious wiles. So in v. 1 we have, apparently, a reference to Samuel's rebuke of Saul after the defeat of Agag. But instead of *Saul* not intending to do wrong, we have a general statement respecting '*fools* offering a sacrifice, though they mean not to do evil.' Similarly in vi. 10, *Adam* 'of the earth, earthy,' according to the narrative in Gen. ii., is taken to represent the nature of man in general. And probably in the same verse there is a similar generalised application of what is said concerning the antediluvians in Gen. vi. 3."* Such a tendency to the allegorical would afford an additional mark of affinity with the Talmud.

Attention must be directed, however, to another matter of considerable importance in its bearing on the relation of Ecclesiastes to the Law and the Prophets, and also on the significance of the concluding verses. The Mosaic legislation was supported by sanctions of earthly good and evil. The righteous and obedient were to enjoy worldly success and prosperity, while calamities were to overtake and overwhelm the disobedient and wicked. These promises and threatenings did not appear, however, to be uniformly fulfilled, if we may take as evidence what is said by the Psalmists (Ps. xxxvii.; lxxiii.). And the Book of Job is occupied with the same subject, though, at least ostensibly, its scene lies outside the theocracy. But the difficulty was met by the allegation that the prosperity of the wicked and the calamity and suffering of the righteous were but for a season. In the end the normal order would prevail. The tempted and suffering Job becomes at last far more pros-

* Tyler's *Ecclesiastes*, pp. 54, 55.

perous than before his temptation. Koheleth states the difficulty very broadly:—

For I laid all this to heart, even to investigate all this, that the righteous and the wise, and their works, are in the hand of God, yet men discern neither love nor hatred in all that is before them. All is alike to all: there is one lot to the righteous and to the wicked, to the good and to the pure, and to him that is defiled, and to him who sacrificeth, and to whom who sacrificeth not: as is the good man, so is the sinner; he who sweareth, as he who feareth an oath (ix. 1, 2).

The difficulty could not easily be removed by the suggestion that the rule was uniformly observed in the very early times of the theocracy, though subsequently it had not been regarded, for it was reiterated by the prophets, and declared about as emphatically as ever, even after the captivity (see Haggai i. 6—11; ii. 16—19). Malachi stated it apparently with some reserve, looking forward to a day of retribution, possibly beyond the range of earthly life (Mal. iii. 16—18).^{*} Koheleth, in viii. 12, 13, gives substantially the old explanation, that, notwithstanding present appearances, "it will be well with those who fear God," but that "it will not be well with the wicked man," who will not prolong his earthly life to the extreme limit. But this explanation does not seem to be given in Ecclesiastes as having greater authority than the dicta of Stoics and Epicureans. Indeed, in relation to this subject we are advancing on ground occupied, also, more or less by the Greek philosophers. The injunction, "Fear God and keep His commandments," will thus stand opposed to all speculations about the moral government of God, the course of Providence, and the distribution of earthly good and evil. The utterances of the Law and Prophets on the subject were probably to be regarded as hidden mysteries, which should not interfere with practical obedience. But it would appear from xii. 14 that a future

^{*} Comp. Kuenen, *Prophets and Prophecy in Israel*, p. 355, seq.

judgment was to be looked for, when everything hidden as to the work of God in the world is to be reviewed, in order to its justification, though the manner in which this final adjustment and rectification is to be made is not stated.

In bringing to a conclusion the discussion of our third question, it may be affirmed that there appears no valid reason whatever for cutting off the Epilogue, or attributing it to a later hand. On this matter Dr. Ginsburg has said, "As to the assertion that verses 9—14 are not genuine, and have been added by a later hand (Döderlein, Schmidt, Berthold, Umbreit, Knobel, &c.), it is most arbitrary, and to be repudiated. Nothing can be more weak than the arguments brought to support this allegation."*

To Dr. Plumptre's exegetical notes we may possibly have an opportunity of referring hereafter in connection with M. Renan's work on Ecclesiastes, which is understood to have been now some time in the hands of the printer.

THOMAS TYLER.

. The anticipatory publication of M. Renan's Introduction in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* enables us to append his answers to the three questions discussed above. (1) He is inclined to place the origin of the Book at about a hundred years before Christ. (2) The name Koheleth, which he regards as an unsolved enigma, he represents by the four letters QHLT. These letters, he suggests, may be the initials of four words now unknown. This suggestion scarcely needs refutation, since M. Renan admits that the letters in question form in the text of Ecclesiastes a veritable name, and that the ordinary pronunciation, as represented by the vowel-points, is probably that intended by the author himself. (3) With regard to the Epilogue M. Renan acts in a very arbitrary manner, cutting it in two between xii. 10 and 11, and allowing only the ninth and tenth verses to be genuine.

M. Renan traces the genesis of Ecclesiastes to a supposed fundamental Semitic Monotheism, which required that the Deity should reward the good and punish the bad. But this theory came directly into collision

* Ginsburg's *Cohleleth*, p. 470.

with the hard facts of Nature and human society. Nature is but injustice (*La nature est l'injustice même*); and Society is very little better than a reflection of Nature. Faith in a compensating immortality had not yet emerged in Israel. This faith it was to be the function of Christianity to evolve. Ecclesiastes marks a pause in the struggle and evolution. Its author knows nothing of Messianic hopes, nothing really of a life beyond the grave. Though not an atheist, he may be regarded as a fatalist, a materialist, and, above all, a pessimist far superior to Schopenhauer. He is resigned to fate, and teaches a moderate Epicureanism; but it is by no means certain that this Epicureanism had any connection, either direct or indirect, with Greece. A complete explanation of everything in the book may be derived from the logical development of the Jewish thought with regard to the Deity and retribution, though the attempt has often been made to prove that the philosophy of Ecclesiastes bears a trace of the philosophy of Greece (*On a souvent cherché à prouver, &c.*)—a remark, by the way, fitted to convey a very false impression.

M. Renan's theory, however "logically developed," is, in several respects, a good deal out of harmony with facts. Will M. Renan reply, *D'autant pis pour les faits?*

T. T.

MATERIALISM.*

MATERIALISM is a system of thought which regards the universe, including man and the mind of man, as solely consisting of or produced by matter, or what is called "material force." The importance of such a doctrine cannot be over-estimated, since it apparently implies disbelief in the existence of God and in the moral freedom of man. God disappears in this system of thought as a needless hypothesis, whilst man is reduced to a mere effect of the powers of Nature. Such, at least, appear to me the logical results of the doctrine.

Yet it is certain that Materialism has been the philosophic creed of men, both in ancient and in modern times, whose aspirations were lofty, and whose lives were temperate, laborious, and serene; and to some of its professors it has seemed to be consistent, not only with a high morality, but even, strange to say, with strong religious feeling. A lively sense of the inadequacy of Materialism as a theory of the universe, and of its present mischievous tendencies, need not interfere with our appreciation of it as a necessary and often useful element in the historical development of philosophical opinion, and of science and the practical arts.

The great achievements of our time in the field of physical research, and more especially the brilliant induction connected with the name of Darwin, have, without doubt, largely contributed to the revival in the latter half of this

* A Lecture delivered before the Union Debating Society, Wellington, New Zealand.

century of materialistic habits of thought. What is called scientific explanation has penetrated to groups of phenomena hitherto enveloped in a mysterious darkness, more particularly in the department now called "Biology," which concerns itself with the development, structure, and functions of living organisms. Darwin's data are few, seemingly simple, and, for the most part, well established on the solid basis of experience; so that one is apt to forget that he postulates any force of which the origin is unknown. We learn how the eye has been developed from mere spots of pigment, and the honey-bee educated by circumstance to attain the perfect symmetry of her hexagonal cells; how monkeys have obtained prehensile tails, and giraffes have been provided, in the same organ, with special fly-flappers; why the orchid *Coryanthes* entraps the humble-bee, visiting its gigantic flowers, to a plunge-bath in its great water bucket; why the argus pheasant and peacock spread such glorious fans whilst their hens are soberly attired; why the glow-worm carries a light in her tail; how the torpedo came by his galvanic battery; with an endless list of like "whys" and "hows:" we read and are delighted—almost spell-bound; not only by the variety of Nature, but by the force and ingenuity of the human mind; and are prone to believe that the plummet of science has really touched bottom, and that the origin of all things in mere physical adjustments is at last on the point of demonstration.

Persons unused to philosophical inquiry may not be aware that the question of original causation is not even approached by the physical researches to which I have alluded. To many such it seems simple to say—"We take our stand upon experience; we believe what we know; we know what we can see, hear, touch, taste, smell. To us the world seems to go of itself. If any one will explain the origin of things without going beyond the limits of what we perceive through the senses, to him we will listen as proposing a

possible and a rational solution. No solution which transcends these limits, and resorts to the super-sensuous, is admissible."

But by the general consent of both the great divisions of modern philosophy, compliance with this demand is an impossibility. Those who are determined to ascend to the first cause of things, may, if they please, call themselves Materialists, but must needs transcend the limits of sensuous experience. Nature presents our outward senses with nothing more than a succession of appearances—phenomena. Suppose a line of billiard balls; and let the outermost be struck by another ball impelled by some unseen hand; the motion will be transmitted from ball to ball in regular succession until the force is spent by friction. No one would think in such a case of attributing the motion of any one ball to its immediate predecessor in the line of movement. It is plain that the balls are mere vehicles of force, and not originant causes. They are, as regards their movement, but links in a chain of effects, where each indeed stands in the relation of a cause to those that follow, but is at the same time the mere effect of all that precede. Physical nature presents to our senses precisely such a chain of successive effects, the originant cause of which is hidden from us. To the philosophic eye the world does not seem to go of itself. True, the phenomena follow one another in an invariable order. But unless we go behind phenomena, unless we carry our thought back to the unseen power—I myself should say to the unseen hand—which first set the machine in motion, and still keeps it moving, we learn nothing more than the order of events. "We only find," as Hume asserts, "that the one does actually in fact follow the other. . . . This is the whole that appears to the outward senses. . . . The scenes of the universe are continually shifting, and one object follows another in an uninterrupted succession; but the power or force which actuates the whole

machine is entirely concealed from us, and never discovers itself in any of the sensible qualities of body. . . In reality there is no part of matter that does ever by its sensible qualities discover any power or energy, or give us ground to imagine that it could produce anything, or be followed by any other object which we could denominate its effect." *

This is just one of the points on which the first impression of nearly every one will be against the doctrine of the philosophers; yet, if you will ponder the matter, remembering always that the question is as to what we know *by means of the outward senses*, you will, I think, be sure to agree in the end that Hume is in the right. When, indeed, experience has taught us that any natural occurrence has been invariably followed by some other, then, assuming as we all do in modern times the perfect uniformity of nature, we confidently expect that the appearance of the former event, whenever it occurs, will be infallibly followed by its regular consequence; and in common speech we couple the two together as cause and effect; though, if we reflect upon the matter, we easily perceive that the so-called cause is itself a mere effect of something antecedent. We must not delude ourselves with the metaphor of a self-acting machine, for, in truth, there is no such thing. No machine goes of itself, or is more than an arrangement for transmitting force—like the intermediate billiard balls. We may then take it as established, that the notion of producing cause or force is not given us by the senses, nor to be found in external nature, for this is the concurrent verdict of all the schools of modern philosophy. On this account, Hume and his followers, including Mill and Herbert Spencer, consistently maintain that the knowledge of a producing cause is beyond the scope of science. Knowledge of the order of phenomena is all that, in their opinion, is possible to the human intellect.

* Hume's *Inquiry concerning Human Understanding*. Section VII., 'Of the Idea of Necessary Connection.'

But despite the caveats of these philosophers, the dynamic idea, the notion of a force in nature, maintains its hold upon the human mind. We are impelled by an irresistible necessity to demand a cause of every occurrence. "By an irresistible law of thought all phenomena present themselves to us as the expression of power, and refer us to a causal ground whence they issue. This dynamic source [this origin of power] we neither see, nor hear, nor feel; it is given in *thought*—supplied by the spontaneous activity of the mind itself as the correlative prefix to [*i.e.*, inseparably coupled in the mind with] the phenomenon observed. By the general acknowledgment of philosophers this idea is so strictly a necessary idea as to be entirely irremovable from the conception of any change: to cut the tie between them, and think of phenomena as *not effects*, is impossible, in fact, even to the very writers who propose it in theory."* A productive power, though unrevealed to sense, must then be sought for behind the things produced. To revert to our well-worn illustration—the movement of the first billiard ball must be accounted for, or nothing is finally explained.

In one respect the backward search for the primal cause of all things has, of late, been made easier for the materialist, and a guess of ancient science has been confirmed. Modern experiment has taught us that the various effects ascribed to the supposed forces of matter are mutually interchangeable—that force arrested in one manifestation and seemingly absorbed, is not destroyed but transmuted. The old fable of Proteus, as has been often said, is exactly realised in nature as she appears to the eye of modern science. Bind her you cannot, for she forthwith reappears in a new shape. The motion of the smith's hammer, arrested by the anvil, sets the atoms vibrating and is

* *Essays Philosophical and Theological*. First Series. By JAMES MARTINEAU, p. 47. Trübner, 1866.

changed to heat; whilst heat in the furnace of the steam-engine results in molar motion. An electric current can be made to produce magnetism, and *vice versâ* magnetism to give rise to the phenomena of electricity. The galvanic current is an effect (in the physical sense) of chemical changes, and is also (in the same sense) a cause of them. Heat, electricity, radiant energy, and chemical action are mutually convertible, can all produce motion, and be, in turn, produced by it. More than this, there is reason to conjecture that the effects of force, differing as they do in their action on ourselves as sentient subjects, may be identical when considered in their own nature, or, as we say, *objectively*; and that all are resolvable into modes of motion. Such an objective identity with motion is considered to be already established in regard to light and heat. Motion appears the simplest effect of force, and everything points to the probable resolution of all other phases or effects of force into this one mode of manifestation. That accomplished, physical science will have verified the datum of Democritus. We shall have matter in motion, in void space, as the apparent beginning of physical things. There the science of nature must come to a stand; the investigation of phenomena can take us no further back. But behind the ultimate phenomenon of motion the materialist assumes a force as causing motion, and through motion, in its successive phases, producing all other phenomena. This force is supposed to reside in atoms, the ultimate particles of matter. In modes yet to be explained it leads on to combinations of ever-increasing complexity, and is displayed in higher and higher developments of power; rising from mechanical to chemical, from chemical to vital, from vital to mental manifestations. Without diminution or increase, by imperceptible gradations, it ascends through the infinite series of physical existence,—from the glowing hydrogen and nitrogen of

the incandescent Nebula to the light of reason in the brain of man. Such is the theory we have to deal with.

It will be seen that the Materialist herein agrees with the Theist, that he asserts, and, so to speak, believes in, a First Cause; differing in this from Hume and the Phenomenists: for the scepticism of Hume is as fatal to Materialism as to Theism. But the first cause of the Materialist is mechanic force, or matter endued merely with mechanic force, and wanting not only mind and consciousness, but sensation, and even life. Yet this dead matter, or, if you please, this mindless unconscious power, is the supposed origin of life, sentiency, and self-conscious intellect. What we have to consider is whether this be a thing conceivable.

It is implied in the very notion of an originating cause that it shall be adequate to the production of its appropriate effect. No words can make this matter clearer. But here you will, of course, bear in mind the distinction between cause in the proper sense, and in the sense of mere physical antecedent. In regard to the latter, there is no necessary resemblance between it and the natural occurrence of which experience has shown it to be the invariable precursor, although in familiar language the two things are, as we have seen, coupled together as cause and effect. For example, there is nothing in the qualities of oxygen and hydrogen that could *a priori* lead one to suppose that the result of their combination could be a substance like water, which differs in every sensible quality from either of its natural predecessors or parents. In the physical antecedent we cannot, as Hume rightly teaches, by mere dint of thought and reasoning, discern the presence of any power or quality adequate to the production of any effect at all, far less to the production of any particular effect. And when we recur, as we must recur, to the super-sensuous, or metaphysical, notion of cause, we are at the same time carried back by reason behind all the phenomena of nature

to some real energy in which they all originate, and by which they are maintained. When, therefore, I insist that the cause must appear to the mind adequate to the production of its appropriate effect, it is of this *vera causa*, this true originating power, that I am speaking. But the proposition is one not capable of proof, for it relates to a simple primary idea of which no analysis is possible. I can only throw myself upon the general consciousness of mankind, and beg you to ask yourselves whether it is not as I say.

Now, the Materialist assumes, as we have seen, that he has at his disposal a force self-capable of the wonderful series of transmutations which has been enumerated. The series includes as its last two terms the ascending steps, first to vital, and thence to mental, manifestations. Let us fix attention on the last step but one; that, namely, from inorganic matter to living organisms. Observation has, it is true, as yet failed to discover any case in which even the lowest organism appears to have been generated out of inorganic matter. Let it, however, be assumed that such a sequence of phenomena—no more, remember, than a sequence of phenomena—may be at last recognised as sometimes occurring, or as having at some time occurred in the course of nature—there will still remain at this upward step a huge difficulty for the materialist. Beginning as he must with separate atoms endued with motion, and this motion resulting in attractions, repulsions, and mutual affinities, he has with these when we arrive at animated nature to build up *an organic whole*. Now, an organic whole is not the mere sum-total of the constituent atoms. These, as we all know, are in perpetual flux in every living creature. "The parallel," says Huxley, "between a whirlpool in a stream and a living being, which has been often drawn, is as just as it is striking. The whirlpool is permanent, but the particles of water which constitute it are incessantly changing. Those which enter it on the one

side are whirled around, and temporarily constitute a part of its individuality; and as they leave on the other side their places are made good by new comers."* The turmoil of molecules in a living creature may, he thinks, be justly likened to the great wave of the vortex below Niagara, which for centuries past has maintained the same general form, though the component particles of water are changing every moment. One might almost think that Samuel Taylor Coleridge was speaking, and with Coleridge I continue:—"As the column of blue smoke from a cottage chimney in the breathless summer noon, or the steadfast-seeming cloud on the edge point of a hill in the driving air-current, which, momentarily condensed and recomposed, is the common phantom of a thousand successors—such is the flesh which our bodily eyes transmit to us; which our hands touch." "Not only," he proceeds, the "characteristic shape is evolved from the invisible central power, but the material mass itself is acquired by assimilation. The germinal power of the plant transmutes the fixed air and the elementary base of water into grass or leaves; and on these the organic principle in the ox or the elephant exercises an alchemy still more stupendous. As the unseen agency weaves its magic eddies, the foliage becomes indifferently the bone and its marrow, the pulpy brain or the solid ivory. That what you see is blood, is flesh, is itself the work, or, shall I say, the translucence of the invisible energy, which soon surrenders or abandons them to inferior powers (for there is no pause nor chasm in the activities of nature), which repeat a similar metamorphosis according to *their* kind;—these are not fancies, conjectures, or even hypotheses, but *facts*, to deny which is impossible, not to reflect on which is ignominious."†

We see, then, that an organic whole imports a distinct

* *The Crayfish*, p. 64. Kegan Paul, 1880.

† *Aids to Reflection*, p. 392. Pickering, 1836.

and individualised agency, whereof the identity consists not in the ever-changing material, but in the living principle, which on that changing material imposes a definite form. The profound and candid Lange clearly recognises the difficulty which here arises for the materialistic thinker :—
 “Sensation,” he says, “is found only in the organic animal body, and here belongs not to the parts in themselves but to the whole. We have thus reached the point where Materialism, however consistently it may be developed in other respects, always, either more or less avowedly, leaves its own sphere. Obviously with the union into a whole, a new metaphysical principle has been introduced, that, by the side of the atoms and void space, appears as a sufficiently original supplement. . . . The organic whole is then a wholly new principle by the side of the atoms and the void, though it may not be so recognised.” *

This leads on to what appears to me an insuperable objection. Atoms in motion, and, of course, a void space to move in, are, it will be remembered, the postulate of the Materialist. Sensibility for the atoms is not demanded. If it were, other considerations would be opened, to which I shall hereafter advert. Given, therefore, the non-sentient atoms, how is the sentient to be developed out of the non-sentient? I again refer to Lange, who thus pursues the subject of my last extract. “The difficulty,” he says (Vol. I., p. 146), “which here again suggests itself of fixing the exact seat of sensation is in the most important point completely evaded by the Epikurean system, and in spite of the immense progress of physiology the Materialism of the last century found itself at precisely the same point. The individual atoms do not feel, or [if they did] their feelings could not be fused together, since void space which has no substratum cannot conduct sensation, and still less partake of it. We must, therefore, constantly fall back on

* *History of Materialism.* Vol. I., p. 144. Trübner. 1881.

the solution—the motion of the atoms is sensation." But, he asks, a few lines further on, "How can the motion of a body in itself non-sentient, be sensation? Who is it, then, that feels? How does the sensation come about? Where?"

With these last words of Lange, the full difficulty of the problem opens upon us. Mere animal sentiency may perhaps exist without any degree of consciousness, as, for example, in the oyster. But the philosophy which would explain the Kosmos as the effect of the forces of matter, must show those forces to be adequate causes of conscious sensation in man. Here, however, on the confession of men themselves strongly attached to atomic Materialism as a physical theory, we reach the brink of an impassable chasm. "On the atomic theory," writes Lange (Vol. I., p. 23), "we explain to-day the laws of sound, of light, of heat, of chemical and physical changes in things, in the widest sense, and yet Atomism is as little able to-day, as in the time of Demokritos, to explain even the simplest sensation of sound, light, heat, taste, and so on. In all the advances of science, in all the modifications of the notion of atoms, this chasm has remained unnarrowed." Even when science shall have succeeded in constructing a complete theory of the functions of the brain, and in showing clearly the mechanical motions, with their origin and their result, which correspond to sensation, she will be (I again recur to the words of Lange) "for ever precluded from finding a bridge between what the simplest sound is, as the sensation of a subject—mine, for instance—and the processes of disintegration in the brain which science must assume in order to explain this particular sensation of sound as a fact in the objective world" (Vol. I., p. 23). To the same purpose Professor Tyndall who, on this point, will not be a suspected authority, says in his article entitled, 'Virchow and Evolution' (*Nineteenth Century*,

November, 1878),* "Here, however, the methods pursued in mechanical science come to an end; and if asked to deduce from the physical interaction of the brain molecules the least of the phenomena of sensation or thought, we must acknowledge our helplessness. Between molecular mechanics and consciousness is interposed a fissure"—the Professor is thinking of the Alpine glaciers—"over which the ladder of physical reasoning is incompetent to carry us."

But if no mechanical theory of the universe can account for mere sentience, how complete must be the failure of every such system to take the last upward step from vital to mental, and to resolve the problems of human thought and feeling. "The special case of those processes we call intellectual," says Lange, "must be explained from the universal laws of all motion, or we have no explanation at all. The weak point of all Materialism lies just in this, that with this explanation it stops short at the very point where the highest problems of philosophy begin" (Vol. I., p. 30). Man himself is, so far as our experience extends, the highest product of the universe. Is it rational—is it possible—to regard him as the effect of something destitute itself of mind and consciousness? Can the effect be more and greater than the originating cause? It may, indeed, be less, but can it, I repeat, be greater? Just in this point lies the vast advantage of those who, in any form, hold to the doctrine of an originating mind. On either side an assumption simply stupendous—for the moment let me call it an assumption—must be made when we endeavour to account for this stupendous universe, of which we form a part. Some one, perhaps, will interject, But why endeavour to account for it? The question is foreign to our immediate purpose; but I reply, in passing,

* Republished in *Fragments of Science*. Sixth Edition. Vol. II., p. 375. Longmans. 1879.

because we cannot help attempting. The problem of existence is thrust upon us. *We are*, and know there was a time when we were not. We know ourselves to be effects of an unknown power. Not to suppose a cause is simply a thing impossible. Some cause of all things—that which I just now called “an assumption”—is then no assumption, but a belief, which is inevitable. The belief of the Theist is in a Being not less than man, but immeasurably greater; who of the fulness of life has given us a portion. The first cause of the Materialist is matter in motion—nothing more—and I ask again, Is such a cause of things conceivably adequate to the production of the known effects? Can we so explain to ourselves our own rational existence? We have seen materialistic explanation brought to a stand before the phenomenon of mere organic life. How can it deal with the fact of conscious personal existence? Have I then no meaning when I say, I AM? Let us ask ourselves that question, for it is vain to argue with those who will not face it. Then are we, in deference to supposed deductions from physical experience, to give the lie to that inner consciousness which tells us that we are other than, and more than, the material organism to which our life is for the time inexplicably bound—that the *mind* of man is not his *brain*, nor his life the sum of the mere vital forces which are its perishable instruments? Can we indeed believe, that, saint and sage, philosopher and poet; the play of fancy, the method of reason, the struggles of the Will, the warnings of the Conscience, with all that belongs to the abysmal deeps of Personality; all the drama of history; all the passion of life; are, as this pseudo-science pretends to teach us, the mere outcome and expression of molecular change, all products alike of the fortuitous concourse of atoms? Rather let us confess an ineffable mystery than thus darken counsel by words without knowledge!

The notion of a self-transforming power, which becomes

of itself at each upward movement more than itself, is no solution of the riddle of the world. Each successive change requires a cause. Under the term "development" we only conceal the difficulty, for that which is developed must have pre-existed potentially in the germ. Out of matter, we can get nothing which hypothesis has not first put into it; and if mind be the outcome and effect, nothing less than mind will suffice as the cause and origin. It may be argued that the creative ascent to man is by an infinite gradation extending downwards and backwards into past Time through æons of lower existence. But this does not diminish the requisite creative power. It is not as in mechanics, where the smallest force, with time to work in, may suffice to the mightiest tasks. For it is here a question not of quantity, but of quality. "In not a few of the progressionists," writes Dr. Martineau, "the weak illusion is unmistakable, that, with time enough, you may get everything out of next to nothing. Grant us—they seem to say—any tiniest granule of power, so close upon zero that it is not worth begrudging; allow it some trifling tendency to infinitesimal increment; and we will show you how this little stock became the Kosmos without ever taking a step worth thinking of, much less constituting a case for design. The argument is a mere appeal to an incompetency in the human imagination, in virtue of which magnitudes evading conception are treated as out of existence; and an aggregate of inappreciable increments is simultaneously equated—in its cause to *nothing*, in its effect to *the whole of things*. You manifestly want the same Causality, whether concentrated on a moment or distributed through incalculable ages; only, in drawing upon it, a logical theft is more easily committed piecemeal than wholesale. Surely it is a mean device for a philosopher, thus to crib causation by hairs-breadths, to put it out at compound interest through all time, and then disown the

debt. And it is vain after all:—for dilute the intensity and change the form, as you will, of the Power that has issued the Universe, it remains, except to your subjective illusion, nothing less than Infinite and nothing lower than Divine” (*Essays* : First Series, p. 141).

Fairly viewed, the facts import that at every step in the ascent, there has been a fresh influx of power, a gradual imparting of new qualities. We may grant to the physicists that the stock of mere physical force has been a constant quantity. But it is rational to hold that its persistence has been accompanied by gradual infusion of transforming power and purpose, of which physics can take no account, and to do the tasks of which material force has been, as it were, set as a bond-slave.

Still, however, there will recur the old question, How are we to explain the apparent dependence of mental phenomena upon material arrangements? A single clot of blood upon the brain will destroy consciousness. And how shall we account for the phenomena of insanity, and of old age, unless we regard the mind as an effect of the material organism? Is it not true, as the German says, “Without phosphorus, no thought”? The argumentative force of these questions depends upon the fallacy of which Hume has furnished the refutation already quoted. Philosophy does not justify us in asserting that the concomitant phenomena of mental and cerebral action are related to one another as cause and effect. They are to be regarded as conjugate effects of an unknown cause which has coupled them together, perhaps only for a time. To say that consciousness and thought are *produced* by the motion of the molecules of the brain, is to outstep the limits of physical science, and more than that, to state a proposition which is absolutely inconceivable. To use the language of Professor Tyndall, “it eludes all mental presentation.” Vibrations of matter cannot be conceived of as translated into thoughts

and feelings. This would be to cross the unbridgeable chasm between mind and matter. And there is this additional reason for not regarding the mental as products of the accompanying material phenomena. The molecular changes in the substance of the living brain result in the generation of nervous force. The physical series of events is complete in itself, without reference to the synchronous mental series. The energy developed in the brain is no doubt a physical force. As such it can be fully accounted for. It disappears in the performance of its appropriate physical work—including not only those material phenomena (whatever they may be) which accompany thought, but digestion, secretion, respiration, muscular action—in short, in the provision of the main supply of power for every vital process. We have every reason from analogy to believe that the dynamic account of expenditure and product could be made out, and exactly balanced, were our physiological knowledge equal to the task. But in such an account it would not be possible to place "thought" to credit as a product of expended force. The account would balance without it. "That metaphysical ghost the Ego," it is Huxley's phrase, suddenly looks in on the completed calculation of the physicist, as an unwelcome visitant from some strange region, refusing to be accounted for or to be explained away. The mental power developed simultaneously with molecular changes in the brain, is, therefore, not a phasis of the material energy developed. It cannot be computed in foot-pounds. "Consciousness, on this view," says Tyndall, in the article already cited, "is a kind of by-product, inexpressible in terms of force and motion, and unessential to the molecular changes going on in the brain." Except the term "by-product," which implies causal connection, we may accept this statement. A little further on in the same paper, Tyndall quotes himself as inquiring, "What is the causal connection between molecular motions and states

of consciousness?" "My answer," he continues, "is, I do not see the connection, nor am I acquainted with anybody who does. It is no explanation to say that the objective and subjective are two sides of one and the same phenomenon. Why should the phenomenon have two sides? This is the very core of the difficulty. There are plenty of molecular motions which do not exhibit this two-sidedness. Does water think or feel when it runs into frost-ferns upon a window pane? If not, why should the molecular motion of the brain be yoked to this mysterious companion—consciousness? We can form a coherent picture of all the purely physical processes—the stirring of the brain, the thrilling of the nerves, the discharging of the muscles, and all the subsequent motions of the organism. We are here dealing with mechanical problems which are mentally presentable. But we can form no picture of the process whereby consciousness emerges, either as a necessary link or as an accidental by-product of this series of actions. The reverse process of the production of motion by consciousness is equally unrepresentable to the mind. We are here, in fact, on the boundary line of the intellect, where the ordinary canons of science fail to extricate us from difficulty."

It is a favourite saying of the ultra school of Materialists that the brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile. In the light of the foregoing observations we may perceive the full absurdity of such a statement, as of others of the like coinage. Such language has no real significance; except, indeed, as displaying that the speaker who employs it has failed to grasp the facts of the case. Our conclusion then is, that the association of the human mind with a physical organism is not ground on which the philosopher is warranted in regarding mind as the mere effluence and expression of material changes.

As I have quoted largely from Professor Tyndall, it is as well to say that, whilst glad of him as a useful ally in what

he calls "laying bare the central difficulty of the materialist," I am by no means content with his conclusion of the whole matter. "If," he says, "you consent to make your soul a poetic rendering of a phenomenon which, as I have taken more pains than anybody else to show you (!), refuses the yoke of ordinary physical laws—then I, for one, would not object to this exercise of ideality." It is impossible to accept as satisfactory this jaunty concession to the faith of mankind. We know what the Professor means when he relegates a belief to the ideal realm. It is to him, as to many other votaries of physical science, the world of unreality. Rather would I profess with Robert Browning, "God and the soul the only facts for me."

Prove them facts? that they o'erpass my power of proving,
proves them such,
Fact it is I know I know not something which is fact as much.

I content myself with this passing protest, for my present design is rather to expose the fallacies of Materialism than directly to vindicate a more rational creed.

I have had more than once to fall back upon the general consciousness of mankind in proof of an assertion. Such appeals are not to be avoided in a discussion like the present, but are not always satisfactory. Some seem to find consciousness a blank, where to others it appears to render a clear verdict. But in regard to the distinction between mind and matter, so far as human knowledge goes, it happens that the question can be brought to a conclusive test. It is this: All material objects appear to occupy a certain space. In the language of metaphysics, extension is an attribute of matter. The mind, on the contrary, with its faculties and affections, cannot be thought of as extended. Neither long-measure suits them, nor square, nor cubic; love and hatred, hope and fear, honour and honesty, will and conscience, occupy no space, have neither length,

breadth, nor thickness. Weight, and other measures of material force, all of which have relations to space, are equally inapplicable. Mental powers are, as Tyndall puts it in the passage I just now cited, "inexpressible in terms of force and motion." So much is clear beyond all possibility of doubt or cavil.

On this ground we are justified in treating the chasm between mind and matter as, to human conception, absolutely impassable, and that not merely in the present state of physical science, but for ever. In truth, we know more of mind than we do, or ever can, of matter. Men of Tyndall's way of thinking recognise this chasm—this "fissure" which their "ladder" is too short to cross. But they are under an illusion common in the case of those who limit their studies to physical nature. They place themselves, in idea, *on the wrong side of the gap*. They think they can approach the problems of mind from the side of matter, and try in vain to lay the plank across. But in reality they stand with the rest of us on the opposite edge of the chasm.

We know less, I repeat, of matter than of mind, and always must do so, for the simple reason that we ourselves are minds. Of matter, whatever we may believe, we know directly nothing but its phenomena—not the thing in itself. Here we may almost shake hands with the school of Hume. How far that school, generally held in reverence by Materialistic thinkers, can go in the direction of pure subjective idealism is shown by John Stuart Mill, who would resolve the external world into "permanent possibilities of sensation." Huxley, too, has hinted at his own possible escape from the platform of Materialism through the same trap-door.

It has been attempted to reform the hypothesis of Materialism in several ways with a view to evade the difficulties which have been pointed out in regard to the evolution of the sentient and intelligent from the non-sentient

and non-intelligent. The course pursued has been essentially philosophical, namely to import into the supposed cause the qualities known to appear in the effect. Mind and a thinking power have accordingly been assumed, either as qualities of the universe of matter as a whole, or of the constituent atoms. Upon the former hypothesis of the universal diffusion of soul in matter, Materialism merges in Pantheism. Such a notion, taught by Paracelsus and others, is well known as the doctrine of *anima mundi*. The other method is adopted by Priestley in his lectures on "Matter and Spirit," commended by Bain as one of the ablest expositions of Materialism in the last century. It has recently been revived in a new shape by the late Professor Clifford, in his doctrine of Mind-stuff, and has even found an expositor amongst ourselves in a pupil of that accomplished and admirable man. My objection to the doctrine, so far as it here concerns us, may easily be anticipated from what has gone before. No theory which disperses sentiency and intellect amongst the atoms composing our bodily frame can account for that conscious unity which is the most intimate of our convictions. Mind as it exists in the atoms is of course to be supposed something less than human; that being so, the summation, or fusion of their intellectual forces, or even the bringing of these forces to a focus, were any such processes imaginable, do not give us the required effects in the production of human consciousness. It is quality which is wanted, and the physicist is ever seeking to fulfil the requirement by accumulating quantity. In illustration of this topic, I cannot forbear borrowing a quotation of Tyndall's, from the German Materialist Ueberweg, in a letter to Lange. The passage is as follows:—"What occurs in the brain would, in my opinion, not be possible, if the process which here appears in its greatest concentration did not obtain generally, only in a vastly diminished degree. Take a pair of

mice and a cask of flour. By copious nourishment the animals increase and multiply, and in the same proportion sensation and feelings augment. The quantity of these latter possessed by the first pair is not simply diffused among their descendants, for in that case the last must feel more feebly than the first. The sensations and feelings must necessarily be referred back to the flour, where they exist, weak and pale, it is true, and not concentrated as they are in the brain."

This passage presents itself to me, I confess, as quite a burlesque of the doctrine of Mind-stuff. Ueberweg, it will be seen, prefers to trace the sensations of the increasing family of young mice not to the organic power transmitted through the parents, and impressing a form on the assimilated particles of the food consumed, but to similar feelings, "weak and pale, it is true," in the flour itself! A Cheshire cheese, or a bunch of tallow candles, would, no doubt, be found to possess like sentiments. Surely Ueberweg, in penning this absurd passage, cannot have reflected that the same particles which might nourish mice might also form the food of a pair of cats, or even of a human couple, and would in that case be proved by his argument to possess the sentiments not of mice alone, but of their natural enemy, and of mankind.

At the beginning of this lecture I adverted to the theory of Darwin, as tending to favour the spread of Materialism. Darwin has, in fact, revived "the simple and penetrating thought," as Lange calls it, first offered by Empedocles to the thinkers of antiquity—that adaptations preponderate in the animated world, just because it is their nature to perpetuate themselves; while what fails in adaptation has long since perished. In the light of this idea the appearance of design in creation may seem explicable without resort to the hypothesis of a creative mind. Now and then, though rarely, Mr. Darwin himself writes as if this were a legiti-

mate inference from his theory. Thus at the beginning of the last chapter of his work *On the Origin of Species* we have the following passage:—"Nothing at first can appear more difficult to believe than that the more complex organs and instincts should have been perfected, *not* by means superior to, though analogous with, human reason, *but* by the accumulation of innumerable slight variations, each good for the individual possessor." "Surely," observes Martineau, commenting on this passage, "the antithesis could not be more false were we to speak of some patterned damask as made, *not* by the weaver, *but* by the loom; or, of any methodised product as arising, *not* from its primary, *but* from its secondary source. All the determining conditions of species—viz.: (1) The possible range of variation; (2) its hereditary preservation; (3) the extrusion of inferior rivals—must be conceived as already contained in the constituted laws of organic life; in, and through which, just as well as by unmediated starts [or, as he says elsewhere, "creative paroxysms"], reason superior to the human, may evolve the ultimate results." * To which I would add that some of the laws of organic life, upon the assumption of which Darwin works out his explanations, are in themselves so marvellous—for example, a taste for beauty in the female pheasant coincident with our own—that we may well transfer our wonder from the "patterned damask" to the "loom" itself. And behind these postulated laws a power, as we have seen, is wanted. As Max Müller reminds us, "even Charles Darwin requires a Creator to breathe life into matter,"—and, indeed, a good deal more than mere life. No scientific explanation even touches the ultimate dynamical question. Light is thrown on the methods of creation, but the creative power remains a mystery beyond the sphere of science.

I have thus endeavoured, I fear at too great length, to

* *Essays*, First Series, p. 144.

present you with a sketch of one branch of the argument against corpuscular Materialism (the only popular form of the doctrine of Materialism), as it presents itself to my mind. We are, I have contended, absolutely unable to conceive that the organic and sentient wholes which make up the animal world can have sprung from inorganic, non-sentient atoms, without a new infusion of power, still less that the self-conscious minds which constitute the world of man can have had such an origin. To the difficulties thus raised the Materialist has only one reply, which consists in the hypothesis that the atoms themselves are, from the beginning, endowed with all the powers, including the power of thought, which ultimately make their appearance on the stage of Being. I have endeavoured to show, with the help of better illustration than I myself could bring to bear upon the subject, that even this hypothesis is insufficient to account for the facts and the phenomena, either of sentiency or intellect. The attempt to reform the hypothesis so as to supply at the beginning a cause adequate to all that is finally developed in the result, can only end in that very supposition of a Divine Original which Materialism repudiates. Nothing less than God can be the adequate cause of Man. It has, indeed, latterly been attempted to evade this conclusion in a strange way. To secure the sufficiency of a mechanic force as the origin of things, Man, as the supreme effect, is degraded to the level of an automaton. There is a sort of consistency in thus completely banishing mind from the universe; yet it is strange to think of the trouble these acute intellects are taking to persuade us that we and they alike are mere magnetic mockeries—the ephemeral result of unstable combinations of matter. By first giving the lie to our perceptive constitution, and then inviting us to confide in suicidal conclusions founded upon data furnished by this discredited witness, they involve themselves in a tissue of contradic-

tions, and we may safely leave their refutation to the common sense of mankind.

The secret sources of disbelief, as of belief, often lie beyond the reach of logic, deep in men's character and history. What appears to me convincing argument may find no way to the recesses of another's mind, may fail to break through the crust of inveterate mental habit, or prove futile in presence of deficiencies which are organic. Yet I hope that to a few, to whom the argument may not have been familiar, and who may have been drawn in what seems to me the wrong direction by prevailing tendencies, I may, perhaps, have succeeded in showing that the difficulties of the question are in reality enormous; and that it is at least utterly unwise to draw from materialistic premises conclusions which are repugnant to practical good sense, or, what is still worse, which seem to liberate us from obligations hitherto deemed sacred.

C. W. RICHMOND.

DR. MICHAUD ON THE SEVEN ŒCUMENICAL
COUNCILS.*

WHEN the Old Catholics had their great congress at Cologne in 1872 it was a question still open on what ground they were to stand after rejecting the authority of the Vatican Council. Regarding themselves as Catholic, they refused to be satisfied with the Protestant ground of the Bible and the Bible alone. Some proposed to stand by the Council of Trent, as representing the Catholic Church until July 1870; but others wished to go further back and take the first seven General Councils, as representing the whole Catholic Church before the separation of the East and West. Those who proposed Trent were probably the more advanced party, as they simply took provisional ground, leaving their ultimate destination to the course of events. At the Bonn Conference of 1874 it was expressly abandoned by the great Munich leader of the movement, who said that he also spoke in behalf of his brethren.†

Dr. Michaud, who, at Cologne, was known as the young French Abbé fresh from the Madeleine, was one of those who advocated going back at once to the undivided Church, represented by the decisions of the first seven Œcumenical

* *Discussion sur les Sept Conciles Œcumeniques.* Par E. MICHAUD, Docteur en Théologie. Berne: Jent et Reinert. 1878.

† His words were, "As regards the Council of Trent, I think I may declare, not only in my own name, but also in the name of my colleagues, that we hold ourselves in no way bound by all the decrees of that Council, which cannot be considered as Œcumenical" (*Report*, p. 6, English translation).

Councils. That position he still holds, and the present work is a defence of it against Romanists, High Church Anglicans, and all Protestants. These seven Councils appear to him to offer the only true basis for the reunion of the Churches. "Here," he says, "East and West, Catholic and Protestant, may all be one, and enjoy with the necessary unity that variety which is also necessary."

We shall first dispose of Dr. Michaud's arguments against the Romanists. It is not without wisdom that the Church of Rome has adopted the principle formulated by Cardinal Manning that history must give place to dogma; which really means that history must go for nothing when it tells against the dogmas of the Church of Rome. The era of the first seven General Councils covers the first five centuries of the activity of the Christian Church, after its deliverance from Roman persecution. We have here the mind, or rather minds, for we must use the plural, of the Christian community during the time of its greatest prosperity, and while the Church was ostensibly one visible body. Dr. Michaud shows that all these Councils were convoked by emperors, and that, with rare exceptions, they were presided over by emperors or their legates. No Bishop of Rome appears in any of them, except by his representatives, and the decisions received the confirmation of all the patriarchs. The Bishop of Rome has a precedence, in virtue of his being bishop of the imperial city; but this is simply a political precedence, and not one involved in his ecclesiastical position. The arguments of Ultramontane writers against these statements are examined and found to be largely grounded on writings the genuineness of which is not now admitted even by the great scholars of the Roman Catholic community.

In the first Council Constantine said expressly, "I have called you together." The letter to the Churches of Alexandria, Egypt, and Libya said that the Council was

assembled "by the grace of God and the summons of Constantine." There is no trace of anything to the contrary until after a lapse of three hundred and sixty years, when some one in the sixth General Council joined with the name of Constantine that of Sylvester, Bishop of Rome. Rufinus, speaking of this Council, says that it was suggested to Constantine by the priests. From this Roman Catholic writers make the rapid inference that the idea of the Council must have come from Sylvester, he being the chief of the priests. Some maintain, from the very fact that there were at the Council delegates from the Bishop of Rome, that they must have presided, taking the place which he would have taken had he been personally present. Others suppose that Osius, Bishop of Cordova, was president of the first Council, but there is no evidence of this, and, moreover, he was not the representative of the Bishop of Rome. The second Council was convoked by Theodosius, but in the acts of the sixth Council it is said that "Theodosius and Damasus opposed Macedonianism." This conjunction of the name of the Bishop with that of the Emperor, as opposing the heresy condemned by the Council, is construed as evidence that the Bishop of Rome, in conjunction with the Emperor, summoned the Council of Constantinople. Three bishops—Meletius of Antioch, Gregory of Constantinople, and his successor, Nectarius—were presidents of the Council, and all of them were aliens to the Bishop of Rome. The first he reckoned an Arian. He opposed the elevation of the second to the patriarchate, and Nectarius he did not regard as validly ordained. The third Council was convoked by the Emperors Theodosius II. and Valentinian III. In their names letters were addressed to all the metropolitans. The Bishop of Rome gave his consent after the Council was summoned. The first president was Cyril of Alexandria. He had written letters to the Bishop of Rome

concerning the heresy of Nestorius, and from this it has been inferred by Roman Catholic writers that he presided as the Pope's legate. The fourth Council was summoned by Marcian, the successor of Theodosius. The Bishop of Rome had asked Theodosius to hold a Council in Italy, but he declined. The legates of the Bishop of Rome advanced some claims of precedence for the Roman see, which the Council refused to admit. The fifth Council was summoned by the Emperor, and presided over by the Bishop of the city where it was held. The Bishop of Rome had given a decision on the question at issue, and different from that at which the Council ultimately arrived. Though present in Constantinople, he refused to attend the Council. The Emperor threatened to excommunicate him, an act which all seem to have believed was fairly within his province. The Bishop ultimately gave his assent to the decisions of the Council. The sixth Council was summoned by Pogonatus. He asked the Bishop of Rome to send as deputies for the Roman Church three or four clergymen, but for the patriarchate twelve archbishops, with twelve Greek monks resident in Rome. From this division of deputies Dr. Michaud argues that the Church of Rome at this time, so far from being regarded as the Catholic Church, was not even reckoned the Church of the West. The Roman legates had three places on the left of the Emperor. This, by the ingenuity of the Roman Church, has been made the place of honour. The seventh Council was convoked by Irene, and presided over by the Bishop of Constantinople. The Bishop of Rome was consulted last. According to the Latin version of the letter which he wrote, he advanced claims for his see which the Council refused to admit. This portion of his letter he afterwards allowed to be suppressed, and we only know of it from the Latin version in Anastasius, the translator of the Acts of the Synod.

Dr. Michaud further shows that many of the canons of these Councils bear direct witness to the usurpation of the Roman see. The fourth of the first Council gives the right of confirmation of bishops to the metropolitans. The bishops were then elected by the people; but of this privilege the Papacy has since deprived them. The liberties of the Church, as they were settled by the first General Council, have been ruined by the centralisation of all power at Rome. The sixth canon of that Council says that "the old customs which exist in Egypt, in Libya, and in Pentapolis, according to which the Bishop of Alexandria has authority in all these countries, shall be maintained, as a similar custom exists in Rome." It was also decreed at this Council that bishops, priests, and deacons should continue to live with their wives whom they had married before ordination. The second canon of the second Council forbids any bishop to interfere in the diocese of another, and orders all differences to be brought before the provincial synod, which alone has jurisdiction over the whole province. The third canon decrees that Constantinople, being new Rome, shall have the second place after old Rome; a decree which plainly determines the nature of the Roman primacy. Before the Council of Ephesus, the Bishop of Rome held a synod, in which the Nestorians were condemned; but the Council of Ephesus, taking no cognisance of the Roman decision, went anew into the whole question. The Council decreed that Christ should be worshipped in His divinity, but not in His humanity. The Council of Chalcedon confirmed the Pope's letter to Flavian, not because it was written by the Bishop of Rome, but because it agreed with the decisions of former General Councils. The second of Constantinople pronounced Pope Honorius a heretic: so that fallibility belonged either to the Pope or the Council—probably to both; but in this case the Council was not so wise as the Pope.

At the hands of Dr. Michaud the High Church Anglican

does not fare better than the Romanist. It is somewhat humiliating for our English friends who boast of their Catholicity, as giving them a superiority over other Protestants, to be beaten by an Old Catholic on their chosen ground of the first Councils. The argument is that the Anglican takes the first four or six Councils, and rejects the seventh, which, though not at once accepted by the whole Church, because of political disturbances and misunderstandings, was yet afterwards accepted as an Œcumenical Council, both by the East and the West. The dilemma then comes for the Anglican, who must either accept this Council which decreed the lawfulness of images in worship, or reject it on the Protestant ground that image worship is forbidden in the Scriptures. But to reject officially the authority of any General Council, accepted by the whole Church, is to reject Catholicity.

On the subject of the use of images in worship, Protestants are charged with "blind fanaticism" and "absurd madness." Their use is defended by leaving the word worship in that vague indefiniteness of meaning in which it may be taken for simple respect, or for any amount of veneration, running up almost, and sometimes apparently altogether, into that worship which is said to be reserved for God alone. Allowance must indeed be made for the demonstrativeness of some nations. An Eastern, or it may be a Frenchman, bowing before a statue, or throwing kisses towards it, would appear to men of cooler temperament to be taking the statue for a living being. Image worship is not fully explained by the mere respect which we have for the portrait of an absent friend. More than this it evidently was when the Iconoclasts began their crusade against it; and more than this it evidently was as defended by the seventh Council.

It is argued that image worship was not forbidden in the Old Testament. The second commandment, it is main-

tained, only forbids giving images the same worship which is due to God. This is said in the face of the fact that this commandment absolutely forbids even the *making* of images, much more bowing down to them, or worshipping them in any sense. But Dr. Michaud finds in the commandment the word *served*, from which he infers that God alone is to have *latría*, but worship of another kind might be given to images. Other defenders of the seventh Council admit that this commandment forbids images, but they add that it was merely a positive precept addressed to the Jews. Images were forbidden to the Jews because of their proneness to idolatry. The same reason is given for the absence of images from the religious services of the first Christians.

The adoption of image worship by Christians exposed them to the charge of idolatry, both from Jews and Moham-medans. That the charge was not without good foundation seems proved by history. Dr. Michaud ascribes to Leo no higher motive in the destruction of the images than a desire to possess the treasures of the Church : but to find unworthy motives for the conduct of any great reformer is always easy. In a Council of Constantinople, in 754, the use of images was condemned by 318 bishops. Dr. Michaud says that they did not really condemn images ; but the idolatry which they did condemn shows that image worship had become something more than the mere respect or veneration which is given to the portrait of an absent friend.

This seventh Council was finally accepted by the whole Church ; but its history sufficiently demonstrates that Catholicity is a mere name with no attendant reality. Leo had 318 bishops to vote against the use of images, and thirty-three years later, in the seventh Council, Irene had about the same number of bishops to support her in upholding image-worship. This Empress made an oath to her husband that she would never restore the images, but the

oath was broken as soon as her husband died. The Patriarch of Constantinople, who had taken part in the Iconoclastic Council, prepared the way for the triumph of the opposition by resigning his see, and history, such as we have it, makes him die repenting that he had ever opposed the worship of images. Irene created Tarasius, a layman, Bishop of Constantinople. Before he accepted the office, he bargained that the images were to be restored. The Patriarchs of Alexandria, Jerusalem, and Antioch were to be invited to a General Council, but the messengers were unable to reach them because of the Saracens. They made known their business to some monks whom they met, who sent ambassadors in the name of the Patriarchs. The Bishop of Rome being in favour of the images, overlooked all irregularities, and followed in the wake of Irene and Tarasius. An important part of the proceedings of the Council was the penitence of the bishops who had been active in their opposition to the images, but who were now as submissive to Irene as formerly they had been to Leo. Their ignorance seems to have been as remarkable as their vacillation, so that it was a matter utterly indifferent which way they voted. The long and wide-spread opposition to this Council proves that there was little unanimity on the subject of images. The decrees of the seventh Council were condemned by a Council of bishops at Frankfort in 794. Dr. Michaud pleads ingeniously in excuse for the bishops of Frankfort, that they were misled by a bad Latin translation of the Acts of this Council, and so what they condemned was not the same as what the Council decreed. There are many things here that cannot be fully explained; but it is surely strange that the Pope's legates, who at Frankfort joined in this condemnation of the seventh General Council, should not have known what their master had sanctioned, and wherein the fathers at Frankfort mis-

understood what they meant to condemn. It can scarcely, we think, be doubted that the Council at Frankfort, as well as the Council of Paris in 825, condemned the use of images in the same sense in which it had been sanctioned by Pope Adrian when he confirmed the decrees of the seventh Council.

Leo the Armenian, who came to the throne in 800, found the opponents of images so numerous that, though not himself an Iconoclast, he was compelled for the sake of peace to oppose the use of them in worship. Michael the Stammerer, who was placed on the throne by the murderers of Leo, had to adopt the same policy. Michael, in a letter to Louis le Debonnaire, describes the image worship which he had to oppose, and which found shelter under the decrees of the seventh Council. It consisted in chanting hymns before the images and invoking their assistance, making them sponsors for their children and witnesses to monastic vows. Some priests even mixed paint from the images with the sacramental wine and administered it to privileged communicants, while others put the symbols of Christ's body in the hands of the images, that they might in this way realise the communion of saints. These appear to have been the things which the Iconoclasts opposed, and which were virtually sanctioned by the seventh Council.

Dr. Michaud calls his treatment of these Councils "traditional and liberal." He wishes to find in them a basis of union for all Christians. The object is commendable, but the idea could only have arisen with one who takes that mediæval view of the Church which logically ends in the reception of the Vatican Council. If unity is to be based on General Councils, some of those which followed the first seven can make equally valid claims to authority. Catholicity, in the last analysis, is a mere question of majorities to which, for the sake of unity, minorities must

be subject. Against this principle the Church of England, with other Reformed Churches, rebelled at the Reformation. It distinctly set forth that General Councils "may err, and sometimes have erred, even in things pertaining unto God." Dr. Pusey is willing to accept the words of Du Pin that "General Councils received by the Universal Church *cannot have erred*;" (*Eirenicon*, p. 216), but Dr. Pusey is not the Church of England, and Dr. Michaud might have saved himself the trouble of uncatholicising the "Anglican," if he had attended more to what the Church of England officially says about General Councils. The recognition which it gives to the first four is found in an Act of Parliament of the first year of Queen Elizabeth, and the tenor of it is that a Royal Commission was appointed to determine heresy by the standard of the Holy Scripture, the first four General Councils, or any other Council whose decisions rested on Scripture. These first four, as well as any other General Councils, may or may not have erred, but what is not taken out of Holy Scripture has "neither strength nor authority."

The position of the English Church as to Catholicity might have been settled long before any question was raised about the seventh Council. The fourth canon of the great Council of Nicæa ordains that "every bishop be instituted (consecrated) by all the bishops of the province. When this is not possible three of them may give imposition of hands, with the written permission of the absent bishops." This decree was necessary for the preservation of that unity and Catholicity which depend on the submission of the minority to the majority. But this kind of Catholicity the Church of England repudiated. Matthew Parker was consecrated Archbishop of Canterbury by three Protestant bishops who had no sees and no permission, either written or unwritten, from the bishops of the province, who were deprived, solely by royal authority, because they refused to

acknowledge the royal supremacy. If Dr. Michaud were to apply the same canon to the consecration of the Old Catholic bishops by the Jansenists of Holland, he would find that they too had been consecrated by excommunicated bishops, or rather a bishop, and in opposition to the wishes of the bishops of the province and the Church of the majority.

The advantage which Dr. Michaud has, as a liberal, from the rejection of all Councils but the first seven, is that he is not bound by any dogmas decreed by later Councils. This means that the less we define the nearer we are to unity : which holds good as to the first seven as well as to those which follow. It is put down as an axiom that the disciples of Christ "have a religion with positive dogmas, positive precepts, and positive worship" (p. 6), and the business of Councils is to explain or determine what are those dogmas, precepts, and worship. Now these are either all clearly discernible in Scripture, in which case Councils are unnecessary, or they are not clearly discernible, and in that case nothing is to be believed but what has been decreed by a General Council. But the great doctrines of Christianity, as summed up, for instance, in the Apostles' Creed, are so evidently in the New Testament, that they are received by almost every Church or sect which bears the name of Christian. The doctrines, on the other hand, which have been the subject of conciliar decrees relate mostly to abstract questions which in most cases would have been better left open. Those determined by the first seven Councils might be thus summed up : "The Son is consubstantial with the Father, so also is the Holy Ghost ; Christ has only one person, but two natures and two wills. And as to worship, what these Councils have decreed is that we ought to keep Easter on the Sunday after the fourteenth day of the new moon which follows the vernal equinox, worship God the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost

with *latría*, and give *dulia* to the images of Mary and the Saints." The brevity of the dogmatic creed is satisfactory; but if we can go thus far on the mere authority of General Councils we need not strain at the Vatican. It is credible that if the Church had infallible Councils for eight centuries it would continue to have them for eighteen; but it is incongruous to suppose that the Spirit of God presided over General Councils so long as the Roman Empire remained one, but abandoned the Church to fallibility when it was divided into East and West.

Dr. Jortin once said that the Council of Jerusalem was the first and the last Council over which the Holy Ghost presided. The history of the first seven Œcumenicals does not entitle any of them to be regarded as an exception. In a letter written by Constantine to the contending parties in Alexandria, which is described by the historian Socrates as containing "arguments wonderful and full of wisdom," we have the judgment of that Emperor as to the question for the determination of which the first General Council was summoned. The scope of the letter is that the two parties were one in the substance of the faith, and therefore they ought not to fight about mere trifles. These differences did not affect any important doctrine of Christianity. The question had already emerged in philosophy, whether the *Logos*, or Wisdom of God, was eternal, or if the absolute Being had not, at least in thought, priority of existence. It was only by inference that the Arians were supposed to touch the Trinity or the Incarnation. The Council decreed that the Son was consubstantial and coeternal with the Father. This definition or dogma was not the faith, but only a certain mode of expressing the faith. The subject was really above definition; and though that of the Council is to be preferred to the Arian, it ought never to have been made an article of faith. The great patristic scholars of all Churches are agreed that the Athanasian mode of explaining

the Trinity is not that of the ante-Nicene Fathers. To prove that it was so is the object of Bishop Bull's famous work, and with him Dr. Michaud agrees; but Bishop Hefele says truly that "the Anglican Bull undertook to demonstrate what was not demonstrable." The creed of Eusebius of Cæsarea, nominally an Arian, was the basis of the Nicene Creed. It was rejected by the Council simply because the Arians were willing to subscribe it. Eusebius said it was the same which he had learned from his predecessors, and which he had taught his presbyters. The Athanasian party in the Council inserted the word *consubstantial*, to which they knew the Arians objected, as they took the word in a different sense. But Eusebius and his party afterwards accepted the *consubstantial*, with explanations which really meant that the truth was compatible with either the Arian or the Athanasian definitions. The Arians feared that *consubstantial*, as they understood it, endangered the doctrine of the Trinity, just as Dr. Michaud infers that the Arians, without knowing it, really denied the divinity of Christ (p. 53).

The second General Council determined that the Holy Ghost was also consubstantial with the Father. This followed necessarily from the consubstantiality of the Son. Both were congruous parts of the same mode of explaining the Godhead. The decisions of the third Council were more doubtful than those of the first two. Nestorius, the Patriarch of Constantinople, zealous for the humanity as well as the Divinity of Christ, thought that to defend both successfully it was necessary to ascribe to Christ two persons. As the word person sounds now to us, the mode was clumsy, but the heresy was slender. Nestorius specially objected to call Mary the Mother of God, as she was not the mother of Christ's divinity, but only of His humanity. The Council decreed that, though not the mother of Christ's divinity, she was yet the mother of God, because of the personal

union of the two natures in Christ. The dogma decreed by this Council has been vastly more mischievous than that of Nestorius could ever have been. It has contributed more than anything in history to that exaltation of Mary which is now the most conspicuous idolatry of the Church of Rome, and the stem on which have been engrafted the most objectionable of Romish superstitions. The orthodoxy of the third Council developed into a heresy which was condemned by the fourth. To secure the unipersonality of Christ against the Nestorians, Eutyches maintained that Christ had only one nature. He neither denied the divinity nor the humanity, but, with an ingenuity worthy of a great metaphysical theologian, he said that the one nature was "God made flesh and become man." The condemnation of the Eutychians was only the condemnation of an ingenious mode of expressing the truth of the Incarnation. The fifth Council defines nothing. The Nestorians, instead of appealing to Nestorius, who had been condemned, found their doctrines in writings which had passed for orthodox. The Council contented itself with condemning these writings, confirming the decrees of previous Councils, and anathematising a long list of reputed heretics, beginning with Arius and ending with the great Origen. The sixth Council made a dogma of the theory that Christ has two wills, one human and one divine. It also condemned Honorius, Bishop of Rome, who protested against the introduction into theology of abstruse metaphysical terms and subtle distinctions, saying that the doctrines of the Scriptures were sufficiently clear, and that discussions about such questions as one or two wills ought to be left for the ingenuity of grammarians and the amusement of children.

Dr. Michaud maintains that these seven Councils were free and œcumenical, and therefore represented the mind of the Church Catholic. But we need not go beyond the facts, even as he records them, to see that they were not free, nor

did they always express the mind of the majority. They exhibit to us the usual phenomena of bishops fighting with bishops about subjects on which they barely understand each other. The Emperor sometimes compels them to agreement and sometimes to compromise by means of words which they take in different senses; or if this fails, he lends his influence to one party to crush the other. The first Council surpasses all the rest in good qualities; but even here the influence of Constantine cannot be ignored. He regarded the whole business with the eye of a politician, and his main object was peace. Only thirty-eight of the assembled bishops are put down as Arians, and only two refused to conform to the decrees of the Council. What then, we might ask, was the cause of all the disturbance? Dr. Michaud even denies the prevalence of Arianism at any time, and takes Jerome's lament that the world had become Arian as mere hyperbole. It is, indeed, easy to play at see-saw with the word Arian; but if we take the Arians as those who objected to consubstantiality, Jerome's words will be found not far from the truth. The fight may have been about a word, or, as it was in the Greek, about a letter, and that an iota; but those who objected to consubstantiality were always a numerous party, sometimes so numerous as to constitute the Catholic Church—if Catholicity is to be constituted by numbers and majorities. After the Council the strife continued, and the Arians were even able to compel the other party to subscribe creeds in which for consubstantiality, or of the *same* substance, was substituted a word meaning of *like* substance. Dr. Michaud pleads that those who thus agreed to abandon consubstantiality did not renounce the truth intended by it. Probably this is true, and it agrees to what Constantine said in his letter, already quoted, that both parties were really of the same opinion, and so the strife was all about trifles—that is, different modes of expressing the same thing. The Nicene Council,

therefore, did not give the Church the doctrine of Christ's divinity, but only a certain mode of expressing it, and if that mode is to be called a dogma, then a dogma is not a revealed doctrine, but only an opinion decreed by a Council.

The history of the other Councils shows the same scheming, fighting, and coercion which mark the most objectionable Councils held in later times, and regarded as infallible by the Church of Rome. Theodosius summoned the second Council purely to give peace to the Church militant. There were present only 186 bishops, of whom 38 were reckoned heretics. This is the Council described by Gregory Nazianzen, who says that the bishops raged like furious horses in battle, or like madmen casting dust into the air. He adds that they go even as they are led by their chief men, who to-day are of one opinion, and to-morrow, if the wind veers about, come to another judgment. The 150 orthodox, with the Emperor on their side, were too strong for the 38 on the other side, and so the latter retired from the Council, leaving the 150 to settle the faith of the Catholic world.

The third Council did not await the arrival of John of Antioch, who with his party were supporters of Nestorius. The President was the notorious Cyril of Alexandria, who urged the assembly to proceed with the condemnation of Nestorius; but Count Candidian, who represented the Emperor, refused to sanction the proceedings. When John arrived he opened a Council of his own, with forty bishops, who deposed Cyril and the Bishop of Ephesus. Both parties appealed to the Emperor, and complained of each other's partiality and injustice. The Emperor prudently decided in favour of the strongest party; but Cyril had pushed his objections against the doctrines of Nestorius so far, that he seemed to deny the two natures. His successor, Dioscurus, certainly did so, and appealed to Cyril's writings in defence of Eutyches. By the authority of

Theodosius, a Council was summoned at Ephesus, over which Dioscurus presided, when the Eutychians were declared orthodox. To condemn this Ephesian Council was the object of convening the fourth General Council. As soon as the legate of the Bishop of Rome saw Dioscurus among the bishops, he exclaimed that he had orders to depart if Dioscurus were allowed to be present. A tumult followed, in which it was evident that Dioscurus was on the losing side. Then all the bishops who had taken part with him in his Ephesian Council rose up against him, and swore that what had been done there they had been compelled to do. The same plea for going with the stream was made by the bishops of the seventh Council, who sanctioned the use of images, which once they had condemned.

A General Council seems a likely method of settling differences of doctrine. It might be supposed to give the Catholic voice of the Church, and, moreover, to manifest such Catholic wisdom as would overcome all opposition. But experience is here contrary to expectation. No General Council has ever had a tendency to heal; and every one, not excepting the first, has either made or perpetuated a schism. The more a Church defines, the more exclusive it becomes. The fires that once burned with the fury of volcanoes may now be extinct, but the divisions once made continue as petrifications, which it seems impossible ever again to put in solution. The influence of the rash fury of Cyril is still visible in the separation of the Nestorian community, once the great missionary Church of the East. The Armenian Church is also in separation, because it never received the decrees of Chalcedon—in fact, apparently never understood how that which was condemned could be a heresy. The Jacobites of the Syrian Church are the descendants of those condemned at Chalcedon; and the Maronites, the other party of the same Church, are monuments of the heresy-making work of the fifth Council.

The Coptic Church was also separated from the rest of the East by the decrees of Chalcedon, and in its daughter, the Abyssinian Church, these controversies about the nature of Christ, fruitful only in mischief, still exist. No Councils have helped towards the reunion of East and West, and all who accept the authority of the seventh Council must exclude from their fellowship the whole Protestant world.

Dr. Michaud's book has received less attention in England than it deserves. But for his acceptance of the seventh Council he would have had the full sympathy of English High Churchmen. But he has reduced them to the dilemma of accepting the seventh or giving up the first six, and they retort on him that in accepting the seventh he commits himself to the idol worship of the Church of Rome.

We would counsel Dr. Michaud again to look in the face the simple facts of Christianity. He will find that many questions, especially such as those which occupied the first General Councils, are still open for further investigation; that many things which he regards as dogmas or authoritative doctrines are mere opinions; and, moreover, that there has been no such thing as Catholicity of dogma or worship since St. Paul anathematized the Judaizers in Galatia, or withstood Peter at Antioch, because he was to be blamed. The necessary unity with the necessary variety must have some better basis than the authority of the first seven General Councils.

JOHN HUNT.

ELIZABETH STUART, QUEEN OF BOHEMIA.

I.

ELIZABETH STUART, sometime Queen of Bohemia, and still titular Queen of Hearts; daughter of James I., and Anne of Denmark; grand-daughter of Mary Queen of Scots, fourth in descent from Margaret Tudor; sister of Prince Henry, and of Charles I.; wife of the *Winterkönig*; mother of the Princes Rupert and Maurice, and of the Electress Sophia; friend of Lord Craven—is the Princess who took the blood royal of England and of Scotland to Germany, where it became blended with that of the Guelphs; the result being that Elizabeth's descendants, Stuarts on the spindle side, succeeded to the throne of England, after the last Stuart King had been deprived of the Crown, and after his two daughters had died without leaving issue.

A direct descendant of this mixed strain of royal blood now wears the Crown of Britain. "The sovereign qualification was restored to the realm (at the accession of the house of Hanover) in its highest purity through the descendants of the Guelphs, passing back through the house of Este to connect themselves with some of the illustrious Roman *Gentes*. The new dynasty was, indeed, by centuries older in history than the Plantagenets." (Burton.) Elizabeth Stuart was born in Falkland Palace, 19th August, 1596; she died 13th February, 1662, in Leicester House, London.

Between birth and death, this descendant and ancestress

of kings lived through many adventures, saw many men of mark in many foreign lands, experienced bitter sorrows, and passed through a strange life of royal romance. Princess, Electress, Queen, fugitive and refugee, her career knew pomp and pleasure, penury and pain. After stormy alternations of rule and of reverse, the (titular) ex-Queen of Bohemia returned from the continent to England, to die there, generally neglected and half unknown. The years which elapsed between the period at which she quitted England as Electress Palatine, and returned to it a beauty-waning and distressed widow, discrowned and forlorn, embraced the terrible epoch of the 'Thirty Years' War; and Elizabeth's vivid memory was filled with vital images of the long agony of that most cruel civil and religious struggle. She had actually and intimately known the persons, intrigues, interests, of the great war; had seen many of the heroes, adventurers, tyrants, of that woful time; had spoken with Gustavus Adolphus, Maurice of Nassau, Mansfeld, Christian of Brunswick, and many other of the notabilities of that distinctive epoch of history; had shared the somewhat heavy splendours of the German Courts of the seventeenth century, and had experienced the substantial comfort of the hospitable States-General in the great days of Holland. Around her image stand the figures, behind her glooms the sombre background of that dire convulsion. The years over which her active life extended were of singular importance alike to the politics and to the religion of all Europe. A witness of, and an actress in, that supreme struggle between faiths and dynasties, Elizabeth lived in the very midst of the horror, the romance, the woe of that dæmonic strain and anguish of thirty years' duration. She saw the long process of that exhaustion of war-worn nations which dictated the peace of Westphalia: her own brother, after the civil wars of England, perished on the scaffold at Whitehall: she lived through the time of

the Protectorate, and she witnessed the restoration of the royal line in England. Her life, and the times through which she lived, are surely subjects of surpassing interest for an historical essay. Of the sources of information about the Thirty Years' War it may well be said that their name is legion. The number of German authorities, the plethora of continental records are, in truth, almost bewildering; but the writer about that complex time may well bear in mind Professor Masson's modest and pregnant saying, "I can never pass a sheet of the historical kind for the press without a dread, lest from inadvertance, or from sheer ignorance, some error, some blunder even, may have escaped me."

The girlhood of Elizabeth, after her father's accession to the throne (1603), was passed chiefly at Combe Abbey, under the wise guardianship of Sir John, afterwards Lord Harrington, and of his wife. There she played, and studied, and became a mighty huntress. The influences which surrounded her youth were noble, kindly, natural. The Gunpowder Plot conspirators designed to seize her person, and to proclaim her Queen after the murder of her father. They hoped to mould her tender youth to the religion of the Romish Church, and to obtain from such a sovereign Catholic supremacy in England. During the danger arising from the plot, the young Princess was removed, temporarily, from Combe Abbey to Coventry; but after the execution of the conspirators she returned to the beloved home of her childhood. The great delight of her years of girlhood consisted in the tender friendship which subsisted between Elizabeth and her noble brother, the young Prince Henry; a Prince of rare promise, "the expectancy and rose of the fair State," who evinced in his early years a true sympathy with all that was noblest in English life and thought. Henry, had he lived, would, probably, have been, like the last great Tudor monarch, an

England-loving King, "more English than the English themselves," and in intimate and instinctive union with the essence of the national life. Both Henry and Elizabeth were convinced and ardent Protestants. Between the royal children and their parents there was not—there could not be—much intimacy or close sympathy. Anne of Denmark was gay, pleasure-loving, cheerful, frivolous. James, fittest, by nature, to squabble with another mind of like calibre with his own about the trivialities of theology, was a monarch besotted with his own fatuous conception of the divine right of Kings; and was unstable, pedantic, undignified, and unvirile. That he had a coward's cruelty, the fates of Arabella Stuart and of Sir Walter Raleigh amply prove. Ungainly in person, he was yet more unlovely in mind. Entering upon the noble inheritance of a reign which succeeded to that of Elizabeth, he alienated the nation from his dynasty, he prepared the great rebellion, he lowered England in the councils of Europe; and, while a most exasperating tyrant to people and to Parliament, he remained long the abject slave of Spain and of unworthy favourites. The best excuse, perhaps, for the pusillanimous King of England, who dared not look upon a drawn sword, consists in the fatal event which occurred while he was yet in his mother's womb. James and his daughter never came very near together; James and his son Henry drifted even farther and farther apart. It was inevitable that it should be so.

As the years rolled on, the question of the marriages of such a hopeful Prince and Princess began to press. "I would rather espouse a Protestant Count than a Catholic Emperor," said Elizabeth. In this, as in other things, she took her tone from her knightly Prince brother, who opposed heartily a scheme for marrying him to the Infanta Anna of Spain, sister to that Infanta Maria whom his brother Charles afterwards pursued in Madrid with bootless

courtship. Henry, indeed, proposed to accompany his sister to Germany, in order there to be able to remain purely Protestant, and to select and marry some Protestant Princess.

At the suggestion of Maurice of Nassau, a suitor for the hand of Elizabeth presented himself in the person of Frederick, Pfalzgraf of the Rhine, and son of the *Kurfürst*, or Elector, of the Palatinate, Frederick IV. Frederick IV., who was born in 1574, and married 1593, Luise Juliane, daughter of William the Silent, a noble daughter of a noble father, was the most considerable Protestant Prince of Germany. His territory did not equal in importance that of Saxony, but the talents, the character, and the zeal of Frederick IV. soon placed him at the head of Protestant Germany. He took a leading part in founding the famous Protestant Union in 1608; and was, indeed, the Chief of the Union, which included among its members the Duke of Würtemberg, the Landgraf of Hessen-Kassel, and the Markgrafs of Anspach and of Baden Durlach. Frederick IV. died 18th September, 1610. The Protestant Union called into being the Catholic *Liga*, founded 10th of July, 1609. The Union had many heads; the *Liga* only one, but that one was Maximilian of Bavaria, while its general was Tilly. Maximilian was unscrupulous, eager, crafty, energetic. A pupil of the Jesuits, and a bigoted Catholic, Maximilian knew well what he wanted, and he hesitated at no means that would serve his ends. He had the advantage, to a partizan, of a clear will, a ruthless cruelty, and a cunning audacity.

The youth of Frederick V. was passed chiefly at Sedan, under the guidance of the Duke of Bouillon, though his guardian was the Herzog Johann von Zweibrücken, to whom Frederick IV. left the Government of the Palatinate while Frederick V. should remain a minor.

At Sedan the young *Kurfürst* was in a court, but never

in a camp. He learned politics, and not war; he was taught accomplishments, but not warfare; he acquired arts without learning arms. His education was political, and was peaceful. The son of the Chief of the Union, he remained ignorant of the art of war. Such knowledge as he attained to in the use of arms fitted him rather for the holiday tilt-yard than for the terrors of the battlefield. He was but a poor soldier, and he was no general. For the needs of his day, and of his own future life, he was but imperfectly trained. He was a cavalier, but not a warrior. Frederick was graceful, and was gentle; courteous, tender, and true. He was capable of a constant and a noble love. His person was fine, though not stalwart: he shone more at the ball than in the school of arms. His father had passed from Lutheranism to Calvinism, and the young *Kurpfalz* was a convinced and zealous Calvinist. As a suitor for the hand of Elizabeth Stuart, he was acceptable to James, and was highly popular with the English nation, which ardently desired a Protestant Prince as a husband for the daughter of the throne.

The match was distasteful to the Catholic party, and to the gay and sprightly Anne of Denmark. Her ambition desired a King as the husband of her daughter, and Anne's sneer at "Goody Palsgrave" damped the present joy, and influenced the future career of Elizabeth, who inherited much of her mother's light and frivolous temperament.

The race of the renowned Otto of Wittelsbach split itself into two branches—the Bavarian and the Palatine. The original stock obtained the Duchy of Bavaria, in 1180, from the Emperor Frederick I.; and, afterwards, from Frederick II., the Palatinate of the Rhine. The treaty of Pavia, in 1329, divided the two countries under two reigning houses springing from the parent root, and, in the early years of the seventeenth century, Bavaria was ruled by the strong and wily Maximilian (born 17th of April, 1573), while his

cousin, the weak and gentle Frederick V., inherited the Government of the Palatinate.

Prince Henry, the gallant-springing young Stuart, died November 6th, 1612; but, amid the actual mourning for her well-loved brother, Elizabeth married Frederick on the 14th of February, 1613. The nuptials were celebrated with great rejoicings and with extraordinary pomp and expense. The honeymoon over, the married lovers sailed from Margate to Flushing, where they were received by Maurice, and whence they passed, in a sort of triumphal procession, to Heidelberg—Elizabeth's new home.

Born in the same year, 1596, Frederick and Elizabeth were alike seventeen years of age at the date of their marriage. Frederick was still a minor when they reached Heidelberg; nor did he assume the reins of Government until the next year, 1614; but his territory had been well administered by his mother and his guardian. In 1614, Elizabeth's first child, Heinrich Friedrich, was born in the Palace of Heidelberg.

The early time of their marriage was one of singular happiness; of a happiness so great that it contrasts painfully with the sorrows of the coming years. Elizabeth exercised an unlimited empire over an uxorious young husband, who found his chief delight in her affection. She had all the things for which she vitally cared—pomp, pleasure, dominion, and hunting; though the crumpled rose-leaf in her lot was, perhaps, the rankle of her mother's sneer at "Goody Palsgrave." The years of peace and of pleasure in Heidelberg were but few. Frederick and his wife could not remain contented with their own Palatinate. Light and trivial natures both, they were not too light or too trivial to remain untouched by ambition during the intoxication and the ferment of their day of strain and storm:—

'Tis dangerous when the lesser nature comes
Between the fell pass and incensed points
Of mighty opposites.

To his own utter undoing, and to the great injury of the Protestant cause, Frederick plunged into those troubled waters in order to encircle the round hat of an Elector with a golden crown. The primary cause of the Thirty Years' War in Germany was the determination of the Austro-Spanish Monarchies, aided by the Catholic Princes—and notably by Bavaria—to establish the ecclesiastical dominion of the Pope in all Germany, in Holland, and afterwards, if possible, in the northern kingdoms of Scandinavia, and in all the other "Heretic States" of Europe. The Treaty of Augsburg (1555) was to be torn up, and the Reformation suppressed by force as well as fraud. The House of Hapsburg, as vassal of the Pope, was to rule and reign throughout the land of Luther. Religion furnished the impulse; political ambition the secondary cause; while bigotry lent ferocity to the conduct of the merciless and devastating struggle.

The Austrian branch of Hapsburg sought absolute imperial power and universal monarchy. The war was a battle-field for princes and for captains who desired either to acquire or to defend territories and inheritances. It was an arena for the plots of schemers and for the ambition of heroes. It fostered the trade of mercenary soldier, and developed to gigantic dimensions the place, the profit, and the pride of the able warrior of fortune. Through valour, cruelty, treachery, it marched over a country rendered wretched, desolate, and waste. By the process of utter exhaustion, it left the chief combatants in the situation in which, as regards principles, if not position, they were at the treaty of Augsburg in 1555. It confirmed a religious toleration which it ought never to have disturbed. It returned practically to the point from which it started. In result it was a triumph for Protestantism and for religious liberty; its issue repelled the fierce onslaught of Catholicism; but the war was, on the part of those who provoked it, a wicked

war; and such success as was attained was purchased by oceans of blood and by years of misery.

The preliminary indications of the long war were the violent seizure by Maximilian of Bavaria of Donauwörth, and the intricate tangle of the question of the inheritance of the Duchies of Cleve and Jülich. The weakness of Protestantism in Germany was caused in part by the fatal split between Lutheran and Calvinist, and by the contemptible character of the leading Protestant Princes—of such men as Johann Georg, of Saxony, and Georg Wilhelm, tenth Elector of Brandenburg. Both Electors honoured and dreaded the Emperor more than they loved their religion; neither would peril aught for that cause. Carlyle says, “in fact, had there been no better Protestantism than that of Germany, all was over with Protestantism. . . . Over seas there dwelt and reigned a certain King in Sweden; there farmed and walked musing by the shores of the Ouse, in Huntingdonshire, a certain man; there was a Gustav Adolf over seas, an Oliver Cromwell over seas.” Selfish and sensual, a lover of the wine-cup and the boar hunt, *Kur-Sachsen* was an “unspeakable curse to Germany. A man of no strength, devoutness, or adequate human worth;” and the Elector of Brandenburg was led by him of Saxony. At the outbreak of the great war Protestantism in Germany had but little to hope from its natural leaders.

Then came the irresistible temptation for Frederick and Elizabeth. The great prize of a crown—that of Bohemia—was dangled before their eager eyes.

When, in 1612, Matthias succeeded Rudolph II. as Emperor, he managed, by practice, to impose upon Bohemia, as his successor to the crown of Bohemia, Ferdinand, son of the Archduke Charles, Prince of Styria. Both Rudolph and Matthias were childless men. Charles was brother to the Emperor Maximilian; and both Charles and Maximilian were the sons of the Emperor Ferdinand I., and of Anne,

heiress of Bohemia and Hungary. Bohemia resisted the nomination of Ferdinand as King, but could not shake off the yoke. The country was essentially Protestant, but saw its liberties invaded and its religion proscribed by the fanatic, Jesuit-led monarch who was so ruthlessly forced upon the country. When, in 1619, Ferdinand was elected Emperor, as Ferdinand II., and ruled the Empire, being himself ruled by Father Lämmerlein and Father Hyacinth, the Bohemians hastened to depose him as King of Bohemia, and to offer the crown to the best Protestant Prince who could be induced to accept the dangerous dignity. It was promptly refused by Saxony and by Brandenburg, nor was it accepted even by the Prince of Transylvania; and then, as a last resource, the crown of Bohemia was offered to Frederick. Anne of Denmark died (1619) before a crown was placed within the reach of "Goody Palsgrave;" but there can be no doubt that the chance of becoming Queen was welcomed by Elizabeth with light-hearted rapture.

To Frederick every project was easy; every action difficult. However he might secretly hesitate about accepting so perilous a crown, he was yet elated by the prospect, and he had his wife to lean upon. She chastised him with the valour of her tongue; and she wrote to her father, asking James I. for his approval and advice. Charles I. said, later, of the Palatine pair, that "the grey mare was the better horse;" and Elizabeth's exultation overcame their sense of dread of danger. Meanwhile Frederick sought advice from various quarters. Saxony besought Frederick to remember that, in accepting the Bohemian crown, he hazarded the loss of his hereditary dominions. Max of Bavaria wrote in a frank, even cousinly way, and warned Frederick earnestly against acceptance. Max told his cousin how fickle the Bohemians were: "You want subjects; they want a servant:" and added that motives of interest alone impelled

them to choose Frederick. Maurice of Nassau would not help, but did not dissuade. Had Maurice himself desired the Bohemian crown, he would, probably, have won and have worn it; but Frederick was not Maurice. Luise Juliane, the mother of Frederick, addressed her son in a letter of singular ability (*Mémoires sur la vie et la mort de la Princesse Louise Juliane*; Leyden, 1644), and this remarkable state paper is worth producing here. She said that "the affairs of the Empire might soon be retrieved, and that the Pope would convoke all Catholics to defend the Emperor. The King of France, however inimical to Austria, is not in a state to oppose its power; the King of Spain will eagerly sustain it. As to the King of Great Britain, believe me, you little understand him if you persuade yourself he will break with Spain for your interests. On my brother Maurice, there is more reliance to be placed; but the States will not sacrifice Holland to the Palatinate. What aid can you expect from the King of Denmark? He is too far distant. The houses of Saxony and of Bavaria are already jealous of yours, and will heartily concur in driving you from Bohemia. Trust not too much to the Protestant Union. . . . Distrust still more the Bohemians. If they offer you the crown, it is not that they love you better than another Prince, but that they have no other resource. Do not flatter yourself they will be more constant to you than they have been to Ferdinand; but, even though you could depend upon your kinsmen, your allies, your friends, and your subjects, you have neither troops nor treasures adequate to the charges of war." Surely wise advice. Every prophecy of Luise Juliane was fulfilled by the bitter event. Frederick was not the man, nor had he the means, to obtain success in such a desperate venture. He was well known to the men of his own day and land; no man would help because no man believed in him. Frederick could not oppose Fer-

dinand. Bohemian Protestantism could only be helped by German Protestantism; but that, in 1619, was selfish and supine, and would by no means stir for Frederick. If Frederick could not maintain himself in Bohemia, and defend the Bohemians, his enterprise sank into a mere usurpation, which would give grounds for reprisals, and for the further oppression of Protestantism. Nowhere in all Germany was there any enthusiasm for, any belief in, Frederick.

Half deceiving themselves, Frederick and Elizabeth attempted to sanctify their decision with the name of religion, and veiled ambition under the pretext of piety. The Kaiser himself deigned to warn Frederick, though Ferdinand steadfastly refused to believe that *Kurpfalz* could contemplate a seizure of "Austrian territory." Meanwhile Bohemia was pressing for Frederick's answer. His council in Heidelberg advised him to come to no decision until he should have heard from England; but Elizabeth was not inclined to wait for anything. After declaring that the chance was a call from God, she writes to Frederick—"Nor shall I repine whatever consequences may ensue; not even though I should be forced to part with my last jewel, and to suffer actual hardship." Sötl quotes another letter of hers in which she reminds Frederick that he has married the daughter of a King, and should not want courage to make his wife a Queen. Elizabeth concludes by saying—"rather *Sauerkraut* with a King than luxury with a Prince." This sentence expresses her real motives for decision, and exhibits her character; which was ambitious, shallow, and fond of splendour. Without waiting for her husband's final decision, she made all preparations for starting for Bohemia. Another pressing mission came from Prague, and Frederick was ultimately pushed over the edge of treason. As he rode away from Heidelberg, his weeping mother cried out, "Ach! Du trägst die Pfalz

nach Böhmen!"—"Thou art carrying the Palatinate into Bohemia!"

The Palatinate itself was left under the Government of Zweibrücken; but Frederick, who, in his incapacity, seemed to forget that he was burning his ships behind him, made no provision for the defence of his native territory.

Frederick and Elizabeth entered Prague, amid great rejoicings, on 31st October, 1619. His coronation took place on November 4th.

He immediately issued an address to his new kingdom. This manifesto was large and loose and liberal as a modern hustings declaration. It promised everything to everybody, and was so framed as, if possible, to please all his subjects.

Acting with the nervous hurry of small natures bent impatiently upon a darling project, Frederick and Elizabeth accepted the Bohemian crown without having waited for the reply of James I.

James was, according to Clarendon, "very quick-sighted in discerning difficulties, very slow in mastering them." His confused love of peace, and poverty of spirit, threw him into a perplexed astonishment when he heard of the serious step taken by his son-in-law without his royal concurrence; nor did he ever approve Frederick's Bohemian usurpation. It may well be contended that a King of England should not have wasted English blood and gold in the mere attempt to win a crown for a son-in-law; but it may be a question whether, in the larger sense of European politics, a great English King, the natural antagonist of Hapsburg ascendancy, and natural defender of Protestantism, might not have enlarged the question into such an action of combined Protestantism as that which Gustavus Adolphus afterwards led. James might have wielded the strength of England, and such a war would have been highly popular. Frederick personally was liked, though he was not known in connection with great affairs, in England; and his cause,

and that of Elizabeth, would have merged into the greater cause of European civil and religious liberty. But James, a laggard in love and a dastard in war, was not the man for great causes. He might have ruined Austria and have served Protestantism; but he was led by Gondomar, and was, probably, in reality a crypto-Catholic. Diego Sarmiento de Acuña, Count of Gondomar, reached London as Ambassador from Spain, in 1613; and soon acquired complete dominion over the lean-souled King. Marc Antonio, archbishop of Spalatro, was made Dean of Windsor in 1618; and Goodman, yet more Catholic than Laud, sat upon the bench of bishops. Rightly had Luise Juliane said that James would not break with Spain. The Spanish marriage was dangled before his eyes by the astute Gondomar. On 4th of November, 1616, the rickety Duke of York (afterwards Charles I.), had been created Prince of Wales; and James burned to match his son with the blood of Hapsburg. James hastened to disavow his unfortunate son-in-law; he would not recognise Frederick as King of Bohemia, and he apologised to Ferdinand for Frederick's "usurpation" of Austrian territory. The Spanish leanings of James were, until the Spanish match was broken off in failure and contempt, very pronounced; and were as stable as anything in his unvirile nature could be stable or strong. The first Stuart Kings, who robbed the English Nation of the Church of Elizabeth Tudor, drove the force and passion of the National religious character into Puritanism; into the "sectaries"—Presbyterians, Independents, Anabaptists—into those intense, if gloomy convictions which animated the Ironsides, and rode in victory through the red fields of Naseby and of Marston Moor.

The German title of *Winter-König* is, being interpreted rather than translated, to be rendered into English as a "mockery King of snow." An estimable country gentleman may be a very poor monarch; and incapable, fatuous

Frederick, whose very amiability increases the contempt felt for him by history as a King, soon began to melt away. Anxieties commenced early to surround the fire-new royalties of the hapless King and Queen of fickle Bohemia; and yet their first time in the palace of Prague was one of unalloyed triumph and exultation, especially to the sanguine, pomp-loving Elizabeth. Feast succeeded feast; ceremony followed ceremony; she was, at last, a Queen, and Elizabeth was royally happy. Despite the tolerant tone of poor Frederick's "hustings manifesto," he too, as a Calvinist, was priest-ridden. He took with him to Prague his narrow and bigoted chaplain, Schulze (*Scultetus*), and the interfering minister soon embittered both Catholics and Lutherans against his royal master.

Bohemia became gradually dissatisfied with its new King. It was found that Frederick could neither help Bohemia nor himself; and that he could bring no help from outside. Elizabeth, who in the flush of her triumph was extremely gracious, and was always graceful, was, for a time, popular; but Bohemia found that there was but little behind that superficial gracefulness. Neither Frederick nor Elizabeth could speak, or could understand, the Bohemian language. The split between Court and Nation widened, until Frederick found himself in the position of a timid and unskilful rider mounted, without saddle or bridle, on an unbroken, vicious horse.

They that stand high, have many blasts to shake them;
And if they fall they dash themselves to pieces;

and none stand in greater danger than those who, impelled by their own vanity, and assisted by accident, have attained to an elevation for which they are incompetent. He who, in the 17th century, would usurp a possession of the House of Austria must have been a warrior who could hold what he had seized in the tenacious grip of an iron gauntlet.

The dangers thickened round them ; and Frederick, with his want of insight, and confused vision, was like a short-sighted man before the invention of spectacles. A miner does not notice the lengthening or shortening of the days. Frederick, in the darkness of his incapacity, seemed unconscious of the fate that was surely drawing near. The Pope Paul said : " That young man has got himself entangled in a nice labyrinth." Ferdinand absolutely refused at first to give credence to the report of Frederick's coronation. Such blind audacity seemed to the Emperor incredible. The Protestant Princes, meeting at Mülhausen, under the guidance of Saxony, wrote to Frederick, urging him to relinquish the crown, and not to involve the cause of Protestantism with " his rebellion." The Emperor curtly summoned Frederick to vacate the throne by the 1st June ; failing which—ban of the Empire and war. Spinola and his Spaniards were gathering to march on the Palatinate ; the *Kriegsvolk*, the war-folk of the *Liga*, were assembling for the Empire. Spinola led one army—Tilly and Bucquoy the other. The Palatinate had been left defenceless ; what would Frederick do to defend his new kingdom ? The Bohemians were tired of Frederick, and were in dread of Ferdinand. Frederick's army was indifferent in point of quality, and had no heart in the cause ; there was no discipline and but little pay. The troops had to live by plunder ; and, indeed, they seized Elizabeth's private jewels, as they were being conveyed to Prague, and confiscated their own Queen's gems. Frederick was not the man to teach drill, to enforce discipline, to lend a soul to an army, or to inspire it with confidence in its King and leader. His affairs were ready to tumble to ruin. Elizabeth refused to quit Prague, and held on to the last to the seat of her brief Queenship.

The smaller fight of Rakonitz was lost for Frederick ; and, on Sunday, November 8th, 1620, the Imperialists

attacked Prague; and the battle of the White Mountain—a battle which lasted only one hour—completed the defeat and ruin of the wretched Frederick. Most characteristically, Frederick was at dinner, at a stately dinner which he gave to the Ambassadors, during this crowning fight for his own crown and interests. "After dinner, the King resolved to go to horse to see the army; but before the King could get out of the gate, the news came of the loss of the Bohemian and the royal cause." The fact is, Frederick was driven back through the city gate by his own troops, who, in full rout, crying out, "The battle is lost!" were tumbling pell-mell into the city, to gain the protection of its walls.

It was intended to defend Prague, in order to secure the retreat of Elizabeth, but she herself opposed the measure. Cousin Max granted an armistice of eight hours; during which the King and Queen fled wildly, and in such haste that they left behind them crown, papers, jewels—almost everything that they had. Prague, with terror in its heart, did trembling homage to the incensed Emperor. Frederick had taken the Palatinate to Bohemia; had lost crown, Elector's hat, his new kingdom, and his ancient inheritance. He was to become a penniless, discrowned fugitive, and under the terrible ban of the Empire.

The hardships which Elizabeth had been willing to incur for the sake of a crown had come upon her, as, with husband and with child, but reft of all else, she fled through the snow of a severe winter to Breslau in Silesia. The Markgraf Georg Wilhelm of Brandenburg had married (in 1616) Frederick's sister, Elizabetha Karolina; but the timid brother-in-law hesitated, at first, to grant to the hapless couple refuge in Cüstrin; where, on December 25th, 1620, Elizabeth's son, Maurice, was born. Rupert, the "Rupert of the Rhine," of our Civil Wars, was born in Prague, December 20th, 1619. In 1617, Karl Ludwig; in 1618, Elizabeth was born; indeed, the first dozen

years of Elizabeth's life abroad are all speckled with confinements.

Frederick preached resistance, and called loudly upon every one to help him. Meantime the Upper and Lower Palatinates were overrun by Spinola; and Heidelberg was taken by Tilly. Without consulting the Electors, the high-handed Ferdinand gave the Palatinate Electorship to Max of Bavaria, who also got the Upper Palatinate, while the Lower was, for the moment, given to Archduke Albert. The Archduke died July 13, 1621, and then the Lower Palatinate fell also to Maxmillan. Max "had done more than any Emperor could expect," and deserved reward from a grateful *Kaiser*. On December 13th, 1621, all Protestant preachers and teachers were ejected from Bohemia. On February 28th, 1621, Tilly put to death, in Prague, some eight and forty of the best and noblest citizens, on a large public scaffold, similar to those used by Alba, for similar purposes, in the Netherlands. The tongues of some were torn out by the roots; the right hands of others were hacked off. Confiscation, persecution, death and misery succeeded Frederick in Bohemia.

On January 22nd, 1621, the Ban was pronounced against Frederick. On April 12th, 1621, the Protestant Union dissolved itself. The whole Palatinate was subjected, compulsorily, to the Romish religion, and the Pope wrote to the Emperor to congratulate him upon the triumph of Catholicism. Truly, Frederick's zeal for religion had done but little for the Protestant cause.

Frederick and Elizabeth took refuge in Holland, and were received with great kindness by the generous States General. Even James, stung by the violent seizure of the Palatinate, awoke to a certain passionate activity—of words. On January 30th, 1621, the King told the Parliament, "Now shall I labour to preserve the rest; wherein I declare that, if by fair means I cannot get it, my crown, my blood,

and all, shall be spent, with my son's blood also, but I will get it for him (Frederick). And this is the cause of all, that the cause of religion is involved in it; for they will alter religion when they conquer, and so, perhaps, my grandchild also may suffer, who hath committed no fault at all."

Brave words! But James "dared not strike one blow for the inheritance of his daughter's children, and was dallying with the oppressors of the people and of the Church of God." Of James' negotiations Nani (quoted by Mr. Samuel Rawson Gardiner) says, "His first proposals to Vienna might have been listened to, but they were so impracticable and absurd that the subtil Spaniards soon saw what sort of person they had to deal with, and availed themselves accordingly of his improbable schemes and delays; they knew, likewise, that James trembled at war, and abominated a rebellion."

The polite evasion of contempt was the only answer obtained by James.

On January 30th, James, seeking for popularity, told the Parliament that religion "was the cause of all;" and yet Gondomar reports to Philip (Simancas MSS.)—also quoted by Mr. Gardiner—on February 18th, the pith of a memorable conversation between James and himself, held on February 2nd, in which James admitted that he was "ready to acknowledge his readiness to recognise the Pope as the head of the Church in matters spiritual, and to allow appeals to lie to him from English Bishops, provided the Pope would refrain from meddling with temporal jurisdiction in his (James's) kingdoms, and would renounce his claim to depose Kings at pleasure. If in his writings he (James) had spoken of the Pope as Antichrist, it was because of his usurped power over Kings, not because he called himself the head of the Church;" and, in testimony to the truth of this statement, the King gave his hand to the delighted ambassador. The Pope might have the

diviner right, but yet was not to interfere with the "divine right" of Kings.

Elizabeth implored her father to take action for the recovery of Bohemia as well as the Palatinate, and, by her advice, Frederick refused to lay aside the title of King of Bohemia. In this dark hour of her fortunes, Elizabeth, a true Stuart, with a nature satisfied with the pleasures of the present, writes to Sir Thomas Roe, the English ambassador (she always addressed him as "honest Thom"), "yett I am still of my wilde humour, to be as merrie as I can in spite of fortune." The gentler Frederick felt his misfortunes, and especially the loss of his hereditary possessions, more keenly. "The Winter King's account was soon settled;" but the Elector's loss was harder to bear, and this loss he owed partly to Elizabeth, partly to his own imbecility.

German political sympathy was, to a great extent, with Frederick so far as the Palatinate was concerned; but it was also felt that Frederick, in taking Bohemia, had done to Ferdinand the same thing which the Emperor, in savage reprisal, had done to the Elector. The sentiment of the sacredness of hereditary possession was then strong among the German Powers. The monarchy of Bohemia was not, in a practical sense, an elective monarchy. In default of an hereditary succession, the crown of Bohemia was seizable by him who could take and hold it. The crown had on various occasions been the prey of violence and fraud, and had been mainly at the mercy of the *Kaiser*. Thus, Matthias compelled the weak Rudolf to cede Bohemia to him; and Matthias, when he was elected Emperor, compelled the Bohemians to accept Ferdinand. The unfortunate, if fickle, Bohemians constantly saw their religion and their liberties outraged by Catholics and by tyrants. They sought freedom by means of a Protestant Prince, and, failing in obtaining one of power and mark, they had the misfortune to see

their ruin consummated by their last resource, Frederick. Their hope that the Union, that the German Protestant Powers, that England, would support Frederick was soon shown to be the shadow of a shade.

Two defenders sprang up for the lost cause of Frederick and Elizabeth. One was a partisan of policy; the other a champion of chivalry. The first was Count Mansfeld; the second was Christian of Brunswick.

Mansfeld was the ablest adventurer, the most successful soldier of fortune of his land and day. He had strong reasons for hating Austria, and hated her accordingly.

Christian was a man of a very different stamp. He was *Geschwisterkind* (first cousin) of Elizabeth (Sötl), and was born September 10th, 1599. He was, therefore, three years younger than Elizabeth. Christian's mother, also an Elizabeth, was the daughter of Frederick II. of Denmark. Christian first met Elizabeth Stuart when, after the disastrous day of the White Mountain, she had taken refuge in Holland. He was charmed with his cousin; he felt knightly sympathy for a Queen's misfortunes: a passionate Protestant, he glowed with true zeal for Elizabeth's religion. Burning for military glory, a fanatic of chivalry, a knight-errant of romantic devotion; high-flown, sombre, and intense, Christian eagerly devoted life and fortune to his cousin and her cause. Her wore her glove in his helmet; he adopted as his motto, *Alles für Ruhm und ihr*, "All for glory and for her." He called himself *Gottes Freund, der Pfaffen Feind*—"the friend of God, the foe of priests." When, after a wound at the siege of Breda, his arm had to be amputated, he caused the trumpets to sound while the operation was performed, and said that "the arm he had left would be enough for revenge upon his enemies." Heroic as a knightly champion, Christian was yet unsuccessful as a general. Intrepid, rash, and headstrong, he was easily beaten by the wily Tilly. Mansfeld was abler

and more successful ; but their joint help had really availed but little when, on July 16th, 1662, Frederick saw himself compelled (partly by pressure put upon him by his father-in-law) to dismiss the two generals who—the one from hatred of Austria, the other from love to Elizabeth—bravely maintained and kept alive a falling cause.

After the bitter step of such a dismissal, Frederick would seem to have begun to suffer from life-weariness. He stood apart, and left his affairs mainly to his sprightly wife, and to the Secretary, Russdorf.

It is impossible in this short essay to narrate all the battles, sieges, fortunes, which occurred in the great war, even in so far as such events may have indirectly affected the fortunes of the Palatine House. Much must necessarily be passed over, and I am compelled to restrict myself to those leading occurrences which were most clearly determinate of the fortunes of Germany, and by consequence of those of Elizabeth Stuart.

H. SCHÜTZ WILSON.

(To be continued.)

MR. RHYS DAVIDS' HIBBERT LECTURES.*

WE can hardly be surprised that Mr. Rhys Davids begins his course of interesting and suggestive lectures by declaring that "it would be a hopeless task to attempt in six Lectures, that is to say, in six hours, to give any adequate account of that great movement which has influenced the greater portion of the human race during the lapse of so many centuries." It might perhaps be possible to give a tolerably complete sketch of Buddhism in a volume of the same size as the one before us; but the result would be a mere sketch more suited to a handbook on the history of religion than to a course of lectures. For a lecturer must never forget that he has to rouse the interest of his hearers in his subject; nor can he find any more efficient means of doing so than the constant reference to points of resemblance and difference between the ideas with which they are already familiar and those which they are to meet with on the comparatively strange field of his special investigations. The lecturer, therefore, is at liberty, or rather is compelled, to make a selection from the rich accumulations of his knowledge, and to go to work eclectically, without, however, considering himself absolved from the necessity of following a definite plan.

The plan which Mr. Rhys Davids has proposed to himself is "to discuss those points in the history of Buddhism

* *Lectures on the Origin and Growth of Religion, as Illustrated by Some Points in the History of Indian Buddhism.* By T. W. RHYS DAVIDS. (Hibbert Lectures, 1881.) Williams and Norgate.

which appear to throw light on the origin and growth of religious belief," and, further to explain his meaning, he adds, "This means, as I understand it, the origin and growth of religion outside, as well as inside, the circle of the Buddhist beliefs themselves."

The method which the lecturer promises to follow is "the comparative method," especially that which is followed in "comparative philology." In this science, we are told, "we find, *firstly*, that words in the more modern dialects of any family are derived, as far as possible historically, from words or roots in the older dialects." I am afraid that no one who has not worked at "comparative philology" himself will be led to a correct idea of the method in question by these words. The fact is that the philologist, by comparing the facts and phenomena observed in the languages of one family known to him, and by applying certain strict rules which he has derived from his linguistic studies, endeavours to track out the older *pre-historic* condition of a family of speeches. He endeavours to proceed from the known to the unknown, to fix the degrees of relationship between the several members of the same family of languages, and to prove that at some remote period there was one language, out of which, in the course of time, all these dialects, which appear so different, have grown in natural or, at any rate, in explicable ways. We shall see the important bearing of the distinction here drawn when we come to the Sixth Lecture.

The second mark of "comparative philology," we are told, is that in it "*general* rules respecting the tendencies of the growth of language, and of vowel and consonantal change, are laid down as being of very general or even sometimes of universal application." It is very questionable whether such general rules with respect to tendencies have much value on the field of comparative philology, even

if they are anything more than hasty generalisations. What does chemistry care for the fact that the elements, as a general rule, have a tendency to combine? On the contrary, it is of supreme importance to her to ascertain the conditions under which the compounds are formed and resolved, the quantitative relations of the respective elements in each compound, and so forth. It is just the same in comparative philology, the results of which, at any rate so far, have been due exclusively to the investigation of very special laws derived from the observation of phenomena. Possibly the time may come when every one will endorse Mr. Davids' remark:—"It is precisely such general observations which are now, and will increasingly be, the most valuable results of philological research." But in any case he himself admits that the application of the method in question to the study of the development of religions only leads to the discovery of "general tendencies," and, what is more, that we are not to look for anything else, even in the future. "We must not hope to find more than tendencies, to find laws in the scientific sense." The reason why this is so is set forth on p. 10.

We shall perhaps do best, under these circumstances, in taking up, lecture by lecture, a few of the special points on which Mr. Rhys Davids' views appear to us to be open to criticism, rather than attempting any general survey of the subject.

After speaking of those phases of religion which are indicated by the words "animism" and "polytheism," and the connected representations of the soul and the future life, the lecturer pauses at the conception of "transmigration." The same point is treated more fully in the third lecture, where the conclusion is reached (on grounds for which we must refer the reader to the volume itself) "that the pre-Āryan occupants of the valley of the Ganges were

believers in something of the kind, and that the Āryans first derived the principle of the idea from them; but not until long after the Āryans had entered India, and until the conquerors and the conquered had been fused together into one people" (p. 82).

Be our opinions what they may as to the probability of this supposition, it is certain, at any rate, that we have no right *a priori* to deny that the aborigines exercised any influence upon the Indian Āryans; but we do not know whether they were numerous enough to produce any marked effect upon the mind of the Āryans, any more than we know to which of the three races—Dravidian, Kolarian, or Kirātan—they belonged. This much, at any rate, would follow from the hypothesis of Mr. Rhys Davids, that the aborigines were not exterminated, nor even very grievously oppressed, as it has been sometimes asserted.

We return to the First Lecture to ascertain the views of Mr. Rhys Davids with reference to Indian monotheism and pantheism. Concerning the latter, we find much which remains, to me at least, even after repeated reading, far from clear—*e.g.*, "And as to the souls of men, though they are condemned to wander for ever and ever from shape to shape, from labour to trouble, their existence is not independent; they are not self-existent, and they can defeat the unlucky action of the God that gave birth to their individuality by certain ceremonies, or a certain kind of knowledge, held, by various opposing schools, to be able to destroy again that individuality by bringing about the return of the spark to the central fire, by the absorption of the human soul in that Great Soul which was supposed to be the only real existence" (p. 20). I am not aware that any school taught that the Salvation (Moksha, Mukti, &c.) could be obtained "by certain ceremonies, or a certain kind of knowledge." The highest good, inseparably associated

with the cessation of all evils, was conceived to be attainable by dint of completely fathoming the *true* and *highest* knowledge, which could only be reached as the fruit of unremitted contemplation. For the Vedântin, in earlier and later times, Salvation is associated with the full recognition that the individual is identical with the absolute, imperishable being—whatever may be understood by that term. It would have been less confusing, therefore, to speak of destroying “the false conception of individual existence,” rather than “individuality.” No necessary connection exists between the attempt to gain Salvation and “transmigration of souls.” The latter doctrine is, indeed, mentioned in some of the Upanishads, but opinions are ascribed to certain teachers, especially Yājñavalkya, which have nothing in common with “transmigration.” According to Yājñavalkya, the soul is born with the creature and disappears again at its death.

Think what we will of these and other such theories, we cannot properly apply such a term as “hopeless creed” to them. If a man regards the cessation of individual existence and of all suffering as the highest good, and believes that in reflection and contemplation he possesses the means of securing it, then his creed is to him a very hopeful one. The pessimistic element in the Indian conception of things is not found in its theory of Salvation, but in its exaggerated contempt for the beautiful and good on earth.

Mr. Rhys Davids regards the doctrine of the Upanishads as “the highest point of the old Indian philosophy,” “the ultimate outcome of the long history of the Aryan spirit-belief.” A further step in the same direction was well-nigh impossible. Buddhism, then, “started on a new line.” *“It swept away from the field of its vision the whole of the great soul theory.”* “For the first time in the history of the world, it proclaimed a salvation which each man could gain for himself, and by himself, in this world, during this life,

without any the least reference to God, or to gods, either great or small." Much of what is contained in these last lines is applicable to every Indian theory of salvation. The gods, whether great or small, have no influence over the Salvation. The use of the word "God" in this connection may easily cause confusion. A contrast between "a knowledge of God," *i.e.*, knowledge of the *brahma*, and "a clear perception of the real nature, as they supposed it to be, of men and things," such as is drawn on p. 29, appears to me to be rather verbal than real. What is the *brahmavidyā* or *ātmavidyā* but "a clear perception of the *real* nature, as they *supposed* it to be, of men and things"? For instance when the Chândogya Upanishad (3, 18) identifies the *brahma* with mind or thought (*manas*), and at the same time with space, and assumes that these two conceptions of mind and space are necessary to explain phenomena—then surely the knowledge of the *brahma* is made to include "a clear perception of the real nature, as they *supposed* it to be, of men and things." In a word, "*God*," and "*the real nature of men and things*" were to the Indians identical, and cannot therefore be contrasted.

The Second Lecture deals with the canonical books of the Southern Buddhists. On the ground of "the internal evidence afforded by the books themselves," the lecturer arrives at the following conclusion: "It is quite clear that the literature has been of gradual growth, and that, though the books as we now have them contain a great deal of older material, some of it perhaps reaching back to a time even before the death of Gotama, they cannot have been put into their present shape till long after that event" (p. 35).

In these words the rights of historical criticism are allowed and we shall avail ourselves of these rights to examine how far the Assalāyana Sutta, the chief contents of which are

given on p. 51, can be allowed a place amongst the "older Suttas."

In this Sutta the Buddha speaks of Greeks—doubtless the Greeks of Bactria*—on which the editor, Professor Pischel, makes the following remarks: "The name of the Yonás or Yavanás is a rather ambiguous one, but the fact that in our passage and in numerous other passages they are mentioned along with the Kambojás, tends to show that their country cannot have been situated very far from that of the latter. Now if we consider the geographical site, as defined by our Suttam, and remember that in other Buddhist scriptures the Yonás are doubtless Greeks, we are, I think, driven to the conclusion that the Yonás of our text can only be the Bactrian Greeks, and as there is no ground for supposing that the sentence in which they are spoken of has been interpolated, we must assume that the whole Suttam has not got its present shape before the third century B.C." There is nothing to urge against this conclusion. The Sutta, as handed down, cannot be altogether authentic. I would even go further, and maintain that it contains much more also that marks its apocryphal character. For instance, we are told of the brahman boy, Assaláyana, who, when sixteen years old, was "perfect in the study (pāragû) of the three Vedas with their complements, Nighaṇṭu, Ketubha, the etymological science, and the Itihâsas (which are the fifth Veda), who was familiar with the Padapāṭha, a grammarian, and perfectly acquainted with casuistry and the science of fortune-telling." All this is simply impossible. In India it was reckoned that thirty-six years, on an average, were needed for the study of the three Vedas;† and Assaláyana is said to have completed the study not only of the three Vedas but of other branches of knowledge, some of which, as the

* The *Greeks of Bactria*, not simply "Bactria," as appears in the lecture.

† Manu 3, 1.

Itihâsas, are completely distinct from the Vedas. No genius, however great, could have accomplished all this at the age of sixteen. How could any one have dared to record such an absurdity of a contemporary, and in a society in which Brahmins actually lived? And, moreover, this same Assalâyana shows, later on, that he is really ignorant of the doctrine of the Brahmins. This appears from his words: "The Brahmins, O Gotama, say thus: The Brahmins are the best caste, all the other castes are inferior to them; the Brahmins are the white caste, the other castes black; the Brahmins alone are pure, not the non-Brahmins; the Brahmins are the legitimate sons of Brahmâ born from his mouth, sprung from Brahmâ, created from Brahmâ, heirs of Brahmâ." So far the Sutta. Now the first sentence contains no misrepresentation. The second and third are in contradiction with what every one in all India, with the exception of Ceylon, might have known. The Brahmins never asserted that the other Âryas, that is to say the Kshatriyas and Vaiçyas, were either black or unclean. In the fourth sentence truth and error are so jumbled together, that it could not possibly have been uttered by a Brahmin. Every one who believed that the Brahmins were created by Brahmâ, likewise believed all men and everything that exists to be created by him. Such mistakes on matters of general knowledge make it impossible, in my opinion, that the Assalâyana Sutta can have been composed in India. We may conjecture that it was drawn up in Ceylon by some one who had read and heard certain things about the Brahmins, but did not really understand the matter. We have great cause to regret the apocryphal character of this Sutta, for it prevents our citing it, as we might otherwise have done, in evidence that the Brahmins recognised the *same* rules of morality as did Gotama himself.

A striking case of ignorance of Brahmanic ways of

thought is also found in the Tevijja Sutta (p. 56), where the Brahman Vāsetṭha says, amongst other things, "Are they all paths which will lead him who acts according to them into a state of union with Brahmā?" This "Brahmā" is the masculine, not the neuter word, as appears further from the sequel; but though it is rather strange that a Brahman should use the masculine in such a connection, it is not impossible. Let us see, however, what follows. To Gotama's question: "Is there a single one of the Brāhmanas, &c., or of their forerunners up to the seventh generation, who has ever seen Brahmā face to face?" Vāsetṭha answers "No," which again is conceivable. But not so the idea that any one who had had a Brahmanic education should have been at a loss for a retort when Gotama thus went on:—"Know, Vāsetṭha, that from time to time a Tathāgata is born into the world, a fully enlightened one, blessed and worthy, abounding in wisdom and goodness, happy, with knowledge of the world, unsurpassed as a guide to erring mortals, a teacher of god and men, a Blessed Buddha." No Brahman who knew his trade would have failed to ask, in reply, what proof Gotama had of the existence of such Tathāgatas. How far the Brahmanas were from allowing themselves to be taken in by the charlatanry of an *ipse dixit*, may be seen amusingly enough in the scene between the Jaina and the Buddhist in the Prabodha-candrodaya.*

The Third Lecture, on the Buddhist theory of Karma, is, in my opinion, the very best of the many valuable contributions to scholarship contained in these lectures. The doctrine of Karma consisted in the belief "that after the death of any being, whether human or not, there survived nothing at all but that being's Karma, the result, that is, of its mental and bodily actions. Every

* P. 50 sqq. ed. Brockhaus.

individual, whether human or divine, was the last inheritor and the last result of the Karma of a long series of past individuals—a series so long, that its beginning is beyond the reach of calculation, and its end will be coincident with the destruction of the world." A necessary supplement to this is found on page 99, in the remark that the Karma ceases as soon as Arahatsip has been reached in any case. Without annihilation of the Karma there can be no Nirvāṇa. It follows that man must aim not at doing that which shall bring a blessing on remotest posterity, but at destroying everything that has any consequences either good or bad.

Quite independent, at any rate in principle, of the "doctrine of Karma" is "the duty of universal love." This "goodwill towards all beings" is not specifically Buddhistic, as might be gathered from p. 111, but is common to all Indian systems. The command of *ahiṃsā*, the prohibition to hurt any living creature, and the exhortation to cherish *maitrī* (goodness, charity), play as important a part in both the Brahmanic and the Jainistic literature as they do in the Buddhistic.*

In the Fourth Lecture, on the Buddhist lives of the Buddha, Mr. Rhys Davids has occasion to expound his views as to the historical and ideal elements in the accounts of the life of the founder of Buddhism, "a perfectly natural man, whom the orthodox Buddhists came eventually to regard as a being quite different from ordinary men, and endowed with powers quite different from theirs." After relating "the little that can be ascertained of his real life," Mr. Davids attempts to explain (p. 129) the unhistorical elements of the biography. "The early Buddhist ideas of

* E.g., Manu 4, 238; 6, 66; 2, 87. Yogaśāstra 1, 33; and for the Jains Sarvadarśana—Sangraha 39. With regard to *ahiṃsā* towards animals, the Jains, it is admitted, go furthest of all.

the Buddha were chiefly modified by two ideals dominating the minds of men in those days, neither of which had any necessary connection with the particular individual whom we know by the name of Gotama, so that both might have been equally well applied to any other person in India, if he had only excited the same feelings. The one ideal was chiefly due to political experiences, the other to philosophical speculations; the one was the ideal of a King of Righteousness, the other of an all-perfect Wisdom."

We are not expressly told from what sources the knowledge of the "early Buddhist ideas of the Buddha" is to be drawn, but there can be no others than the canonical books, for the non-Buddhistic literature of India makes no mention of Gotama until far later. Now since even the earliest of these canonical writings give us more than the simple history, the "early ideas" must be extracted from them by the help of criticism. Now where criticism is admitted differences of opinion will manifest themselves, and it cannot surprise us that different investigators should arrive at very different conclusions as to the historical or unhistorical character of the narratives that have come down to us.

The ideal of a King of Righteousness began to develop itself, in the opinion of Mr. Rhys Davids, under Candragupta, the ally of Seleucus Nicator, whose victories and wide-spread dominion brought home to the people *the idea of a universal monarch*, a Cakkavatti. To this idea was united "the theory of a golden age," in which the Cakkavatti, "a king of kings, irresistible and mighty, ruled in righteousness over a happy people."

We may readily admit that such an ideal of a Cakkavatti might be applied to the Buddha, and that too at the period indicated. But a difficulty still remains. If Gotama roused such feelings as to fasten this ideal upon himself alone, how are we to explain the fact that it was about two hundred

years after his death that men first thought of the application of this ideal of the ruler of the "golden age" to him? The saga of the golden age was known long before Candragupta. We must further acknowledge that other strange phenomena present themselves in the earlier history of Buddhism. For instance, that the order had existed about two hundred and fifty years before any one attempted to spread the doctrine beyond the boundaries of Magadha. This too would point to the conclusion that in the course of the third century before Christ, perhaps under the patronage of Aśoka, a change came over the spirit of the church, the zeal of which had remained latent for two or three centuries. Others may prefer to adopt the belief that the Singalese date of the Nirvāna is simply an official fiction.

Mr. Rhys Davids continues:—"Besides the ideal King, the personification of Power and Justice, another ideal has played an important part in the formation of early Buddhist ideas regarding their Master. . . . It was the ideal of a perfectly Wise Man, the personification of Wisdom, the Buddha" (p. 141). "It was Gotama himself, in all probability, who gave the start to this latter phase of the new Buddhist conceptions, by his own belief, as recorded in the Suttas, that he was himself a Buddha" (p. 143). This may well be, especially as the ideal itself was already age-old in India. It is a conception of extreme antiquity that the Brahman, so far as he deserves this name of honour, stands at the head of all the world. It is true that Brahman and Kshatriya are of one origin—(*brahmakshatram ekayoni*, says the *Mahā-Bhārata*). It is true, likewise, that the Buddha and the Cakkavatti may be united in a single person; but yet the Brahmanship or Buddhahship is higher than the earthly kingship. In principle, therefore, the Brahmanic and the Buddhistic ideals of the sage as the highest and best of men resemble each other. Hence the Buddha is called both a King and

a Brahman—the latter because he has put away all sins, and has attained all the other excellences of Brahmanship.*

On page 147, Mr. Rhys Davids makes some good remarks on the points of similarity between the Cakkavatti-Buddha and the Messiah-Logos. A little further on he deals with the question whether there is any evidence "that the Christian writers, who lived about five hundred years after the Buddhist writers, borrowed their ideas from India;" and he declares that he "can find no evidence whatever of any actual and direct communication of any of these ideas from the East to the West."

The history of Gotama's Order, "the Community or Society of those who had given up the world to carry out the new ideas," a history "most instructive, from a comparative point of view," is handled in a masterly style in the Fifth Lecture. Though by no means blind to the one-sidedness of the monkish ideal, and the defects which, in the long run, must cleave to every Order, the lecturer, nevertheless, brings out with great eloquence all that is attractive and broadly human in the search for calmness and peace. The well-chosen selections, both from the Pāli literature and from European writers, increase the value of this lecture, which, together with the third, seems to me to be amongst the best in the whole series.

The subject matter of the Sixth Lecture, as Mr. Rhys Davids is careful to show, is no less interesting than that of the one that precedes it. It is the "later forms of Buddhism." But the difficulty of the subject is proportioned to its interest, for the forms which the doctrine assumed in different lands are as numerous as they are divergent. "The history of Buddhism, therefore, in each of the countries where it was adopted, requires separate treatment. It is incorrect to speak, as is often done, of

* See *Milinda Pañha*, 225.

Northern and Southern Buddhism as the only two great divisions into which Buddhism had been divided." Against this latter assertion, it may be urged that the Northern Buddhists, in spite of all their differences, at any rate agree in recognising the same canonical writings; and in this sense can be said, with perfect justice, to stand opposed, as a single whole, to the Southern Buddhists. When the lecturer goes on to say: "There was a unity in Southern Buddhism; but there has been no such unity in Northern Buddhism," we venture to doubt whether his thesis can be established. We hear, it is true, of diverse sects among the Northern believers, but neither was there any lack of such amongst their Southern brethren. This assertion I make on the authority of the *Dipavansa*, V. 30 sqq., where we read (cf. Dr. Oldenberg's translation) as follows:—

The wicked Bhikkhus, the Vajjiputtakas who had been excommunicated by the Theras, gained another party; and many people, holding the wrong doctrine, ten thousand, assembled, and (also) held a council. Therefore this Dhamma council is called the Great Council.

Before going further, a word or two of explanation may be given. We hear of a great schism that took place at the time of the second council, a century after the Nirvāna. The Theras, the senior priests,* represented the orthodox doctrine. Their system is called the Theravāda, and is laid down in the Pāli canon. The second council is said to have been held in Vaiṣālī, more than a century before the doctrine was introduced into Ceylon. And since the Southern Church is identified by Mr. Rhys Davids with "early Buddhism," his "unity in Southern Buddhism" implies and includes unity in the creed of the Buddhists before the conversion of Ceylon. Now let us see what the *Dipavansa* goes on to say:—

The Bhikkhus of the Great Council settled a doctrine contrary

* Enumerated in vv. 22, 23. l. c.

(to the true Faith). Altering the original redaction they made another redaction. They transposed Suttas which belonged to one place (of the collection), to another place; they destroyed the (true) meaning and the Faith, in the Vinaya and in the five collections (of Suttas). Those Bhikkhus, who understood neither what had been taught in long expositions nor without exposition, neither the natural meaning nor the recondite meaning, settled a false meaning in connection with spurious speeches of Buddha; these Bhikkhus destroyed a great deal of (true) meaning under the colour of the letter. Rejecting single passages of the Suttas and of the profound Vinaya, they composed other Suttas and another Vinaya which had (only) the appearance (of the genuine ones). Rejecting the following texts—viz., the Parivāra, which is an abstract of the contents (of the Vinaya), the six sections of the Abhidhamma, the Patisambhidā, the Niddesa, and some portions of the Jātaka, they composed new ones. They changed the original rules regarding noun, gender, composition, and the embellishments of style.

If we suppose this account to be true, it follows that in "early Buddhism," a century after the death of the founder of the Order, two great and hostile parties were already in existence. The party which the Theras laid under their ban held a Great Council. It is not expressly said that they in their turn laid the party of the Theras under the ban; but it follows from the facts that they regarded the Theras—the real or supposed fathers of the Pāli canon—as heretics. The circumstance, too, that the gathering of the heretics is known by the name of "the Great Council" is significant enough. But without dwelling further on this point, we will proceed with the quotation from the Dipavansa:—

Those who held the Great Council were the first schismatics. In imitation of them many heretics arose. Afterwards a schism occurred in that (new school); the Gokulika and Ekabyohāra Bhikkhus formed two divisions. Afterwards two schisms took place amongst the Gokulikas: the Bahussutaka and the Paññatti Bhikkhus. And opposing these were the Cetiya (another) division of the Mahāsaṃgītikas.* All these five sects, originating

* i.e., Those who held the Great Council.

from the Mahāsaṅgītikas, destroyed the (true) meaning and the doctrine and some portions of the collection, &c.

All these schisms took place outside the limits of what the lecturer means by "Southern Buddhism"; but the latter did not remain free, as we learn from the following account:—

In the orthodox school of the Theras again a schism occurred. The Mahīṃsasāka and Vajjiputtaka Bhikkhus formed two sections. In the school of the Vajjiputtakas four sections arose—viz., the Dhammuttarikas, Bhaddayānikas, Chandagārikas, and Sammitis. In later times two divisions arose among the Mahīṃsasākas: the Sabbatthivāda and Dhammagutta Bhikkhus formed two divisions. The Sabbatthivādas and Kassapikas, the Kassapikas and Saṃkantikas, and subsequently another section, the Suttavādas, separated themselves in their turn. These eleven schools, which separated themselves from the Theravāda, destroyed the (true) meaning and the doctrine and some portions of the collections, &c.

Seventeen are the heretical sects, and there is one orthodox sect; together with the orthodox sect there are eighteen in all. The most excellent Theravāda, which resembles a large banyan tree, is the complete doctrine of the Jina, free from omissions or additions. The other schools arose as thorns grow on the tree. In the first century there were no schisms; in the second century arose the seventeen heretical schools in the religion of the Jina.

There are thus eighteen sects; the number (accidentally?) coinciding with the official (not the actual) number of the Purāṇas. But although the number of the sects is put at eighteen only, yet at the same time it is admitted that there really were twenty-four of them: for the Dipavansa yet adds:—

The Hemavatikas, Rājagirikas, Siddhatthas, Pubba, and Aparaselikas, and sixthly, the Aparā-Rājagirikas arose one after the other.

If all this, which is part of the official version of the ecclesiastical history of the Southern Buddhists, be true,

then it is admitted that instead of having any "unity in Southern Buddhism" we find that the Pāli-canon represents the doctrine of *one* of the eighteen or four-and-twenty sects. Now, if any one chooses to say, "I, for my part, side with this one sect; for I am convinced, on grounds that to me are conclusive, that this sect is in possession of the pure, unadulterated doctrine of Gotama," then no one can disturb his faith; but it would be as well not to speak of "a unity in Southern Buddhism," and contrast it with the want of "unity in Northern Buddhism."

But even those who do not regard it as proved that the Pāli-canon contains the pure, unadulterated doctrine of the oldest Buddhism, "free from omissions or additions," will in the main agree with the opinion expressed on p. 195. "It is impossible rightly to understand any one phase of later Buddhism in any country, without starting from the standpoint of the earlier Buddhism of the Pāli Piṭakas." Even this, however, must be taken with some reserve. Mr. Rhys Davids draws an illustration from another field—"A Buddhist would never understand Spanish Christianity unless he traced it up, in a manner reasonably and sufficiently complete, from the earliest Church." To say nothing of the fact that "Spanish Christianity," as a separate ecclesiastical society, does not exist—for the Spanish Roman Catholics profess the same doctrine as the English and other Roman Catholics—the two cases are not alike, for all Christians, Spanish or other, have the same sacred writings; *all* Christian sects, orthodox or not, recognise essentially the same canon as the foundation of their faith. Now it happens that in the case of Buddhism it is precisely the opposite. The sub-divisions of this Church have *not* the same canon, and, what is more, they have not one single book in common. We have seen from the Dipavansa that the Pāli Piṭakas are the books of one sect, which called

itself orthodox, and professed to have faithfully preserved the doctrines of the eight Theras. The reason why the authority of these eight Theras is so great is that they had all known the Buddha face to face. Now, luckily, these eight were still living, exactly a hundred years after the Buddha's death, to lay the "wicked Bhikkhus, the Vajjiputtakas, who held the Great Council" under the ban. The youngest of these Theras, therefore, cannot have been less than a hundred and twenty years old at the time. One of them, Yasa, was amongst the first converts of the Buddha, and must, therefore, have reached the ripe old age of a hundred and sixty-five at least. Truly the orthodox church enjoyed a rare piece of good fortune in the lengthened lives of all these eight Theras, which enabled them to hand down the doctrine in all its purity, "free from omissions or additions;" but, alas! even these eight could not avert a schism when the first century had gone by. Are we to suppose that the Northern Pīṭakas were the work of these schismatics, or of later heretics? There is not a shadow of evidence to that effect. What became, then, amongst the Northern believers, of the old canonical writings of the golden age, when all Buddhists were as yet united? There are short fragments in the canonical writings of the North, which coincide verbally, or almost verbally, with passages in the Pāli Pīṭakas, and of these fragments we may assert that they were the common inheritance of all the sons of Buddha; but in all other cases it still remains to be seen whether and how far the canonical books of the North can have arisen from modifications of the *existing* Pāli texts. At the same time, inquiry must be made which writings are derived from other—ultimately non-Buddhist—sources. Hitherto such comparative research has been impossible, inasmuch as hardly any of the Northern Canon has yet been edited in Sanskrit.

Amongst the few Buddhist books that have been edited

in the Sanskrit text, is the *Lalita-Vistara*. In a discussion of the date of this work, Mr. Rhys Davids comes to the conclusion that it may have been composed some thousand years after Gotama's death; on which he takes occasion to enter "a protest against the careless and much too common habit of using works dating many centuries after the time of the Buddha, as evidence of opinions or teachings of Gotama himself." Every one must admit without reserve that the later the book the greater the chance of its contents departing from the original. But the question is by no means so simple as is here represented. Are we at liberty, for instance, to use a work in which the Greeks are mentioned "as evidence of the opinions or the teachings of Gotama himself"? and are we precluded from using other books, such as the *Lalita-Vistara*, the date of which is entirely unknown? In this same *Lalita-Vistara*, and in other writings of the Northern Church, passages occur which are found verbally, or almost verbally, in Pāli books as well. These passages, at any rate, must be regarded as equally ancient in either case. It is true, however, that there is a different spirit in the *Lalita-Vistara*. The ideal of the Bodhisatva, who endures all things out of love of created beings, comes out more beautifully perhaps in this than in any other Buddhistic writing; and if it may be taken, in its entirety, "*as evidence of Nepalese beliefs at the time when it was composed,*" the Nepalese poet who so well perceived and worked out the ideal deserves our highest admiration.

It is far from my intention to deny that Northern Buddhism approximates more closely to Hinduism than Southern Buddhism does, or to maintain that the writings of the former have not felt the influence of other Indian systems; and considering that most, if not all, of these writings were composed by Indians and in India, and that the Buddhists of the mainland remained much longer than the Singalese in close relations with their unbelieving

countrymen, their distinguishing tendency and line of development is easily enough explained.

"The modifications the faith has undergone in various countries" are to be ascribed to "influences of ideas foreign, even antagonistic," to the faith itself. Amongst the characteristics of the Northern Buddhism, Mr. Rhys Davids mentions "the exaggerated importance attached to its mysticism, to its negative teaching." As regards this latter point, we may remark by way of supplement that the *zeal* of the Northern believers, at any rate, was not "negative." Their preachers and pilgrims were men of action. They spread their faith successively over China, Thibet, Japan, and Mongolia, and made numerous converts in Kamboja (in Further India), in Java, and in Sumatra.

In comparing the remarkable coincidence between the organisation of the Roman Catholic Church and the Thibetan Lamaism, Mr. Rhys Davids remarks (p. 194) that "each had its origin at a time when the new faith was adopted by the invading hordes of barbarian men bursting in upon an older, a more advanced civilisation." We will say nothing of the circumstances under which the Thibetan hierarchy was developed; but, confining ourselves to Europe, we may ask how far the facts to which the Roman Catholic hierarchy owed its origin are fairly represented. The "invading hordes of barbarian men bursting in upon an older civilisation" can only refer to the Teutonic peoples who made themselves the temporary or permanent masters of portions of the Roman empire in the fifth and sixth centuries. What influence may we ascribe to these peoples in the development of the hierarchy? This question demands the most careful consideration, for the Teutonic race, from the days of Julius Cæsar to the present time, has, on the whole, shown itself to be anti-hierarchical, and to value freedom more than autho-

city. This fundamental trait in their character displayed itself in ancient times far more conspicuously than even now. As long as these "barbarians"—a term which, for my part, I should be sorry to use on my own account—retained their nationality, they were not favourably disposed to the Pope at Rome. The Goths, under Alaric and Theodoric, in their capacity of Arians, were anything but promoters of the hierarchy, while the Longobardi had other reasons for hostility. It was not till the eighth century, long after the invasion of the said "hordes of barbarian men," and long after the establishment of the hierarchy, that certain Frankish kings supported the Pope. Their reasons for doing so need not be investigated here, but they certainly imply no want of insight or conduct, for Pepin and Charlemagne cannot well be called "children in intellect." It may be urged that the deeds of princes prove little as to the spiritual and moral condition of peoples. But what proof or shadow of a proof is there that the Franks, Longobardi, and the rest were more apt to further the rise of the Roman hierarchy or organisation than the Romanised inhabitants of the countries conquered by the Teutons were? When we see that the peoples of Teuton race in Germany, England, Holland, Scandinavia, North America, and elsewhere, have for centuries been involved, in one way or another, in strained relations with the Holy Seat, and have in large measure formally severed themselves from the Roman Catholic Church, and when we compare all this with what we know of the Goths and Longobardi, we incline to the conclusion that the "invading hordes of barbarian men" were not in a position, indeed, completely to check the growth of the hierarchy, but that had it not been for them and their strong tendencies to decentralisation, this hierarchy would have become far mightier yet. So much is certain, that the Roman Catholic organisation has found

more acquiescence and firmer support in countries of "an older, more advanced civilisation," than amongst the Teutonic "barbarians," so that we have no reason to suppose that the defective mental culture of these latter favoured the development of the hierarchy. Nor must we forget that, rightly or wrongly, these "barbarians" stood, in their own estimation, far above the Romans and the Romanised peoples, not only in strength and courage, but also in sound common sense.

I conclude these notes on the Lectures by adopting the words of Mr. Rhys Davids and saying, in relation to my own criticisms, "What has been left unsaid is . . . more in extent, and in many directions more interesting perhaps, and more important, than what has been said." My object has by no means been to give such a full analysis of the contents of the Lectures as to tempt the reader into holding himself absolved from studying the book itself. On the contrary, everything I have said has been intended to stimulate all who read it to make themselves acquainted with the Hibbert Lectures; and it was in no spirit of barren compliment that I began by pronouncing them in a high degree interesting and suggestive.

H. KERN.

Leiden.

ALFONSO LA MARMORA.*

WHEN Burke, at the time of the French Revolution, lamented that the age of chivalry was gone, he meant the old cavalier spirit of loyalty to the reigning dynasty. And the statement was true to a certain extent. In our island the downfall of the Stuarts had given a fatal blow to this sentiment. After James II. had been thrust from the throne, and a foreigner elected in his stead, never again could the principle of Divine Right hold up its head with any sort of confidence. Thenceforward British sovereigns should reign by the will of the nation, and learn that Legitimacy, though a respectable thing in itself, was not an insuperable barrier to the removal of a prince who made himself obnoxious to his subjects. A century later, when the French Revolution gave birth to democracy, the spirit of chivalry (in Burke's sense) may be said to have expired generally throughout Europe. The nations, suddenly awakened to a sense of man's rights, rose and protested against despotism; and if they sank again under the yoke it was in a sullen mood awaiting a day of reckoning.

In Italy the gross abuse of sovereign power provoked frequent conspiracies and rebellions. The Italians are naturally an easy-going, patient people, and could bear a considerable amount of paternal government if judiciously administered; and so it happened that in a State where the Prince, though despotic, was in the main just and true, he

* *Il Generale Alfonso La Marmora. Ricordi Biografici. Per GIUSEPPE MASSARI. Firenze.*

was loved and served with that romantic devotion which united a Highland clan to the chief. The Kings of Sardinia had never been given to grinding their people into poverty to support extravagant pomp and luxury. They were hardy soldiers who did not send their armies to fight for them; they led them to the field, and shared their hardships. For ages the spirit of loyalty to the house of Savoy and personal attachment to its actual representative had grown into the blood of the Piedmontese nobility and people, and it bound them like an enchanter's spell from raising their hand to grasp the liberty they began to long for when the echo of the French Revolution made itself heard. Even the young Constitutionalists of 1821 had no intention of dethroning Victor Emmanuel I.; they wished to separate him from Austria, and "make him greater and more powerful" against his will. Santorre Santa Rosa, the leader of the movement, wrote of the King's abdication:—

"The night of March 13th, 1821, was fatal to my country; so many swords raised in defence of liberty dropped; so many dear hopes vanished like a dream. The country, it is true, did not fall with the King, but for us the country was *in* the King—Victor Emmanuel himself personified it, and the young promoters of that military revolution often said, 'Perhaps some day he will pardon us for having made him King of six million of Italians.'"

Thus we see that the old cavalier spirit of loyalty to the sovereign as such was still alive in Piedmont after it had died a natural or violent death in most other Continental countries, and it was so strong that in the struggle with the fierce young spirit of democracy it was able to hold its own. The reconciliation of these two spirits took place in 1848, when Charles Albert voluntarily renounced his absolutism, and proclaimed a Constitution. With rapturous joy the citizens of Turin beheld their hereditary Prince raise the tricoloured banner on the balcony of his palace, and

with tears of passionate emotion they vowed eternal fealty to the House of Savoy. They could not be more royalist than the King, and he had become revolutionist; there was nothing now to divide them, and he became their hero. There is enough of the savage in the most civilised races to make them like their ruler to be a fighting man. The Princes of Savoy had always been such, and, the Salic law prohibiting female succession, there was never an exception to the rule. Charles Albert did his duty to the best of his ability, and recklessly exposed his life on repeated battlefields; but he was not an able general, and the fates were against him. His successes in the beginning of the campaign were due chiefly to the wild daring of his son Victor, and the enthusiasm he inspired.

It was in this school that Alfonso Ferrero La Marmora was bred. Descended from a princely line old as the dynasty itself—which counts more than nine centuries of existence—to which he was bound by a hundred family traditions, he grew up amongst his numerous brothers and sisters with all the prejudices and virtues of his race. He was by nature, as well as by education, conservative; but with an intelligence of no common order he sought, by the study of foreign nations, to learn how to improve his own, and though extremely cautious and given to look at the worst possibilities which might arise out of any measure, when once it was decided upon he was resolutely brave in carrying it out. Alfonso La Marmora was the Bayard of New Italy, with all the chivalry and gallantry of his prototype, and some additional attributes which were, perhaps, wanting in the latter. He was an affectionate brother; a model husband, idolised by his wife; a true, warm-hearted friend; a loyal enemy; a patriotic citizen, and the most self-sacrificing, devoted subject king ever had. Though a strict commander, he took such a kind interest in his men that he was called the father of his soldiers, and was

sincerely loved by them. His talents were of a high quality, but he never overrated them, or depreciated the merits of others. He was not ambitious, and his biographer, Massari, has aptly put on the title-page of his life this line from Macaulay—" *He found glory only because glory lay in the plain path of duty.*" Lord Clarendon, who met him at the Paris Conference, said: "He looks statesmanlike, soldierlike, and gentlemanlike." And contemplating his portrait taken at middle life, when he was covered with honours, one can see that he had a commanding presence. Tall, thin, upright, with the Italian type of face; broad across the forehead, tapering downwards; long, Roman nose; keen, dark eyes, protected by heavy brows; well-kept moustache and beard of dark brown colour and just proportions. The expression is grave and thoughtful; it is the face of a sensitive but self-contained man. It is not a happy face; and, in fact, the owner was not a happy man. No one constituted as he was could be happy for any continuous length of time. That "sublime repression of himself" which he practised all his life was carried too far, and, it seems to us, had a natural re-action in his latter years, when the proud, sensitive soul, afflicted by many sorrows, began to feel that his affections had met with a cold return, that his acts and his motives had not been understood or appreciated, and he could no longer conceal his heart-wounds with that mantle of calm, dignified reserve which he had hitherto worn.

All his life La Marmora had one chosen friend, who was his confidant, and who knew the full depth and tenderness of his heart as, perhaps, no one else did, not excepting his loved brothers and sisters. This friend had predicted, when they were both at the Military Academy, that Alfonso would be a great man, and bring honour to his country; and their correspondence lays bare his character in its mingled strength and weakness, and enables the reader to form a

judgment more correct and true than any description of him could. The cruel accusations of Prince Bismarck called forth many gallant defenders of his fame in Italy, both before and since his death in 1878. One who deserves particular mention is Captain Chiala, to whom the public is indebted for the interesting private correspondence of the General during the Crimean War. The last and most important publication on the subject by the famous biographer, Massari, we have taken as a text for our brief notice of his life ; but as it describes only the public career of the hero, we will not confine ourselves to its pages.

Alfonso was the fourth son of the Marquis della Marmora and Prince Masserano ; his three elder brothers were distinguished soldiers, the one next him, Alessandro, being the founder of the fine corps called Bersaglieri. Alfonso, obeying the genius of his race, devoted himself with extraordinary zeal to the improvement of the Piedmontese army, and to that end he travelled much in foreign countries in order to profit by studying the different systems of each nation. When not much past thirty he was appointed military tutor to the Princes Victor Emmanuel and Ferdinand, a post once occupied by his friend Dabormida. He did not desire the office, and felt it to be a heavy responsibility ; but, having undertaken it, he gave himself heartily to the work, and a close and warm friendship grew up between him and his royal pupils. Though wayward and fond of pleasure, Victor had such fine qualities, such a princely, magnanimous spirit, that every one loved him. The Duke of Genoa's more serious and less impulsive character, however, was in sympathy with that of La Marmora, and their relations were consequently more easy. The young men were much given to " discuss questions," and as they were all three very tenacious of their own opinion, they often spent a whole evening in passionate argument, which a stranger might imagine would lead to a

quarrel, but which, in reality, never caused more than a momentary ruffling of temper. Next morning they met with serene countenances, and laughed over the excitement of the evening before.

La Marmora was the most sincere and honest of counsellors: his chivalrous loyalty, which was part of his very being, did not hinder him from expressing his opinion and giving his advice with perfect frankness to the princes—nay, it impelled him to do so; he had their welfare too much at heart to play the courtier, and they knew it and loved him. An officer once related a story to the princes about one of his companions, who had made a journey in the mountains and was supposed to be lost in the snows of Mount St. Bernard, and a friend of his, not waiting for aid, had gone alone to seek him, and saved his life at the imminent peril of his own—this friend being La Marmora. “Even before you named the officer I knew it must have been our Alfonso!” exclaimed the Duke of Genoa.

In 1848 La Marmora saved the life of Charles Albert by great presence of mind and intrepidity. The Milan mob, persuaded that the king had betrayed them, surrounded the palace, throwing stones and firing shots through the windows and threatening to set fire to the building. Alfonso's eldest brother, the Prince of Masserano, was there, and he had sent a gallant young officer to seek assistance from the garrison outside. But obstacles delayed him, and our hero not being aware of the order given by his brother, and seeing the danger increase momentarily, rushed out into the street, and, by sheer intrepidity, forced his way through the populace, called together a body of troops, with which he returned and carried the King off before young Torelli had been able to get back with the necessary escort. When they returned to Turin the Queen asked to see Colonel La Marmora.

“Monsieur le Chevalier, vous avez sauvé le Roi; j'en

garderai un souvenir éternel!" she exclaimed, with trembling emotion, as La Marmora raised her hand to his lips with the deep respectful sympathy which seldom found expression in words. "It was not only the King I wished to save," he said to a friend, "but the Milan populace from the perpetration of a horrid crime, the consequences of which would have been fatal to Italy."

Novara soon followed, and on that disastrous battlefield Charles Albert, who had sought death in vain, laid down sword and sceptre:—

Stripped away

The ancestral ermine ere the smoke was cleared,
And, naked to the soul, that none might say
His Kingship covered what was base, or bled
With treason, he went out an exile, yea
An exiled patriot: let him be revered.

* * * * *

For he was shriven, I think, in cannon smoke,
And taking off his crown, made visible
A hero's forehead. Shaking Austria's yoke
He shattered his own hand and heart.

La Marmora's grief at the issue of the campaign may be imagined, but he did not despair or waste time in vain lamentations. His country still remained, and her independence, her very existence, depended on the strength of Victor Emmanuel's throne; all true patriots rallied round the monarchy; the republicans, who were rioting in Genoa, cannot be called such, as nothing could be more disastrous for their country than the policy they then pursued. They were for the most part a set of disappointed political adventurers, collected from all parts of Italy, and had chosen Genoa as a convenient centre. La Marmora's first service to his new King was the painful one of reducing the rebel city to obedience; and he was in all the more haste because he feared Austria would make the disorders a pretext for intervening, as she did in all the other States of

Italy. La Marmora (now General) took the city by storm, arrested Garibaldi, proclaimed martial law—taking great care, however, that the peaceful citizens did not suffer in any way—and finally, by his delicate tact, won the respect and goodwill, almost friendship, of his revolutionary prisoner, and sent him on a Government mission to keep him out of harm's way. "It was a great error not to have made use of him," he wrote to Turin; "should another war arise, he is the man to employ."

When the smoke of battle had cleared off and the General had time to renew the amenities of life, he was pleased to find that amongst those who welcomed him to Genoa was Miss Mathews, an English lady, who was a close friend of one of his sisters, and whose acquaintance he had made some time before. Their relations soon became more intimate, and after overcoming some not unnatural misgivings on account of the fact that the lady had become an ardent Roman Catholic, and was in the hands of the Jesuits, who had converted her, he made her his wife. As might have been expected, no little unhappiness to them both resulted from the part which La Marmora felt bound to take in the crusade which the Government of Victor Emmanuel had just begun against clerical immunities and abuses. But the Signora who had to hear from her Jesuit friends that her husband was a sacrilegious monster, a heretic, and so on, had the best opportunities of judging his character for herself; and she soon learned to admire and love him as he deserved.

La Marmora was Cavour's colleague for seven years, and when the grand idea of the Crimean alliance began to be mooted he opposed it strongly. "And where will the money be got?" he asked, when Cavour had successfully assailed and overcome his objections. "England will think of that," replied the Premier. "A subsidised army! The model troops, whose *morale* he had laboured so hard

to elevate, were they to be reduced to a band of mercenaries, and he, their leader, to be at the command of a foreign Power? La Marmora's proud spirit started back from the proposition like a fiery war-horse who feels the touch of a hand, not his master's, on his bridle. They should fight as equals and allies, or not at all. And so a loan was substituted, and the dignity of the Sardinian army saved. La Marmora requested instructions from the Government as to how he was to behave towards the Allies. "He does not require instructions," said Cavour; "he will know how to act according to circumstances."

At the last moment, when the friends were saying adieu, the General asked once again: "In fine, how am I to regulate my conduct? Give me the instructions."

"Exercise your own ingenuity," replied Cavour, as he embraced him. Instructions met him subsequently at Constantinople, which were not to his taste, but he accepted them, using his own discretion, as he had a right to do, with regard to their interpretation. He behaved with great tact and judgment, and was highly esteemed by both English and French officers.

Before they had a chance of distinguishing themselves the Piedmontese army fell a prey to cholera, and this misfortune caused the General indescribable pain and anxiety. His brother, Alessandro, of whose military talent he had a high opinion, accompanied him to the Crimea, and ably assisted him in his duties. They were fondly attached to each other, and Alfonso's modesty and delicate regard for the feelings of others were pained by the fact that he was in a higher position than his elder brother; and when he was promoted at Genoa he concealed it on this account till after his return to Turin. The heaviest blow that had yet befallen him now came in the death of General Alessandro. But he bore it like a Spartan. Two hours after he had closed his brother's eyes he was

walking through the hospitals, attending to all the minute regulations for the comfort of the sick with as much if not more than usual care; and the suffering soldiers who looked with respectful sympathy into the calm melancholy face of their commander, could not read there the anguish of his soul, or know what it cost him to appear always "serene and resolute and still." In the evening he sent a telegram to Cavour:—" *Quel malheur ! mon frère est mort !*"

In his overwhelming sorrow he found relief in pouring out his feelings without reserve to his friend and confidant, General Dabormida, to whom, for thirty years, he had been bound by ties of the closest affection. In one of his letters he complains that in his package from Turin he found no word of sympathy from Cavour, which he had eagerly sought for among the heap. "You only," he writes to his favourite, "have understood my immense grief and my sore need of comfort in these woful conditions." But it was only Dabormida who knew how he suffered, and how keenly he felt the slightest neglect. From the rest he was careful to conceal his sensitiveness, and at the end of the same letter he sends his customary kind messages.

In time the cholera began to disappear, and then came that glorious day for the Piedmontese, the 16th of August, on which was fought the battle of the Tchernaya. It is probable that this would not have been a victory for the Allies if it had not been for the vigilance of La Marmora, who espied the approach of the enemy before dawn. All Europe rang with his fame, and he was described by the Allies as one of the ablest generals living.

Count Cavour to the Signora La Marmora.

Madame,—The Minister of War has received to-day, at three o'clock, the following dispatch from Alfonso:—

"Kamara, August 16.

"This morning the Russians attacked our lines with 50,000 men. The telegraph will tell if the Piedmontese are worthy to

fight beside the English and French. We repulsed the Russians with cries of *Vive le Roi! Vive la Patrie!* The Piedmontese have been very brave. General Montevecchio is dying. We have lost 200 men. The loss of the Russians is considerable. From the French despatches you will learn the rest."

These lines, dictated by La Marmora, will tell how our soldiers and their chief have covered themselves with glory, and that your husband has acquired a new title to the gratitude and affection of his fellow-citizens. You may feel proud of being his wife, as I am proud of being his friend.

Receive, Madame, the assurance of my respectful devotion.

C. CAVOUR.

Let us give a line or two picked out of the voluminous correspondence with Dabormida:—

The French were admirable for the intrepidity with which they repulsed twice, and in some places thrice, the numerous columns of Russians who had already mounted their positions. But they allowed themselves to be surprised, and (*entre nous*, be it understood), if it had not been for our advanced posts, which held firm for about an hour, they would have been late. "I did everything to make them pursue the enemy. (Strictly confidential, I entreat.) I pushed forward the Trotti Division across the Tchernaya, and had the vexation of seeing it turned back—once at the instance of General Morris, and again by Pelissier himself. . . . But to return to ours. I have to praise all in general, but in particular Trotti, Mollard, and that brave Montevecchio, who believed himself to be dying, and edified every one by his firmness, and the noble sentiments he expressed. We have now some hope of saving him.

We must quote a brief passage from Dabormida in reply:—

The letters that came from the English and French camps, as well as ours, are all agreed in recognising the honours acquired in this field by you and yours, and they supply the want in Pelissier's too laconic reports (in that which concerns us), and your too modest ones, a modesty of which I approve however. But the journals will inform you of the enthusiasm which this feat of arms has awakened, not only here, but in Paris and London. . . . I have said your report was

modest ; but permit me to say also that you are very sparing of praise. Could you not say in it of Trotti, Mollard, and Montevecchio what you said to me in your letters ? Could you not say a word of Ricotti and his battery, or mention the expressions of the dying Montevecchio ? You, my friend, place duty above all things, thereby proving the loftiness of your own soul ; but men in general, when they have done that duty well, like to be caressed and encouraged.

Great ovations awaited La Marmora when he returned to attend the Peace Conference at Paris. Cavour's carriage was at the station, and Cavour himself on the platform, determined to be the first to welcome "il nostro Wellington," as he was the last to bid him God-speed. He, too, had suffered much anxiety, feeling the terrible responsibility of the war ; but now that all had turned out as he had hoped, he gave free vent to his happy nature, and he was radiant with joyous triumph when he came forward to greet his friend. The embrace was cordial on both sides. La Marmora could not but feel gratified at the hearty enthusiasm of his welcome and the genuine delight Cavour took in hearing his praises. Later, when he returned with the troops from the Crimea, the ovations were renewed ; the King loaded him with honours and made him commander-in-chief of the whole army. The Queen of England, the Emperor of the French, the Queen of Spain, the Sultan of Turkey bestowed orders upon him. He bore his honours modestly, and shrank from the popular demonstrations.

"I hope this will end all the *fêtes* in our honour," he said to the King, as he was marshalling him to a thanksgiving service in the Piazza, for Victor loved to have the Church's blessing when he could get it. "They have been more than our deserts, and as much as we can bear."

He resumed his seat in the Cabinet, rather contrary to the King's wish, but Cavour insisted upon it, for he had a very high opinion of La Marmora's ability, and unlimited

confidence in his prudence, and he was the only one who was aware of the negotiations going on between the King and the Emperor of the French, of which Cavour was the medium. The Count wrote all particulars to him, and we have some interesting letters that passed between them at this time. Here is a passage from one just after the interview at Plombières :—

The only point not settled is that of the marriage of the Princess Clotilde. The King has authorised me to conclude it only in case the Emperor makes it a *sine quâ non* of the alliance. The Emperor not having pushed the matter to that extreme, I felt bound in honour not to make the engagement. But I am convinced that he attaches great importance to this marriage, and, if the alliance does not depend on it, its final success does. It would be a great error, very great, to unite with the Emperor and at the same time give him an offence which he would never forget, and it would be a serious mischief for the King to have by his side in the bosom of his counsels an implacable enemy, all the more to be feared as Corsican blood flows in his veins. I have written very warmly to the King, praying him not to place in danger the finest enterprise of modern times for the sake of some musty aristocratic scruples. I entreat you, if he consults you, to add your voice to mine. Let us not attempt an undertaking in which we risk our King's crown and the fate of our people without due consideration, but if we risk them, for the love of heaven, let us leave nothing undone to secure success in the struggle. I left Plombières with a more tranquil mind. If the King consents to the marriage, I have the hope, I should almost say the certainty, that within two years you will enter Vienna at the head of our victorious columns.

Not quite so far, Count Cavour! The astute, far-seeing diplomatist reckoned without his host on this occasion. But how could he imagine that the Emperor could be so weak and irresolute as to turn back from the enterprise at the moment of his most brilliant victory?

Signor Massari destroys somewhat the romance attaching to the famous *grido di dolore* by relating the particulars of

the preparation of the King's speech, but we can forgive him this for the sake of the flashes of light he throws on the characters of the two pillars of the State in their private conferences—Cavour giving out his deeply pondered schemes with an air of gay and reckless daring, La Marmora fulfilling the legitimate mission of a Conservative by pouring cold water on them, not to sweep them away, but rather to cleanse them from useless rubbish. He hesitated long about the policy of pushing matters to an extreme with Austria; but when the decisive moment arrived the cautious statesman disappeared, and he was all the soldier—fearless, resolute, indefatigable, full of a subdued fire. "Austria is a formidable enemy, but our cause is just; the public opinion of Europe will be with us. We shall do our duty," he said.

And bravely he did it; not as a soldier only, but as the King's adviser. The Emperor had wished La Marmora to have the supreme command, but the Parliament had willed that the King should lead his own army, and the general would not put himself in comparison with his sovereign. He refused, therefore, any military post, and accompanied Victor Emmanuel to the field in the character of a councillor. They quarrelled at the outset of the campaign because of La Marmora's energetic remonstrances with regard to Victor's reckless exposure of his life; and again about a retreat which the King had decided upon without consulting him, and of which he disapproved so much that he burst into the royal presence in defiance of the servants' orders to admit no one. If Victor Emmanuel had been a tyrant with the power and the will to cut off his head for this offence, he would have spoken his mind and gone to the block serenely, with a sense of fulfilled duty. As it was, the King listened with a dark brow and haughty bearing to his expostulations, and then replied that it was bootless to complain, as the order had been given and the

troops were already in motion. La Marmora then entreated him with great earnestness to repeal the order, and answered the King's arguments with such force that Victor's patience gave way, and he commanded him to be silent—he would hear no more. La Marmora, very much excited, but always respectful in tone, continued: He could not, he would not, be silent when his duty to his King obliged him to speak; his majesty might have him arrested and put under a court-martial—have him shot, if such were his royal pleasure, but speak he would; and the passion which agitated his soul made him eloquent. "Friends and enemies will have the right to despise us," he said at last; "we shall be dishonoured! I shall not move, for I prefer to fall into the hands of the Austrians rather than be the scorn of the French." The concluding words were not calculated to allay the King's natural anger, but he controlled it, and after a brief consultation with Canrobert, who was present, consented to revoke the order. If Victor Emmanuel let the sun go down on his wrath, it seldom rose on it again. The morning brought him information which showed him that his general had been right in his judgment, and prompt to acknowledge a wrong, he wrote with his own hand:—

Cher Général,—Je vous envoie la proclamation de l'Empereur. Dite moi si vous allez trouver le Maréchal Canrobert à Valence. Je vous remercie de ce que les troupes ne sont pas parties hier au soir. A vous revoir.

Votre très-affectionné,

VICTOR EMMANUEL.

When Cavour resigned in a fit of furious anger about the peace of Villa Franca, and La Marmora took up the reins of government unwillingly, at the King's bidding, he did his utmost to bring about a reconciliation between his former chief and the offended sovereign. He consulted him constantly, and begged him to return to office.

"I cannot," said Cavour one day, when he was beginning to recover from the terrible blow; "the place is filled."

"I will resign it to you willingly," was the quick reply.

"No," said Cavour; "if at all, I will serve under you."

"Impossible!" cried the General, whose modesty was startled by the proposition.

"Do you mean to say, Alfonso, that you would not work with me?" asked the Count, with his sly, humorous smile.

This was the time when the central provinces of Italy had thrown off their princes, and offered themselves as subjects to Victor Emmanuel, and his Government hesitated about concluding any engagement on the subject. Massimo D'Azeglio got out of patience with the delay, and wrote a stirring article, with his signature, pointing out its duty to the Ministry. La Marmora, with his delicate feeling, quickly appropriated all the implied blame to himself, and he wrote in a sad but not resentful spirit to his cousin:—

General La Marmora to Cavaliere D'Azeglio.

Turin, September 17, 1859.

Dear Massimo,—Notwithstanding the very bad state of my sight, I have read and re-read with increasing interest your stupendous article in the *Opinione* of the 16th, on *Piedmont and Central Italy*. You justly remark that a grave responsibility rests with the present Government, and you end by saying that the moment is supreme, and that on the resolutions now adopted depends the confirmation or the loss of the noble conquest. These observations of yours are very true; and so true, also, that other one, that "*only great characters save States*," that I feel it my duty to make you a proposition. You know with what repugnance I accepted the Presidency of this new Ministry. Now I feel myself incapable of conducting it, because I do not please the King, because I have public opinion against me, having not done enough for Italy, and little good for the army; and because—I confess it—I do not possess one of those characters which save States. Therefore I propose, without further prelude, that you take my place. After your memorable article, you will be carried in triumph. I await your reply before

speaking to the King or my colleagues, and I earnestly entreat you to send it in the affirmative, and quickly.

Your very affectionate friend,

ALFONSO LA MARMORA.

This letter, which is written in the familiar, brotherly, second person singular, elicited a prompt reply from the critic of his policy. "Lookers on are good wrestlers," says a vulgar proverb, the truth of which strikes one often in political affairs.

Cavaliere D'Azeglio to General La Marmora.

Cannero, September 19.

Dear Alfonso,—I receive at this moment, starting for Turin, your letter, which seems to me to show that you are exactly one of those characters indicated in my article, so strongly does it bear the stamp of the loyal-hearted, honest man upon it. How could you want me to become Minister, with my health, &c., &c.? But you know that I have always been your friend, although you sometimes make me angry. To-morrow I shall be at Turin, and if I can serve you in any way, you shall see that I will do it like a friend. The rest when I see you.

MASSIMO

La Marmora seized the earliest opportunity to resign, on a trifling pretext, and the King at once recalled Cavour to office, when there was a cordial reconciliation. This was what La Marmora wished, as he had tried hard to coax his former chief back to his duty. He went to a ball that evening, and enjoyed himself, saying there was a great weight lifted off his mind. Cavour and La Marmora had always got on very well together, in spite of the over-sensitiveness of the one and the commanding will of the other. Their intercourse was marked by personal attachment and unbounded confidence.

It was a pity that this delightful friendship should have been overcast by a cloud at the last. Cavour and La Marmora found themselves opposed to each other on some home questions; and angry words had been spoken in the

heat of debate. The Count accused the General of writing against his Government in the press; the suspicion was an insult to the knightly spirit of our hero, and he was on the point of resigning all his offices in a moment of fiery indignation. Cavour would not have allowed the estrangement to last long, for he was the most generous-minded of men, but his sudden death—an unparalleled disaster for his country—left no time for a reconciliation.

Four years later La Marmora was summoned by the King to his aid when affairs seemed in a hopeless muddle; and here it is only just to remember that La Marmora never had what might be called a fair chance to display his ability except in the Crimea. When affairs were prosperous some one else was in office; when troubles multiplied, and the burden of power was too much for those who sustained it, then the King, who knew the high-souled loyalty, the self-abnegation, of the man, appealed to him, and never appealed in vain. So now, in 1864, when Rattazzi had to beat a retreat before the enraged Turin citizens because of the French Convention, the General was once more called to the head of affairs. He had not approved of this Convention, but it was made, and must be fulfilled to the letter. "The King's signature is there; that settles the question," he said, resolutely, in the Chamber. He braved unpopularity willingly, and always threw himself, so to speak, into the breach between the King and the people. He was the scapegoat that Prince Bismarck pretends to be.

In 1866 he had not the sole command in the war. The King and Cialdini shared it, but La Marmora had to bear the obloquy of the defeat of Custoza. When Victor Emmanuel and his general found themselves in a hopeless position in front of a powerful enemy, they felt constrained to sue for an armistice without waiting to communicate with the other members of the Government. They both

felt bitterly the humiliation and the heavy responsibility of acting without advice. Victor Emmanuel loved his popularity, as was natural for a King elected by the suffrages of the nation; and La Marmora, after honour, prized most his stainless name. He knew the heaviest blame would fall on him, but he was willing to bear it all to shield his beloved prince; and it is to Victor Emmanuel's honour that he would not accept such sacrifices as many selfish monarchs, in times past, accepted as their divine right. "They may call me a traitor, they may impeach me; I do not care in the least," said our hero, almost in the same words in which he had defied the King in 1859. "I take all the responsibility, your Majesty; it is mine." Victor Emmanuel was deeply moved. With moist eyes, he pressed the General's hand, as he again protested with, "No, dear La Marmora; I must have my share."

All La Marmora's great troubles date from this unfortunate war. He was Prime Minister when the negotiations of an alliance with Prussia were carried on previous to the declaration of hostilities, and Count Bismarck, not knowing the man he had to deal with, revealed himself too openly to the Italian statesman; and when he found his mistake he hated him. La Marmora and the King had been offered Venice free on condition of their detaching themselves from the Prussian alliance, then not formally concluded; but the enormous bribe could not tempt the *Re Galantuomo* or the *Chevalier sans peur et sans reproche* to be guilty of a shadow of disloyalty. Later, however, they found that their slippery ally regarded the matter as Miss Flora Macflimsy did her betrothal—

This is a sort of engagement, you see,
Which is binding on you, but not binding on me.

We cannot here enter into the long and complicated case of La Marmora *versus* Bismarck. It would be impossible,

in our limited space, to convey even a faint idea of all the provocation, the long-suffering under slanderous reports, which La Marmora endured before he at last broke silence and published his volume, *Un Po' Piu di Luce*, in which he revealed enough unpleasant facts to make the most powerful man in Europe his deadly enemy. He was accused of playing into the hands of Austria at Custoza, falsifying dispatches, betraying his allies, and doing everything base and wicked that a public man could be guilty of. In Germany his name became synonymous with treachery, and his own Government publicly deplored the publication of his book as offensive to a friendly Power. He spoke on the subject in the Chamber on one occasion. "I do not want to pass down to posterity as a great captain or a great diplomatist, but I hold to living and dying as an honest citizen, as a soldier without a stain." He had devoted friends, however, particularly in the army, who would have shed their blood in defence of the honour of their revered chief. The persecution of slanderous tongues rendered him very unhappy; but he had his moments of triumph and his consolations. On one occasion, in the Chamber, when the controversy was at its height, the brilliant young diplomatist, General Govone, a man of La Marmora's stamp, pronounced an improvised and thrilling eulogy on him, till the subject of his eloquence, covered with confusion, stopped the excited orator by a gesture of entreaty and prohibition. His constituencies refused absolutely to allow him to retire, and persisted in electing him over and over again in spite of himself. The Venetians, who are a grateful people, remembering that he prepared the way for their redemption, sent him a warm address, regretting his absence on the great occasion of the King's entrance, saying they missed on that happy day "the dignified and noble form of one of their best friends."

And how came La Marmora to be absent on such an occasion? He had not been invited by the King to be present in proper time. Not till Victor Emmanuel was in Venice did he think of telegraphing to Florence for him, and then the General respectfully declined. He was too deeply wounded by his sovereign's neglect of him at the restoration of the Iron Crown, a public ceremony at which, of course, all the makers of Italy were assembled. "Would you believe it," he wrote, "the King never addressed a kind word to me?"

Notwithstanding our great admiration and affection for the memory of the Re Galantuomo, it must be confessed that he did not treat La Marmora as he deserved. The fact is, his nature was of a coarser texture, and he did not always understand him, or know how much he felt a slight neglect. Then, the General was proud and reserved, and in order not to compromise the King with his powerful allies, the Prussians, he kept out of the way, and avoided any intimate intercourse with the royal family. Victor Emmanuel, though a most generous-minded and democratic king, was still a king, and had his dignity to maintain. He would most probably have welcomed warmly any advance towards a better understanding, but the General made none; he hugged his wrongs in silence, and let them eat into his brave, tender heart. The proverbial ingratitude of princes does not apply to Victor Emmanuel. He was never known in any other case to be forgetful of faithful services, and his chivalry in defying "diplomacy" for a friend in trouble was often exemplified. We are induced, therefore, to believe that other reasons than that of selfish policy were at the bottom of his coldness to La Marmora. He was impatient of his "touchiness," irritated by the unpleasant noise excited by the revelations in *Un Po' Più di Luce*, and *Segreti di Stato*; and, above all, being a man of an expansive and open nature, he did not know the depth

of the affection which La Marmora cherished for him under his cold and distant bearing. For him

Loyalty was still the same,
Whether it win or lose the game;
True as the dial to the sun,
Although it be not shone upon.

One day at a dinner, seeing that the King's health was not proposed, he wrote on a card, which he passed to the Prefect, that if the Syndic did not intend to do it he would go away; and when the King had a bad fever in 1869, his friend tells us that when he called to see him, he was informed by his wife that he was reposing, being tired from having "wept all night."

It is right to mention that Margherita and Umberto were true to him, as far as Court etiquette permitted, under the circumstances. On their marriage the Princess sent him her portrait, with the lines, written in her own hand, "*To my father's faithful friend. Margherita di Savoja.*" And in the autumn of 1877, when the Prince learned that La Marmora's health was broken down, he sent by telegraph a cordial message of regret, and of hope for his speedy recovery, with an expression of most sincere friendship and regard.

As soon as Victor Emmanuel was made aware of his illness he wrote in his old familiar, kindly tone; and the poor General was consoled also by the many marks of sympathy and esteem that were showered upon him from all parts of Europe as well as from his own people in these last months of his life. His "glorious enemy," the Archduke Albert, had a special regard for him; they had met in friendly guise three months after Custoza, and discussed the war, when La Marmora, who was the guest of the prince, reproached him gently for the unjust accusation of want of faith which he made in a proclamation. By some mistake, owing probably to the difference of the time

of their respective watches, the Austrian commander was under the impression that the Italians had begun hostilities before the expiration of the hour named in the declaration of war, and hence the offensive allusion to the "disloyal foe" in the proclamation. When La Marmora explained saying, "I was standing on the *middle* of the bridge beside His Majesty with my watch in my hand when I heard a clock strike the hour," the Archduke left him, and having made inquiries into the matter, returned, saying La Marmora was right, and tendered an apology for his hasty accusation. He treated him with the greatest consideration always, having sought his acquaintance perseveringly; when he heard that his late enemy was travelling *incognito* in Austria he sent an officer with an invitation, and would take no excuse. La Marmora shrank from meeting him, and pleaded that he had no uniform with him, and could not present himself to his Imperial Highness; but the next day brought a more urgent message, and he felt it would be too uncourteous to persist in a refusal. Perhaps these friendly relations with Austrians, so soon after the war, gave colour to the accusations of the Prussian Chancellor.

La Marmora's wife died about a year before himself, to his great grief. The large fortune she left him, which he never touched in her lifetime, he hastened to bestow on benevolent institutions, for he had no children.

To the Conte Arese.

Florence, 1876.

You cannot imagine, dear Arese, what I have suffered, seeing the suffering and death of my poor wife. Notwithstanding our different way of thinking on some things we loved each other deeply, and during her long and painful illness I was more than ever convinced that that noble woman never had any serious affection but for me.

To the Contessa Matilde Arese.

Oh, what a blow! what a tremendous disaster for one who had, one by one, lost seven brothers, five sisters, four brothers-

in-law, three sisters-in-law, and who never thought of being left a widower, the only survivor of the generation to which I belong. Of twenty-one I only remain.

The General was already in bad health from all the trials he had undergone, and he grew gradually worse after the loss of his wife, so that the last year of his life was a period of great physical suffering. Death was not unwelcome to the brave old soldier, who was worn out with trouble ; but he was not impatient or disagreeable. He read his favourite authors, conversed with his friends, was made happy by the reconciliation with the King, and in the intervals of pain was bright and cheerful. He never made much profession of faith, but he was a believing Christian, and his last look was turned on the crucifix as he sank gently into repose. The national mourning for the illustrious soldier was soon swallowed up by a heavier grief. Alfonso and Victor Emmanuel had been bound together by the accident of birth ; their lines of life had crossed, and their deaths occurring within four days of each other make the association of their names inseparable in Italian history—names of which any country might well be proud, and to which posterity perhaps will do more justice than did their own generation.

G. S. GODKIN.

POOR LAW RELIEF AND PRIVATE CHARITY.

“IT'S very hard that we should have both to pay the Poor Rates and to subscribe to Charity Organisation and Relief Societies.” So says or thinks many a well-to-do ratepayer at the present day, and as there are the strongest reasons why he should continue to pay both these contributions, it is well to understand what are his objections, that we may try to remove them from his own mind so far as they are ill-grounded, and remove their causes so far as they are well-founded. His main objection seems to be simply this: That it is employing and paying two sets of men to do the same or similar work. The costliness of the machinery connected with the administration of relief is one of the readiest and most popular charges that a hostile critic can take up. People wish to see their money go direct to relieve want and suffering, and grudge the amount absorbed by intermediate agents. All the more do they ask why there should be two sets of offices, one for the Board of Guardians and one for the private charity committee; two sets of officials, the parish relieving officers and the paid visitors of the private society; nay, why should two sets of good and able men be called upon to give up valuable time to form, one, the Board of Guardians, the other, the private charity committee.

The answer to these questions is to be found in the fact that different and incompatible duties devolve upon Poor Law relief and private charity, and that any attempt to

combine their functions and assimilate their methods is fatal to their efficient discharge of these duties.

We must go back to the period before 1834, when the new Poor Law came into operation, to learn what harm may be done by a good-natured administration of Poor Law relief. The subject has been well illustrated in recent books,* from which we will quote only a few instances, but they will be enough to prove the truth of the statement "that all the injury inflicted upon the labouring classes by the deliberately hostile legislation of Plantagenet or Tudor statesmen was but as dust in the balance compared with what they suffered from the benevolent measures of some of the best men that have ever ruled in England. As it has been well expressed: 'The poor might well say, We can deal with our enemies, only save us from our friends.'"

In 1783 the Poor Law expenditure amounted to £2,004,238; in 1817 it reached its maximum of £7,870,801. How heavily this pressed upon the ratepayers with a population of only 11,000,000, and most unequal distribution of the burden, can easily be imagined. The report of 1834 tells us: "In one parish the rector was required to employ 62½ men at 10s. a-week, besides his poor rate of £420, an amount which was about double the value of his benefice." At Cholesbury, in Buckinghamshire, the rates in 1801 were £10 11s.; in 1832 they had mounted up to £367, "when they ceased, owing to the impossibility of collecting them. The poor rate had swallowed up the whole value of the land, which was going out of cultivation." "It sometimes happened that the overseer called for rates upon men who had at that moment nothing to eat in the house. As one witness said, 'Poor is the diet of the pauper; poorer is the diet of the small

* *Dispauperisation*. By J. R. PRETYMAN, M.A. London: Longmans. 1878. *The Poor Law*. By T. W. FOWLE, M.A., Rector of Islip. London: Macmillan. 1881. English Citizen Series.

ratepayer; poorest is the diet of the independent labourer." Meanwhile the demoralisation of the labourer proceeded step by step with the increase in the rates. Men were paid for standing idle in the pound; when they were set to work "most of the day was spent in idleness, and an attempt to put a superintendent over the work was promptly met by a successful threat to drown him. The paupers claimed a right (before the justices) to work less hours for the parish than for private employers, and in many places received higher pay than they could earn as wages. If a man showed signs of doing his task work, the obvious remark of his companions was, 'You must have your money whether you work or not.'" Farmers were often compelled to hire a fixed number of pauper labourers, and thus induced to discharge their regular hands in order to find room for the new comers. The man who had saved money would be left without work till his savings were spent; men who put off marrying had not the same chance of employment as youths with families. It was a regular practice with employers to reduce wages far below starvation point, because they would then be supplemented out of a rate to which others besides employers contributed; and the total income of the inferior workman was often made equal to that of his superior workmate. The female sex received its special degradation when the amount of money paid to the mother of two or three illegitimate children "enabled her to live more comfortably than most decent families, more especially in the very common case where the children were utterly neglected; nay, she was 'considered a good object of marriage on account of these weekly payments.'"

In the case of Indoor Relief, the abuse could hardly grow to so great an extent, but the food given was generally superior, both in quality and quantity, to what independent labourers could afford. "Everywhere the Kentish pauper

has three, four, or five meat days a week ; his bread is many degrees better than that given to our soldiers ; he has vegetables at discretion ; and in the larger houses the boast is, 'We gives 'em as much victuals as ever they can eat.' " In one contract that was actually printed and published, the contractors engaged to provide the workhouse with "warm, wholesome, sweet, clean, comfortable beds ; servants to cook and serve the victuals, and attend on the poor ; good, sweet, wholesome fat meat, good sound small beer, best flour, good Gloucester cheese, good and clean butter." Pork and salt meat were forbidden. Bacon and fish were allowed as a variety. The fires were to be good, and kept up in certain rooms at all hours, so that the paupers might boil their tea-kettles. Lastly, the contractors were "to provide *wigs* for such as wear them or require them."

These instances, all taken from Mr. Fowle's excellent little manual of the Poor Law, will suffice to show the general violation of the canon of Poor Law Relief: *that the condition of the pauper ought to be, on the whole, less eligible than that of the independent labourer*. They will help us to understand the depth of the degradation to which the "independent" (!) labourer has been reduced, and how the English nation, with all its industry and good sense, has been trained to become one of the most unthrifty in the world.*

* The following case is no extreme instance, but is sadly typical of the way in which hard-earned wages are often spent. I called one Monday at a house where I had sometimes received a little money for the Liverpool Provident Society, but where I was generally told they were too poor to lay by. Here I found them all drinking ; the daughter, a young married woman, having broken the pledge she had taken with us a few days before. I called again the next day to see if anything could be done, but was simply told that those I wanted were "not at home ;" and from a neighbour I learned what it all meant. A brother had come home from a fourteen months' voyage, during which he had been employed as a sailmaker, at the rate of £5 10s. a month. Now he was spending the whole sum he had earned, about £90, in drink and dissipation ; and till it was all gone, and the pawnshop

For these intolerable evils a remedy was sought and found in a series of measures, the purpose and effect of which may be summed up in the one word "stringency." The new Poor Law of 1834 introduced better methods of administration, and executed a sweeping reformation of abuses, with results which, as far as statistics go, were eminently satisfactory. The total expenditure was soon diminished by one quarter. The expenditure per head of population fell from 8s. 9½d. in 1834 to 5s. 5d. in 1837; the percentage of paupers to the whole population has decreased more slowly, but to a still greater extent; and when, say about 1871, it was evident that some of the old evils were creeping back, this fact was observed and led to an increase in "stringency," which is once again giving us statistics which show the same kind of satisfactory decrease in numbers and percentages. It is the boast of the upholders of the new Poor Law system that the giving of relief can be made so disagreeable to the recipients as effectually to keep down their numbers, and that without making the physical penalties of pauperism more severe than public opinion will permit, the moral stigma and degradation may be so cultivated by judicious "stringency," as to become most powerful deterrents.

But if we now turn our attention away from generalities, from big totals, percentages, and averages, and look closely into a few typical cases—cases of actual living men and women—our own flesh and blood, all unfortunate and suffering, and most of them, even when the fault is technically "their own," brought up under conditions of terrible temptation to folly and sin, then the results of "stringency" are not found to be so satisfactory. The instances in which people die of starvation rather than go to had again received everything that had been redeemed, there would be no speaking to any of the household; they were drunk as early as half-past seven in the morning; indeed, talking to them, said my informant, was "like pouring water upon a drowned rat."

the parish are more common than they are supposed to be, for it is only the glaring cases on which inquests are held. But, leaving out of view all that may be regarded as sensational or sentimental, the incurable vice of the whole system is this: *the pains and penalties of pauperism now fall heaviest on those who least deserve them.* Light as a feather to the dissolute, half-criminal tramp, they weigh like lead upon the soul of the decent, striving poor; they hang like the sword of Damocles over the heads of those who just avoid them year by year, who, after making every effort, find their strength growing less and less, and employment more and more precarious, and so have to end at last by submitting to what has been the dread of half a lifetime; they afford the pleasing excitement of a safe and stirring encounter to those who regard the relieving officer as their natural foe and the parish as their natural prey, and devote to the task of extracting relief an amount of ingenuity and industry that might fairly have earned them an honest livelihood. This is one side of the question of "stringency," when looked at closely. And here is an instance of the actual meaning of reduced expenditure. A widow who had had a large family, and was very respectably connected, but is now childless, and almost without relatives, lives in an attic, for which she pays 1s. 3d. a week. To get to it you pass through a bird and rabbit shop, the smell of which is intolerable to unaccustomed nostrils, and ascend two flights of stairs, perfectly dark, save when a door is opened, steep, winding in an irregular corkscrew, and sometimes broken. Up these stairs, from a cellar kitchen, she has to bring every drop of water she uses, and often all her coals. The room itself is tolerably large and clean, but the furniture is of the poorest and most meagre description. She can earn a little by sewing, but her health is very poor, and she is often confined to her bed. The parish allowance was 2s. 6d. a-week,

but in a fit of economy the Guardians have just reduced it to 2s., which, when she has paid her rent, leaves her 9d. a-week to live on. Friends who know how deserving she is have in her instance come forward to give her help; but there seems something indescribably petty in the whole business, especially as it is only a recurrence to a reduction which the Guardians made once before, and a little later, in a more lenient mood, reversed, as they very likely will do again. Here is another case which has come under my own notice: An aged couple were deprived of their parish money, at the instance of a relieving officer, who was shortly after himself dismissed for drinking and misconduct, when they soon got their money back again. In their case it is 2s. 6d. a week, and just pays the rent; their earnings are practically *nil*, and they live upon what they beg from former employers and others, and a little help irregularly and grudgingly given by a relative. Their objection to go into the House is mainly that, though quite old and infirm, they would be separated.

Of Indoor Relief or the Workhouse little need be said here beyond testifying to the dread and hatred with which it is regarded by all who have not wholly lost their self-respect and love of freedom. No distinction is allowed among its inmates on the ground of conduct or character previous to entering; they are simply classified according to age and sex; but as paupers with a good character generally get outdoor relief, those admitted, except they be too infirm to live out, must necessarily be a very low class, and to join their ranks a cruel degradation to the more respectable poor. It is difficult to see what harm would be done by allowing superior treatment for those who can prove by the evidence of employers, ministers of religion, and savings-banks, that they really had tried to work, to keep respectable, and to save, and who had been brought low chiefly by undeserved misfortune. A sort of almshouse

retreat* for such would surely be a more fitting national provision than the miserable outdoor dole which is all for which they can at present hope and manœuvre.

Of course, no one expects paupers to be grateful for what they get. It is not given them out of kindness, but because they have a legal right to relief. The guardians have no business to be generous—with other people's money, and, to say truth, very seldom attempt to be. The relieving officer is practically the paupers' great enemy; he represents the defenders of the citadel they try to storm. No doubt he may have his favourites, and, so far as favouritism exists in or out of the workhouse, certain selected individuals may feel grateful for privileges denied to their brethren, while others bitterly resent the injustice; but so long as the Poor Law is worked with rigid impartiality and the indispensable "stringency," so long is there an absurdity, not to say a manifest impropriety, in expecting paupers to be thankful.

And yet we here lose what is the greatest redeeming power which has ever been applied to rescue the fallen and raise the degraded. When we are tempted to turn away from the miseries of the world, utterly sick at heart from seeing how benevolence has multiplied the evils it tried to cure, how fatal it is to rashly meddle with the "struggle for existence" and the "survival of the fittest," how dangerous it is to save the "weak" from going to the wall, and the "hindmost" from being overtaken by their natural fate, then there is only one thing that can keep us to our work, one trust which experience never puts to shame, and that is, *faith in the power of love*. On one condition, and one condition alone, can "stringency" safely be relaxed, and that is that its place be taken by the ties of personal affection. When the poor are relieved by

* Well-managed almshouses are often admirable institutions, but there are often most of them where they are least wanted. Far too plentiful in Warwick, they are almost entirely wanting in Liverpool.

one whom they know to be a real, true friend, one who has proved his friendship in other ways than merely giving money, one who has given time and thought, and what is still more efficacious, time and kind feeling, one who is of a sympathetic nature, and has freely let this sympathy appear, when the money gift is little more than an accidental outcome of the friendship, when it is given with spontaneity and taken with reluctance, then, and not till then, does almsgiving rise to Christian charity, and instead of tending to pauperise, forms one of the strongest incentives to self-help and self-reliance. It makes one ashamed of one's kind to hear the way in which people talk of the ingratitude of the poor. The poor are ready enough to be grateful for real kindness, for anything which they can feel is kindly done or even kindly meant, for anything done really *for their sakes*, and at the cost of some genuine self-sacrifice to the doer. No true-hearted worker among the poor who has heard Wordsworth's lines will fail to frequently admit their force :—

I've heard of hearts unkind, kind deeds
With coldness still returning ;
Alas ! the gratitude of men
Hath oftener left me mourning.

Now the desire to show this gratitude, to prove worthy of the help, or rather of the friendship which prompted the help, the wish not to disappoint the friend who has done so much and been so good, these are motives which may be roused to action in almost the very lowest. Nothing is so likely to lift a man or a woman out of hopeless despondency, nothing will give them such strength to resist the recurring demons of temptation which re-enter any empty heart to make the last state worse than the first, as to know that a real true friend will be grieved by misconduct and be made happy by faithful perseverance. Higher natures may be influenced in this way by a knowledge of the joy in

heaven and the love of God; those who know nothing of God or heaven will feel the same stimulus when the Holy Spirit acts solely through a human friend.

The motto for all such work among the poor may be found in Acts iii. 7, "And he took him by the right hand and raised him up." The whole scene thus described is full of significance for us. The apostles are entering the Temple by the gate, Beautiful; there lies a lame beggar soliciting alms. "And Peter, fastening his eyes upon him, with John, said, Look on us. And he gave heed unto them, expecting to receive something from them. But Peter said, Silver and gold have I none; but what I have, that give I thee. In the name of Jesus Christ of Nazareth, walk. And he took him by the right hand and raised him up." There are many beggars to-day who look to us for alms; to speak to them in the name of Jesus Christ is to deal with them in his spirit. "What I *have*, that give I thee," becomes "What I *am*, that can I give." In proportion to the amount of earnestness, patience, and love that we possess and exhibit, shall we be successful in taking the degraded by the right hand and raising them up.

It is not meant that this will be easy work, or that the power of kindness will have sufficient force to readily overcome all obstacles. What is maintained is that in true Christian charity, as distinguished from almsgiving, we have the one alternative to "stringency." Either let the law of Natural Selection work freely and exterminate those who are not fit to survive, or else make them fit to survive by work done in the spirit and with the love of Christ.* Mere

* We have not yet recovered from the demoralisation caused by the free distribution of relief at the time of the Lancashire Cotton Famine, and there are kind and generous men who maintain that, even in that extreme case, the money given away did more harm than good. If this be so, it is terribly sad, but what may be urged is this, not that the relieving hunger should have been left undone, but that more should have been done since then to encourage thrift and foster self-respect.

good-nature is worth very little ; anything done merely to relieve the impulses of a transient benevolence, or to avoid a shock to sensitive nerves, or to keep the poor quiet, anything given really *for the sake of the donor*, comes under the ban which Christ pronounced upon all righteousness done in public in order to be seen of men. *It has its reward.* The trail of hypocrisy is over it ; it is tainted, and breeds the foul parasites which are the pests of civilisation.

It may be well to give some practical instances of the way in which the poor have, as a matter of fact, been helped with money, and where the success of the help was certainly due to a friendly relation. I, therefore, quote the following from my Report for 1880 to the Committee of the Liverpool Domestic Mission.

“ It [the Poor’s Purse] has enabled several of our old and present Sunday scholars to have a fortnight, or longer, at the Convalescent Homes of Woolton or Southport, at times when such a change was urgently needed, and otherwise quite out of reach. A good deal, too, was naturally spent on coals during the recent period of hard frost and double prices ; milk for sick children, other nourishment for the sick which the superintendents of the nursing districts could not give without infringing salutary rules ; the timely present which proved sympathy at a crisis when mere words would seem mere mockery ; all these have made large calls upon the fund, and show the purposes to which it may safely be put. Rather as an experiment I have recently advanced a loan out of it under the following circumstances :—A man with whom we had been for some time acquainted, and who had suffered a good deal from illness, as well as from want of work when well, lately made a great effort to procure a pony and cart with which to go about selling coals. He had hardly commenced business when the cart wheels broke down, and the whole thing was found not worth mending. He was quite unable to purchase

another, and the chance of earning an honest livelihood seemed slipping altogether away. I therefore purchased a cart and am letting it out to him at five shillings a week, on condition that when he has thus paid me back the purchase-money without interest (£5 10s.), the cart shall become his own property." I would add that the cart was thus paid for every week with perfect regularity, and has long been the man's own. In the same way two mangles are being more slowly paid for; the present of a wringing machine to another woman with a blind husband proved the turning-point in their fate, and we are now helping a man by a loan of £6 to become owner of the cab and horse which he drives. In all these cases if good has been done, it is due to the constant friendly intercourse kept up with those who have been assisted.

In considering what practical measures are suggested by the above facts, it is hardly necessary to emphasize the distinction between Indoor and Outdoor Relief, between admittance to the workhouse and the payment of a weekly allowance to those who may go on living in their own homes. With Indoor Relief it will be impossible to dispense—at any rate, as far as we can forecast the future. A wealthy and humane nation is bound to make some national provision for its poorest citizens, and to take some care that they do not die of starvation and exposure, whether or not their condition is due to their own fault; it would not be well to make "being sent to prison" the only way of securing food and shelter when all other means have failed; practically, the total abolition of the Poor Law would lead to an increase in mendicity which it would be impossible to check or even control. It is hard to resist the impulse to give to beggars now, when you know that there is legal provision made for their relief; it would be still more difficult to refuse when the reply would be, "Well, then, ma'am, if you don't give me anything, I must really knock

you down and steal your purse in order that I may be sent to gaol." The fact seems to be that admission to the work-house has already been made too humiliating and degrading, that its atmosphere of "cheerless comfort" is too much like that of a prison, and that the reform here needed is to introduce more classification and greater difference in the treatment of inmates, especially in the way of allowing past conduct and character to count in determining their *status*, and, if possible, to establish a rank of "first-class inmates" (corresponding to the "first-class misdemeanants"), admission to which should depend on having made really strenuous and honest efforts to keep off the rates.*

If this were done, it would become easier to abolish Outdoor Relief altogether, and it is to be noted that the desirability of doing this is the cry of all Poor-Law Reformers, even as its amount (especially proportionately to Indoor) is confessedly the great blot on the present working of the system. The fundamental and incurable vice in all Outdoor Relief is this: the outdoor paupers are at liberty, and are expected to do all they can to earn their own subsistence, but their earnings are supplemented by a small weekly pension; consequently the canon of Poor-Law Relief is necessarily violated; the condition of the pauper is rendered *more* eligible than that of the independent labourer of the same class; the former has every chance that the latter has and a pension besides. The consequence is that when once the Guardians have decided that a certain

* The sort of privileges we would ask for such a class would be seclusion from degrading company; liberty for aged couples to live together, and for members of families to see more of one another; freedom to go out every Sunday and see their friends, and attend their own place of worship, perhaps permission to attend week-day mothers' meetings, penny entertainments, and the like; these privileges, of course, to be withdrawn if abused. All the evils which *might* spring from such relaxation of rules already exist in connection with outdoor relief, and would be far more easily detected and controlled under the system here suggested.

class of persons, say widows having to support more than one child, shall receive outdoor pay, they almost compel every member of this class to apply for such relief. Those who receive it can afford to work for less wages than those who do not; and it is a well-known fact that the wages of widows are generally lower than those of other women, so that, practically, we have got back to the old intolerable evil of wages being partly paid out of rates, and every discouragement thrown in the way of independent industry.

There can be little doubt, moreover, that the prospect of getting Outdoor Relief, not of being admitted into a work-house, furnishes the hope which is so terribly destructive of thrift, and inspires the trust which so fatally undermines British self-reliance. There can be little doubt that from the day when a decree should go forth absolutely abolishing Outdoor Parish Relief, there would be a fresh incentive to industry and economy, such as may be remembered by those who can remember 1834, but has found no parallel since then. Can Outdoor Relief be abolished without producing worse evils than those which at present exist, and seem likely to exist and grow? This is the great problem of Poor-law Reform.

The answer which is here maintained is that Outdoor Relief may be abolished, and its attendant evils greatly mitigated, if private charity is organised and trained to take up its responsibilities and do the work which its disappearance will leave for a time, at any rate, to be done; and the whole force and worth of this answer lies in the contention that Christian charity has, by showing kindness and eliciting gratitude, a power which may be safely trusted to do almost unmixed good when Parish Relief does almost unmixed harm. Parish Relief weakens and destroys self-respect. Christian charity may strengthen and build it up. The Relieving Officer is generally hard and stern in his manner, as, whatever his natural disposition may be, any official will

inevitably become who has daily dealings with every variety of imposition and degradation. He scolds the poor in a way they bitterly resent, while they dare not show their feelings, and, of all causes which destroy a man's self-respect, perhaps none are so potent as the putting up with insults from the low motive of fear. To abuse the applicant, and then grant the application, is as common a custom as it is efficacious in producing the pauper spirit. Christian charity is always gentle and considerate of the feelings, and seeks to make an applicant think better of himself, whether the application is granted or refused. A refusal is due either to physical impossibility, or to deliberate judgment, acting under a high sense of duty, never to partiality, petty spite, or gross stupidity; and though there may and will be much misunderstanding and misrepresentation, the presence of justice and sympathy, and the absence of the qualities which curse so many homes and workshops, will tell in the long run—nay, before the run is very long. When relief is granted it comes as a free gift, not claimed or yielded as a right—given because kind hearts and generous hands so willed it, not because the law of the land has provided it. It is conditional on a certain amount of good behaviour; at any rate, of good intention, and its renewal is dependent on the way in which good intentions are fulfilled. Much patience, much willingness to overlook the fact, much hopefulness will be needed, but charity is not easily provoked, thinketh no evil, beareth, believeth, hopeth all things.

If this distinction of function were finally made, and the Poor-law confined itself to providing Indoor Relief, while properly organised charity undertook all Outdoor Relief, there would cease to be any overlapping of agencies. The Guardians, too, would cease to have to decide the great question, which it is admitted they do not always decide rightly, and which is often decided differently according to whom happen to be present, viz., whether the applicant shall have Outdoor

or Indoor Relief, *i.e.*, be condemned to a dreaded imprisonment, or blessed with a small pension. The duties of Guardians would then be almost entirely of a routine character, though not unimportant, because they would have to see that the Poor-law system was properly carried out; and men good at routine work would make the best Guardians. Meanwhile, men who have faith in individual action and divided responsibility, who are able to visit among the poor, or are, at any rate, in close and friendly communication with those who visit, would find their proper place, and very different duties, on a Central Charity Committee, or on one of many freely-working local committees, which will try their own experiments and profit by their common experience, and generally bring to the work all the individual interest and freshness of sympathy which in matters of education are displayed by the voluntary managers of Board Schools, and by the Council of Education in Liverpool. No doubt some of the evils of Outdoor Relief would reappear if numerous little pensions were paid by private charity. But (1) this could not be counted upon in a way so destructive of thrift as Poor-law Relief; (2) the vastly greater elasticity of the system would enable each case to be decided upon its proper merits, and with a variety of results that would be far less prejudicial to independent labour than a fixed sum practically paid in aid of wages; and (3), what is by far the most important, there would be room for the introduction of the *personal* element, the feelings of gratitude and friendship, which may be trusted to counteract the possible ill effects of giving any relief whatever.

It is not intended to suggest here any elaborate scheme by which this change may be effected. The fact is, a great deal is already being done in this direction, and much more will have to be done quietly here and there before public opinion is ripe for legislative action. Every Charity Organisation Society is doing something to render the

change feasible and easy ; and the important thing at present seems to be to strengthen their resources and extend their operation.

One word of caution may be added in regard to a danger which the Central Relief Society of Liverpool has certainly incurred, and which it takes no active steps to avoid. It has a system much too like the Poor Law system itself ; at any rate, in the eyes of those it assists. It gives or refuses relief, entirely through the agency of paid officials—very excellent and painstaking men, full of experience and great in common sense—but from the fact of their official position, the extent of their responsibilities, the number of cases in their charge, the absence of other interests and occupation needful to keep sympathy with suffering fresh and living, *not* adequate as agents of Christian charity. Only when the Christian Churches are organised for the work, when thousands of kind-hearted visitors know their place in a wisely-planned system, and labour in the way best suited to their powers ; when with great principles fixed and faithfully observed, large liberty of action is allowed in administrative details, and human interest is kept keen and strong, by encouraging individuality and welcoming originality ; only when the charge of those too poor and too degraded for independence is taken up as the first duty devolving upon Christian charity, will it be seen how much better a method is here of helping the poor than any administration, lax or stringent, of Poor Law Relief.

H. SHAEN SOLLY.

JANE AUSTEN AND CHARLOTTE BRONTË:

A CONTRAST.

"I HAD not seen 'Pride and Prejudice' till I read that sentence of yours, and then I got the book. And what did I find? An accurate daguerreotyped portrait of a commonplace face; a carefully-fenced, highly-cultivated garden, with neat borders and delicate flowers; but no glance of a bright vivid physiognomy, no open country, no fresh air, no blue hill, no bonny beck. I should hardly like to live with her ladies and gentlemen in their elegant but confined houses."

This is the judgment which one great authoress passed on another, and that other the same of whom Macaulay has told us (without one voice of importance uttering a dissentient word) that she was a "woman of whom England is justly proud;" the same, too, whose especial talent Sir Walter Scott describes as "the most wonderful I ever met with," adding, with the modesty of a truly great man, that her "exquisite touch, which renders commonplace things and characters interesting from the truth of the description and the sentiment, is denied to me."

And yet the judgment of Charlotte Brontë is not wonderful, is hardly even surprising. Her genius and that of Jane Austen were of opposite types. It was natural that one should judge the other hardly, and the one to pronounce the harshest sentence was likely enough to be the lesser genius of the two.

The experiences of these two women were as different as their talents, with some curious apparent resemblances. Both were the daughters of clergymen; both wrote novels; both passed the greater part of their lives within the quiet precincts of a country parsonage, and each died within a space of two years from her fortieth birthday.

Life was, however, actually very different for them. We can read so much in their writings without needing to turn to their biographies. Charlotte Brontë required the consciousness of passionate joy and attachment, at some time or other, past or present, to console her for the passionate pains of which her life was full. That life had not been well ordered by those who had the care of it; so intense a nature, struggling continually towards the right amid so many strange influences, could not struggle without suffering. Death played a large part in the drama of her existence; she saw those she loved depart one by one, leaving her alone at last with the strange old father. Her own health was shattered then, all buoyancy of spirit had departed from her, and her surroundings offered to her nothing but monotony and melancholy. Who that has visited her old home, and looked out along the hideous stretching valley, with hardly a tree and with many an ugly building on its undecorated sides, has not felt the misery of gazing day after day into such a scene, where Nature is neither homelike nor picturesque? It was probably better in her days; the buildings were fewer; perhaps the hills were less dreary. We know that she loved her native moors, and behind her home they have just a hint of beauty; but *before* it! Mrs. Gaskell gives us no idea of the dreariness, the simple, bare monotony of those green slopes. Charlotte Brontë loved them, as she loved nearly all the persons and things interwoven in her life's story. She found possibilities of beauty there which no stranger would suspect; she cherished thoughts about them which no stranger

could imagine. But, all the same, when we look upon that dreary, stony, manufacturing valley, we fancy that we see how its reflection would mirror itself as a terrible depression on her vividly-impressible mind. We cannot wonder that she felt isolated, low-spirited, uninspired for work, when she looked out alone on the view from the parsonage windows.

Such a world to look at!—uncultured enough for solitude, peopled enough for cheerfulness; yet possessing neither the wild beauty of a lonely place, nor the redeeming civilisation of a populous district. The people out there, who built stone mills and houses, and did not encourage a plant to grow about them; the nature out there, that reared hillsides against the sky, and hardly produced a tree to grow upon them, were they worth writing about or living for? Yet she managed so to write that the whole world read, and wondered what manner of wild scenery this must be among which the author lived, and what manner of original characters with whom she passed her time.

She had witnessed, too, a terrible tragedy of temptation and sin in her own household. It had destroyed the character, genius, and life of her brother. She had known what it was for a home to be no covert from the troubles of the world, but only a hiding-place, a terrible secret dungeon in which to conceal the dreadful family disgrace and trouble. When she and her sisters went home and shut the door of the parsonage behind them, during the last years of Branwell's life, they did not shut out their worst dread and sorrow; they shut themselves inside with it.

There was hardly, then, any trial of life which Charlotte Brontë had not tasted, and tasted so strongly that it left a flavour of bitterness and futility in all her after success. Existence was emptied for her of its hope, its buoyancy, its health; and then the consolation of a wonderful renown was offered to the lonely, tried, and disheartened woman.

No such melancholy picture of life is woven round the

figure of the other clergyman's daughter, who died when Charlotte Brontë was a year old. She was well nurtured, and carefully taught; she dwelt in a happy home, enjoyed cheerful social relations, moved amongst pleasant scenes, was never brought into close contact with passion or crime; and whatever sorrows of life reached her did not come without the consolations of self-restraint in those around her and of serenity in her own heart.

No passionate disappointments had for her turned the word love into a symbol of anxiety and pain; she had not learnt that to possess was suffering, and to have possessed a perpetual desolation. We see her always a sweet, serene figure—kindly, cheerful, unimpatient, unambitious; willing to be put aside among the middle-aged while she was yet young, yet bright enough in spirit to have remained youthful when she had become actually old. Although personally very much more attractive than Charlotte Brontë, we do not hear that she actually received so many offers of marriage. Whatever offers she did receive were rejected, and there never seems to have been any consequent regret in her heart in after times. Nothing touched her of that bitterness, or that melancholy, or even that oddity, which so many men still believe (all the men of the last century seemed to be sure of it), must characterise any woman who is unfortunate enough to remain unmarried.

We cannot suppose that Jane Austen was a woman without tenderness; her letters and her novels prove her to have been the reverse; and, doubtless, if she had met among her acquaintance a Churchill or a Darcy, who had known how to commend himself to her so as to make her feel as well as to perceive the excellences of his character, she would have married him, and made him a good and happy wife.

Not meeting such a man, or not meeting him in the right way at the right time, she was incapable of longing for what she had not, or regretting what she had given up. She con-

tained all the necessary elements of her own happiness in her own character, and did not require a particular combination of circumstances to bring out her capabilities of usefulness or content. Being so complete a woman, having the perception that there is hardly any relationship of life into which we cannot, if we choose, weave a sufficiency of affection and interest to keep our own lives healthy, she was independent of most of the chances and conditions to which the weaker of us are bound.

Her genius was not unlike her character—self-sufficing, unambitious, serene. It is only actual genius that can afford so to be; that need not long, strive, or struggle; that simply is, and so is excellent. It is like Nature in that respect—sure of itself, unanxious about opportunities. It can afford, like Nature, to possess numerous unexercised and unapparent capabilities; because it exists to answer, out of the fullness of its own capacity, the needs of its own time and place. It does not require, like a smaller thing, that the requirements of the whole world should be adjusted to meet the development of its narrow talent. It is, therefore, independent of chance, certain of opportunity, and does not live in perpetual danger of failure and disappointment.

Jane Austen found subject enough for her genius in her own quiet experience. She never had to search for material, to stretch her imagination, or to reach beyond the limits of her natural sphere in an effort to be great. She probably knew that she *was* great, but we are confident that she never tried to be, and also that she was cheerfully indifferent to the indifference of a world that had not learnt to recognise her according to her merits. It was real success that she desired, the achievement of good work rather than the praise of it.

Get leave to work

In this world—'tis the best you get at all.

And Jane Austen lived out the idea before it was spoken.

She had that unconsciousness of virtue which it is impossible to acquire. As soon as we are sufficiently awake to admire it, the chance of it for ourselves is gone. It is George Eliot who speaks of "that controlled self-consciousness which is the expensive substitute for simplicity;" and this is all that the majority of us can attain.

Jane Austen lived serene without longings, and die content without regrets; whereas Charlotte Brontë, to whom life had brought so much suffering, relinquished it with passionate reluctance. Throughout nearly the whole of her bitter experience, happiness was only a possibility, something she had touched in the past, or might reach in the future. She naturally thought that it was actually in her hands when life was taken from her; for we find the most persistent (although not the most cheerful) hope in the most unhappy. Jane Austen seems to have realised the blessed secret that happiness *is* and is everywhere. It was abundant enough, like Nature or her own genius, to destroy all cause for anxiety lest an early death should deprive her of a little of the small portion allotted to her, if she lived out the usual term of life.

Since her death, Charlotte Brontë has been exalted into a literary heroine. More than one popular history of her life has been written, and the church where she was buried came to be regarded chiefly as a monument of her genius.

It is not so with Jane Austen. No pilgrims wander to her grave as to a shrine; no curious literary studies can be made of her life or her character; and the number of her readers is, even yet, smaller than that of the readers of "Jane Eyre."

It is doubtful, indeed, whether a book was ever written of more absorbing interest than "Jane Eyre." All its peculiarities, all its exaggerations, all its limitations of vision tend to the deepening of the charm in which the reader is

held. We cannot wish that Charlotte Brontë had modified herself when she wrote this book. She threw the whole strength of her genius, the whole original force of her character into its composition; and we accept it gladly, as it is, without wishing that she had altered or improved anything in it.

The only justification of advice offered to genius is its successful result. Pope is said never to have quite forgiven Addison for giving his counsel against any alteration from the earliest form of "The Rape of the Lock," although his advice had, in this case, been actually sought for. Addison's opinion proved a mistaken one, but it was, at any rate, given in a spirit of appreciative admiration.

We can hardly say this so positively of Mr. Lewes' advice to Charlotte Brontë (the advice which provoked her to a depreciative expression of opinion on the subject of "Pride and Prejudice") that she should "follow the counsel which shines out of 'Miss Austen's mild eyes.'" And if the novelist's instincts had not, in this case, revolted against the suggestion; if she had been foolish enough to follow the mistaken counsel, its error would have been made patent enough, as indubitably evident as Addison's was. We should have lost our Charlotte Brontë, but we should have gained no second Jane Austen. "Jane Eyre," denuded of its extravagances, would not have become "Emma." The peculiarities of Charlotte Brontë's style carried their own apology in accompanying power, and possessed their best modifier in the authoress's sincerity. The sensationalism of "Jane Eyre" is not a sensationalism artificially produced or with difficulty dragged in to suit the vitiated tastes of the public. It is entirely the production of the intense excitement and profound interest with which the authoress has come to regard her heroine's fortunes; and, as such, it is a legitimate picture. If the authoress erred in presenting such a picture, the fault was in her mind and not in her

manner. The only cure for it was an annihilation of her wonderful genius.

That very intensity of feeling, which sometimes carried Charlotte Brontë beyond the usual limits of subjects on which women wrote in those days, made her more sensitive to criticism and rebuke than those who were less reckless about provoking them. There is something very characteristic in her strong desire to have the question of sex left out of the criticism of her works—to be spoken of as a writer, and not as a woman. And we should have thought more highly of the delicacy of judgment of her critic in the *Edinburgh Review* of January, 1850, if he had spared her the pain of a discourse on this point, especially since he had chosen to enter himself in the list of her private correspondents, and to add the claims of personal friendship to those of literary courtesy. He took a different view, however, and could even apply the adjective "cavalier" to the style of Charlotte Brontë's very generous second letter to him on the subject.

Another contemporary critic of distinction—Harriet Martineau—objected that the passion of love held too large a place in Charlotte Brontë's writing. To describe that passion with an intensity and reality hardly ever reached before was, however, Charlotte Brontë's speciality; and, indeed, the quality of her genius, its weird imaginativeness, its wild fervour of feeling, could not have worked so well on any other subject than this; for love, with its self-deceptions, its sudden awakenings, its uncertain issues, and the strange positions which it may develop, is, as a certain critic has told us, more capable of dramatic interpretation than any other sentiment which is common to the human race.

Charlotte Brontë excelled in suggestions of natural scenery. She gave us none of the lengthened descriptions which are fashionable to-day, and in which colours are used as lavishly as in a painter's crudest study of a sunset; but there was a

fitting relationship between her personages and the scenes in which they moved, so that each reflected a picturesque light upon the other.

Her command of language, also, was very great, and conscientiously used, although here—as sometimes in her sentiment—there is a tone of exaggeration. We feel that it is too rich, too mellifluous for nature, which has a touch of ruggedness in its sweetest sounds and sights.

As a character-painter she did not attain a very high place. She loved to make studies of particular feelings or interesting situations; and this naturally limited her choice of persons and things, though the studies produced might surpass in interest any possible character-drawings. All her sketches of persons were too strongly biased by her own feelings and experiences to form a representative picture of any time or any place. The fact that so many of her characters were drawn from real life detracted from their value as permanent types. She had not the highest artist's calmness and impartiality; she might be dowered with the poet's "scorn of scorn, and love of love;" but, although she depreciated the style of Jane Austen as wanting in poetry, she had not herself reached the level when she could say,

Poets become such

Through scorning nothing.

In all the characters which she created, and whose fortunes we have followed with so vivid an interest, there is not one for whom she did not indulge some strong personal feeling, whether of like or dislike. There is a tinge of bitterness in her description of disagreeable people which misses the highest tone of literature, if not of morals. The highest artist has learnt patience, and is wholly calm. Bitterness is a different thing from indignation, which may be found among the finest examples of poetical pictures. It is something just a little smaller and a great deal more personal. Our sympathies follow hers in the matter. We do

not disagree with the opinion suggested; only, from an artistic point of view, the opinion had better not have been there. We want no personal colouring in our perfect illustrations of human life; the artist must be out of sight, and the picture should not be painted on toned paper.

It is in this that Jane Austen so much excels Charlotte Brontë. She has found enough to write about without the intrusion of any prejudices or disappointments of her own. When we look at the world through her eyes the atmosphere is wholly clear. The picture is so perfect that we forget to praise the artist; it is simply quite natural, quite true, and so, perhaps, for some persons, wholly without interest. For there is a large class of readers to whom nature does not speak plainly enough, for whom real life is not intense enough. They fail to find in the one the beauty the poets describe, and in the other the passions they depict. Life and nature must be translated for them into plainer expressions by some other mind, and the more theatrical light the other mind throws into these expressions the more satisfactory they are considered. Day by day we all walk through the same scenes without observing half the details of them; and if we are compelled to grope for the first time in the dark along often-trod pathways, we come unexpectedly on hitherto undiscovered objects innumerable. It is only when some new light is thrown upon a well-known scene—the sudden flashes in a thunderstorm, or the red glow of a great fire—that our attention is roused to things habitually passed over unseen.

Some persons walk as blindly through life itself. They require a cleverer mind than their own to throw a background of fantastic colour behind the objects among which they move. Only so can they perceive their true significance.

Such persons cannot be expected to appreciate Jane Austen's delicately-tinted pictures of human life. Perhaps

they must not even be required to realise what we mean when we are foolish enough to praise Shakespeare. A very intelligent young man of to-day, who reads novels with interest and attends theatres with pleasure, is so convinced of the absence of any surpassing merit in the mighty dramatist that he allows himself to believe that the enthusiasts for the poet are all pretending!

Another man, an elderly clergyman (also of to-day), an M.A. of Oxford, in early years a botanist and a dabbler in the natural sciences—a man who thinks he appreciates Virgil, and has got everything out of the poets that can be got by an intelligent mind—has been heard to express, in a kind of confidential disgust at the stupidity of the world, the following astonishing sentiment: “Shakespeare? Shakespeare is a very much overrated man. I can’t understand what people profess to see in him. But it’s no use saying anything.” So he leaves us all to our blindness.

It is not to such men that we must recommend the study of Jane Austen’s works, with their quiet humour, their quaint reality, their trenchant but good-natured criticism, their sober and unexaggerated tone, and that manner which, Macaulay has told us, approaches somewhat near to Shakespeare’s own. There is such an absence of exciting scenes in Miss Austen’s books that, with the exception of those passages in “Sense and Sensibility” designed to illustrate the weakness of the heroine’s sister, we can hardly remember any occasion of actual weeping; agony and wild passion are altogether excluded. We may complain a little of want of the pathetic, which can less easily be spared than the exciting element; but even here we may be wrong to demur. In the present age, when most of the powerful writers employ their power in harrowing our feelings painfully, in weaving miseries out of circumstances which seem improbable, by means of actions which strike us as unnatural; in a time when the chief end of talent seems to be to pile up

the agony sufficiently high, without caring about the reasonableness of the foundation on which it rests, we may well hesitate before expressing a regret that, in a series of half-a-dozen delightful novels, there is not one distressing death, not one terrible domestic tragedy, not one horrible crime, not even one irresistible temptation. All can be good if they choose, and nearly all may be happy if they will.

We may say of these books that they are simply and entirely delightful. The cheerful reality of interest and the genial spirit of laughter which pervade them carry us on through pleasant and instructive pages to a pleasant and satisfactory end. We know none, except Jane Austen, who, by a few delicate touches, can so completely satisfy us concerning the disposal of a heroine at the close of a novel. After passionate quarrels the reconciliation generally seems tame; but we are wholly content with the fate of Emma in the novel which bears her name, of her favourite Lizzy in "*Pride and Prejudice*," and of the gentle heroine in "*Persuasion*."

There is no respect of persons in the works of this writer. A charming impartiality and candour are to be found in all her portraits of friend or foe. Jane Austen delights us as much in depicting the peculiarities of a pleasant old woman as in relating the fortunes of a blooming young one.

And the most extraordinary thing is that at a time when every other writer thought it necessary to write in another way, and to depend upon incident and plot for his interest, Jane Austen ventured to write in this way, and has so commended herself to this generation beyond her more brilliant contemporaries.

Even the king of novelists, Sir Walter Scott, whose wonderful masterpieces of fiction we have all read with absorbing delight and interest, must, in some points, as he has himself so generously acknowledged, bend his head before this quiet and unobtrusive young woman, who never made,

and never seemed to wish to make, a sensation of any sort.

The fact that so little of the interest of Jane Austen's works depends on her incidents is in favour of a repeated perusal of these delicate etchings of human life. The characters she depicts are less romantic than is, or was, usual in fiction; but then they are much more real—with the reality not of stupid commonplace, but of pleasant familiarity, intelligently and suggestively unveiled to us.

Her style seemed prosaic to Charlotte Brontë, and her characters uninteresting. Life was full of meaning to the younger authoress, and even the minor incidents in her novels are stamped with the impress of some strong feeling, or carry a reflection of some intense personal experiences. But Jane Austen's belief in the seriousness of life went beyond Charlotte Brontë's; and the author of "*Pride and Prejudice*" found the drama of human existence so full of meaning that she dared to leave it to explain itself.

A. ARMITT.

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS.

DARWINIANISM AND RELIGION.—A NOTE ON MR. GRAHAM'S 'CREED OF SCIENCE.'

IS the doctrine of Evolution, as stated by Darwin, essentially and fundamentally in antagonism with the first principles of religion? is a question raised in the reader's mind by Mr. Graham's 'Creed of Science.'* In the absence of any single and universally acknowledged authority on all problems of faith and doctrine, Mr. Graham takes "the consensus] of scientific opinion" amongst the highest authorities on each particular article, and treats this "as the orthodox teaching of science,"—as what would have been the decision had all such authorities met together in council to fix the faith. His book is not the shriek of frightened ignorance: it bears no trace of ecclesiastical resistance to the removal of old landmarks. It is marked by careful study of the scientific thinkers who are criticised, by great willingness to accept facts, and by the dignity of devout conviction.

I do not propose to examine its general course of argument, but to ask for a reconsideration of the description given of the Darwinian hypothesis when looked at from a religious point of view.

What strikes Mr. Graham most in reading Darwin's marvellous story "of the origin and process of manufacture of Nature's living forms," is the seemingly *chance affair* it all was.

We are not permitted, on Darwinian principles, to suppose that there was any prevision or forecast of what was to come resident in Nature's blind bosom. There was no conception, not even the vaguest dream, on

* *The Creed of Science, Religious, Moral, and Social.* By WILLIAM GRAHAM, M.A., author of 'Idealism: an Essay, Metaphysical and Critical.' London: Kegan Paul and Co. 1881.

the part of Nature, at the commencement of the cosmic process, of the forms of life that should emerge in the sequel. . . . Nature had no special aims in view; anything, in fact, might have happened. She did not aim particularly at life or the human consciousness. When life first resulted, it was an accident, lucky or unlucky, as we choose to regard it. When the first rudiments of that wonderful revealer of Nature, the eye, were laid, they came by chance, and by further repeated processes the eye was improved. It was improved as a telescope is improved, by slow degrees, only, unlike the telescope, it was improved not by an inventor or maker, but by natural selection, which preferred the animals with good eyes, and elected them to continue the advantage to the species. What has resulted need not have resulted, for Nature neither knew, nor cared, nor directed (pp. 25, 26).

This identification of the Darwinian hypothesis with *chance* pervades the book. Man, on that hypothesis, is called "the child of chance." Mr. Graham admits that in Darwin's 'Origin of Species,' a Creator is placed at the commencement of the process of organic evolution, but considers that his most eminent followers are justified, "on Darwinian principles," in setting this intelligent Creator aside. It is distinctly stated that "the real and most important issue raised to-day by Darwin, as in ancient times by Democritus," is "whether chance or purpose governs the world" (p. 50). Natural selection is described as a method requiring "little reflection or genius," and as "a rule of thumb" (p. 321).

I submit, however, that the Darwinian hypothesis in itself, and considered in its strictly scientific character, is entirely distinct from any doctrine of chance, and does not necessarily involve unpurposed accident in the slightest degree.

In treating of variations dependent upon constantly changing circumstances, it is extremely easy to speak of them as "accidental," or even as connected with "chance," through the limitations of human language, and the difficulty of restating a profound hypothesis in connection with every illustration. It is the language of some one looking on, from the outside, not an account of the conditions under which changes take place. All that is strictly and scientifically involved when even Darwin himself may incidentally use the word chance or accident, is the fact that slight variations of specific forms take place in manifold directions unanticipated by the observer.

The title of Darwin's book clearly states its substantial doctrine. It is "the origin of species by *means* of natural selection." Natural selection is the means by which the origin of new

species has been secured. It is a *method* by which an *end* has been attained. Darwin bases upon actual observation certain statements concerning the method which has been pursued in the introduction of more and more complex forms of life into the world; all the mighty problems regarding the nature of the power of which this method is a manifestation, these statements leave untouched.

In the struggle for existence the fittest *have* survived. Any peculiarity by which advantage has been gained *has been* inherited, and *has* become a specific characteristic. These are facts. Upon these and kindred points Darwin records what actually has taken place. The conclusion that an endless variety of species has been produced by the operation of certain laws, no more implies a belief in "chance" or "accident" than does the acceptance of the law of gravitation. When it is said that a certain kind of eye has been produced by "natural selection," it does not mean that "natural selection" is a living being, preferring animals with good eyes, and electing them to continue the advantage to the species, but that as a matter of fact special peculiarities are transmitted with certain definite results. Why this method of evolving complex forms from more simple ones should be taken, and by what authority it is sustained in daily action, are questions which the naturalist does not attempt to answer.

It is perfectly true, as Mr. Graham suggests, that a slight alteration of conditions at a critical moment in the history of any one species might have caused things on earth to have taken a wholly different course. It does not in any way follow, however, that there is no Supreme Being who has cared, known, and directed. The importance of infinitesimal changes in an animal's surroundings does not imply the predominance of chance, but emphasizes the sublime watchfulness of a controlling will.

"The more we read the story of Darwin (writes Mr. Graham) the further and further the notion and the possibility of mind recedes" (p. 37). The question respecting *mind* as evidenced by the phenomena of the universe, is this: Can we or can we not detect the action of forces of a character akin to those we term *mental*, when they come within the range of personal experience?

How does "the story of Darwin" adversely affect the argument? It tells us that all living creatures are connected by physical ties. and that the struggles brought about by their

relationships to each other, together with the constantly-occurring variations in their surroundings, have ended in the appearance upon earth of man—a being capable of thought and love and duty. It tells us further that slight deviations from common types will end in specific and generic divergences; and that the beginning of the life-history of the world may possibly be traced back to some few primordial cells.

The hypothesis may be true or false; but it is difficult to understand how it excludes the action of faculties which, when we see them applied to human affairs, are known as faculties of mind. That a myriad apparently petty and insignificant changes should have so harmoniously co-operated as to end in the existence of such a richly-endowed being as man, proves that mental power must have been exerted over their direction as clearly as any work ever performed by man himself is a sign of his own intelligence.

Those who believe—as under the Darwinian hypothesis it is perfectly legitimate to believe—that an Infinite Wisdom has been manifested by degrees, unfolding more and more of its nature from epoch to epoch, cannot justly be charged with resolving creation into the hap-hazard play of unintelligent forces. The growth of a flower from a seed does not disprove the creative activity of a God; neither would it exclude God from the universe were it certain that all the stars of Heaven sprang from one wave of force, and all plants and animals from one cell, and even that cell itself from the primeval wave of force.

Mr. Graham argues that the Creator in *The Origin of Species* has nothing to do.

The Creator in *The Origin of Species* seems introduced more for ornament than for any serious work that He has to do; or at least, rather to conciliate the mass of hostile theological prejudice certain to be aroused by the other doctrines than to satisfy any logical demands in the system. He has nothing to do at the beginning, save to endow "one or a few primordial forms" with the lowest degree of elementary life, leaving the rest of the work to natural selection and the ordeal of battle; and He has had nothing to do ever since (on the earth, at least) but to sit passively by and watch laws which execute themselves, without need of any interference on His part. He is "a Monarch that reigns but does not govern," like the sovereigns under our Parliamentary régime (p. 45).

This passage is pervaded by the assumption that a believer in "natural selection" necessarily thinks of "natural selec-

tion" as a living force, capable of taking action on its own account. Natural selection is only a phrase gathering together a number of observed facts, which are so persistently conjoined in nature as to constitute a rule or method of procedure. A law of nature has no power in itself. It is only a statement of an observed association of special facts as antecedents and sequents.

By what supreme authority this association is rendered constant and universal we are not told, when a simple law of Nature is explained; but laws of Nature can no more execute themselves than can the laws of Great Britain and Ireland.

One or a few primordial forms endowed with the lowest degree of elementary life would necessarily have remained primordial forms for ever had the "Monarch"—the central and Supreme Authority of the universe—sat passively by and watched them in His solemn ease.

The evolution of form from form reveals incessant creative activity. The philosophy of Darwin, so far from dispensing with a God, demands a Creator who never ceases to create, and in whose unslumbering and unresting energy all things live and move and have their being.

HENRY W. CROSSKEY.

NOTICES OF BOOKS.

PROFESSOR SHAIRP'S 'ASPECTS OF POETRY.'*

THIS volume is a noteworthy contribution to contemporary literary criticism. It is questionable if any lectures delivered from the Oxford Chair of Poetry have been of greater value than those which are here brought together by Professor Shairp. Whether they were successful as lectures, in the sense of attracting crowds, is another and an inferior matter. Some of them are, doubtless, better as essays to be read than as addresses to be listened to; but they will do more than anything their author has previously written to enhance his reputation, and—what he will, doubtless, regard as of greater consequence—to promote the study of the subjects he has discussed. The fruit of varied scholarship and mature insight, they are full of suggestiveness and full of wisdom; and they open up, in a new way, many tracks of thought which will be pursued by sympathetic readers for themselves. The title is a fortunate one—definite and modest. If the volume wants the spell of genius and the fascination of the deft literary criticism, which its author's predecessor in the Oxford Chair imparted to all his essays, it is a book far more serviceable to the mass of readers, and will probably send them back to the poets themselves, with more enthusiasm appreciation and delight.

In dealing with the poets it is of less consequence to point out their shortcomings or what they fail to do for us, than to appraise their merits and to signalise their excellences; but in estimating a volume of literary criticism, appreciation by itself is of little value, and one of the excellences of this work, by the professor of poetry, is the way in which it will rouse the critical instinct of the reader. Every one must feel that Professor Shairp is one of those writers with whom it is a pleasure alike to agree or to disagree. Now, in these lectures he desires to put philosophy and philosophical definitions aside. Philosophy has to him no glory, because of the glory in poetry that excelleth it; but he is compelled, at the outset, to fall back on a philosophical definition of poetry

* *Aspects of Poetry.* Being Lectures delivered at Oxford, by JOHN CAMPBELL SHAIRP, LL.D., Professor of Poetry, Oxford; Principal of the United College, St. Andrew's. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press. 1881.

and throughout the volume to take up and defend a very definite philosophy of the universe.

The distinction between "defining poetry" and "noting some of the characteristics of the poetic nature" is a real one; but in the course of the latter process a definition emerges. Professor Shairp has pointed out that the poet must have a large, open, sensitive, and intense nature; that the intellect of the poet must be kindled by feeling, and by a wide range of sympathy. He finds that the limitation of the poet's domain to the field of beauty is too narrow, and says that "the whole range of existence, when imaginatively apprehended, may be transfigured into poetry." "Nothing that exists, except things ignoble and mean," is alien to the poet. But it has been pointed out by many critics that poetry can be extracted even from that which is here excepted. Probably Professor Shairp would not really except it. And he remarks most truly, that "as each age modifies in some measure men's conceptions of existence, and brings to light new aspects of life, before undreamt of, so poetry, which is the expression of these aspects, is now changing, in sympathy with the changing consciousness of the race." In the same lecture we have some most excellent remarks on the need of catholicity in appreciation, of openness to recognise new forms of poetic insight; and some things, equally admirable, are said on the functions of the imagination, on how "imaginative insight kindles and deepens emotion," as well as on its penetrative glance, and its harmonising and embodying power. But in all this—and in the statement of the aim of poetry, to give insight much more than to give pleasure—we have some very distinct approaches towards a definition of its nature. The definition which is explicitly disowned, is implicitly essayed; and yet it may be doubted if it is altogether successfully accomplished. If, therefore, instead of excluding the ignoble and the inharmonious from the field which poetry traverses, suppose we say that its function is, not to deal with beauty alone, but *to pursue beauty as marred by deformity*, then the imaginative area swept by the poet is seen to be as wide as the universe; and we have an explanation of much in his vocation, and in the products of his genius, that is otherwise obscure. As a matter of fact, deformity is intermingled, in a subtle manner, with all existing beauty. We are surrounded with discords in the midst of harmony; but it is the highest function of the imagination to reconcile the two. May it not, therefore, be more appropriately said, that the poet deals, first of all, with the real as he finds it—beauty blent with ugliness, discord in the midst of harmony, sorrow in the midst of joy, good commingled with evil—and that he strives to transform it, to transfigure the reality and to harmonise the discord, by means of poetic idealisation?

It was almost inevitable that in these lectures the doctrine advanced by Mr. Arnold, that poetry is "a criticism of life," should be dealt with, less or more. But there is possibly some misconception of Mr. Arnold's meaning by his critic. Probably they make use of the word "criticism"

in totally different senses. If it is thought of as formal analytic handling, as logical manipulation, cross-examination and scrutiny, Mr. Arnold's maxim may be an extreme, if not an erroneous one. But if it is construed as divining tact or intuitive instinct, the maxim is indubitably true. That the divining tact, or instinct of the poet, pierces to the very heart of problems addressed to the intellect, and which the intellect merely manipulates, is self-evident. It cuts through layers of formal criticism, and annihilates the barriers which these erect, at a single stroke, by a flash of inspiration. Doubtless it is criticism sublimated, criticism glowing and impassioned, but it is at the same time adequate, penetrative, and true. It is not prosaic analysis, or calculating scrutiny; it is critical vision; and, as the judgment of the seer, it may be quite unerring in its verdict, as to the substantive meaning of life, and the underlying spirit of the universe. In fact the poet, just because he is a poet, is at the same time a critic. He is a critic in being a poet; although he does not construct his estimates of men and things by the aid of logical formulæ; and it is in this sense that he often sees deeper or further than the philosopher.

Another question of great interest discussed in this volume is the distinction between Poetry and Prose. Professor Shairp thinks that in modern English literature, at least, the distinction has been gradually abolished, while the distinction between Verse and Prose has been gradually intensified. Surely it would be more correct to say that the margins of the two spheres of Poetry and Prose have increasingly overlapped; that there is (as there has always been) a poetical prose and a prosaic poetry, while the distinction between a poem (however prosaic) and a prose writing (however poetical), remains clearly, and even sharply, defined. A poem is a unity. It produces its most distinctive effect by its self-inclusion, by its rhythmical completeness, and by the singleness of the impressions it evokes. Like a statue by Phidias, or a Madonna by Raphael, or a sonata by Beethoven, it must be gathered up into an imaginative whole, and it must return to its keynote. It must stand out to the eye and to the imagination, as a great mountain or a simple flower, as a sunset or as a constellation in the heavens—varied indefinitely in content, but with clear outlines, and recognisable boundary lines, with a definite framework, and a completed purpose. There is no reason why any passage of poetical prose, on the other hand, should end where it does end. It might go on indefinitely far on the same lines, or in the same strain, without ceasing to be poetical prose. Take, as an illustration of the fundamental difference, one of Coleridge's exquisite prose marginalia to his 'Ancient Mariner,' and any of the single stanzas of the poem itself. "In his loneliness and fixedness he yearneth towards the journeying moon, and the stars that still sojourn, yet still move onward; and everywhere the blue sky belongs to them, and is their appointed rest, and their native country, and their own natural homes, which they enter unannounced, as lords that are certainly ex-

pected; and yet there is a silent joy at their arrival." Compare this specimen of prose poetry with the verse,—

Still as a slave before his Lord,
The ocean hath no blast;
His great bright eye most silently
Up to the moon is cast.

or, with the verse,

It ceased; yet still the sails made on
A pleasant noise till noon,
A noise like of a hidden brook
In the leafy month of June,
That to the sleeping woods all night
Singeth a quiet tune.

and the difference between the unity of effect, the imaginative whole, that is in all poetry, and the indefiniteness of structure, the diffuseness of form that characterises the most poetical prose, is obvious.

There are some deep questions raised in these lectures (such as the relations of morality to art) which are touched rather than discussed. They are most suggestively dealt with, but they are handled rather than wrought out; appreciatively and dexterously written about, rather than philosophically treated, or explained to their farthest recesses. And so we find that while the philosopher is thrown out, and philosophy cast aside, the critic has to fall back on a philosophy of his own after all. Once, at least, Professor Shairp falls back into idealism, pure and simple; while, throughout the book, his polemic against any system of phenomenalism is keen, and constant, and very able. But how, if speculative philosophy as a pursuit is slighted, or as a body of knowledge disparaged, can the literary critic turn validly round *against* that particular "philosophy which had been dominant for the last thirty years"?

In the essay on 'The Spiritual Side of Poetry' four gradations of feeling and insight excited by Nature are acutely characterised; the first, that of mere physical exhilaration; the second, the enjoyment of form and colour; the third, that stage in which physical beauty adumbrates moral truth; and the fourth, when it leads to the rapture of religious feeling. It may be a mistake to arrange these in a necessarily ascending scale; and it may be equally erroneous to affirm that without a belief in a future life, and in our personal relations to the Divinity in whom we live and move and have our being, poetry is shorn of its highest power. Doubtless these "twin convictions" have added immeasurable wealth to the poetic products evoked by them; but in point of mere intensity and power, those poems which have kept to the mundane side of things, and dealt with the elemental relations of man to man, and man to nature, have probably been as effective as those which have dealt with the transcendental and the divine.

One of the most characteristic essays is on 'The Poet as a Revealer.' Most true, and deep, and noble are the teachings of this lecture, because there is a whole side of Nature and of human life which the poet interprets for us, while the philosopher is dumb; and, whether he is dealing with

Homer, or Æschylus and Sophocles, with Virgil, or Wordsworth, or Walter Scott, the author is equally felicitous and successful. It is, however, in what (without disparagement of the others) we may call his minor essays, that Professor Shairp's chief insight is shown. We have a delightful study of Virgil; one that will be new to the majority of English readers on 'The Poetry of the Scottish Highlands;' and another on 'Modern Gaelic Bards and Duncan Macintyre.' But in the two lectures devoted explicitly to Wordsworth—the former on 'The White Doe of Rylstone,' and the latter on 'The Three Yarrowes'—Professor Shairp is at his best. These essays recall the wisdom and the vision of the paper on Wordsworth, published many years since in the *North British Review*, and are only the latest proof of the inexhaustibility of the theme discussed.

The whole volume is full of varied interest and helpfulness. It is a book which will instruct, where it does not convince; and while its judgments on individual poets and poems, and on special problems, will not satisfy every reader (they would have little merit if they did), they will assist many a student to new and fruitful views of the nature of poetry in general, and of the characteristics of our English poets in particular. If a perusal of the book leads to a full and enthusiastic study of the poets themselves, its main end will have been accomplished, and the aim of its author thoroughly fulfilled. No more notable book of its kind has issued from the British press within recent years.

W. K.

ONESIMUS.

THE Epistle to Philemon purports to be sent by the hands of one Onesimus; and the reader gathers that Onesimus was the escaped slave of Philemon, that Philemon himself was an old friend and disciple of Paul, that Paul had even now won over the fugitive also to confess the name of Christ, and that the Apostle desired to restore Onesimus to his master, "no longer as a servant, but more than a servant, a brother beloved." The Revised Version brings out the tenderness of Paul with fresh simplicity and pathos; and fills us with renewed surprise that any Christian minister should ever have found in this touching letter an apostolic precedent for the infamous Fugitive Slave law of the United States. The balance of critical opinion assigns the Epistle rather to the Roman than the Cæsarean imprisonment of St. Paul, and the Epistle to the Colossians contains a reference to Philemon, which has led the commentators to place his establishment in the City of Colossæ, at the foot of the Laodicean hills. If the radical question of Pauline authorship be raised, it must be said that the document is so slight as to afford no decisive indications either way; but even Baur places it in the second rank, next to the great Epistles themselves in probability of authenticity.

The Epistle implies that Onesimus had robbed Philemon, not only of his own services but of something further, and makes mention of a Church meeting in Philemon's own house. On these and one or two other slight indications, the distinguished writer, who prefers, in this connection, to be known simply as "the author of *Philochristus*," has constructed the imaginary autobiography of the bondsman, Onesimus.*

Onesimus lacks the absorbing interest which many readers found in *Philochristus*. The bright central person of the Nazarene no longer radiates from the page, and Paul does not play so prominent a part in this volume as his Master did in its predecessor. Nor when Paul does appear, is his the speech or the countenance or the thrilling presence of the Christ himself. Yet the figure of the Apostle is sufficiently striking when it first passes across the scene. The child Onesimus sees a band of merchants coming along the Iconian road.

Somewhat in the face of one of the travellers held me fast, I know not how, so that I fixed my gaze on him perforce, even as a bird fascinated by a serpent; and indeed I thought myself to be bewitched and spat thrice; but yet I stood still gazing upon him. At that time he was not yet bald, he had a clear complexion, a nose hooked and somewhat large; he was short of stature, and as he walked he bent his head a little forward, as if not able to discern things clearly; his eyebrows were shaggy and met together; but what most moved me was the glance of his eyes which were of a penetrating brightness, as though they would pierce through the outside of things even to the innermost substance (p. 3).

This is the first acquaintance of Onesimus with his future spiritual father, and they do not meet again for many years. There is great power in the narrative of the young man's conversion. Despairing of truth, stung to the quick by the false suspicions instilled into the heart of Philemon by one Pistus, a false-hearted professor of Christianity, above all mad with grief at the death of Eucharis, his betrothed, Onesimus, once a philosopher and a lover of the right, has abandoned himself to the most reckless life. For a time a minister of Cybele, with her gross and sensual worship, he has now become a diner-out at Rome. Falling in by chance with Paul, he feels the power of the man, and is bent with his whole mind upon escaping from an extorted engagement to meet him in a Christian household where the saints are to hear him preach the word. He has been playing the buffoon at some rich patron's board with a wilder and more wanton wit than was his wont, and is staggering along the streets after the feast, when a hand is laid upon his shoulder from behind, and the voice of Paulus says, "My son, thou art not in the right way."

Fain would I have made some excuse, or have fled at once without excuse; but neither could my tongue avail for words, nor my feet for flight. So I went on with Paulus even as a captive, and he took me by the hand and led me unresisting into a house where was a large congregation of the Christians already assembled and expecting his presence; through the midst of whom

* *Onesimus: Memoirs of a Disciple of St. Paul.* By the AUTHOR OF *PHILOCHRISTUS*. London: Macmillan and Co. 1882.

I walked, crowned as I was with roses, and dripping with unguents and staggering in my gait (p. 201).

The mighty force of the speech of Paul slowly penetrates his mind, and clears the fumes of debauch from before his soul, till the great words "I am persuaded that neither death nor life" (Rom. viii. 38, 39) thunder at his heart, and the brightness of the Lord Jesus bursts in a flood upon his spirit.

While the personal narrative in these 'Memoirs' is most skilfully woven, and the resources of a rich scholarship are brought with a light and graceful hand to illustrate the life and surroundings of the young Gentile in many varied scenes, there is no doubt that the most important interest of the book centres in its philosophical and critical discussions. These become very real and living in the minds and mouths of Onesimus and his friends. With some boldness of anachronism, Epictetus, Maximus of Tyre, Ælius Aristides, Celsus, and even Justin Martyr and Irenæus, are made to contribute to the conversations and correspondence in which Onesimus takes part — only Epictetus, however, *proprio nomine*. But the editor pleads that in germ the thoughts of these men already floated in the air in A.D. 60, and that the mind of the inquirer would have to reckon with them long before they found overt and formal expression. The reader will probably be impressed with the profundity of the scepticism which affected the world of thought in that momentous age, compared to the shallowness of the shoals in which the modern doubter flounders. No pole-star shone over that ocean; and however hard it be for the mariner to pilot his boat to-day, few drift so helplessly on the chartless waves as poor Onesimus.

But much more than the philosophical, the critical disquisitions of the volume will attract attention and stimulate reflection. As the geologist exploring the tufa-beds of Derbyshire may behold rocks in the making, so our editor has conceived the bold idea of placing us at the spot where we can see the oral Tradition of the first generation of disciples swelling and radiating and crystallising towards the elaborated form of the completed Synoptics. To do this with full effect it has, indeed, been necessary to endow Onesimus with all the shrewdness of the contributor of the article, "Gospels," to the new edition of the "Encyclopædia Britannica;" and we should find it almost as hard to persuade ourselves that Onesimus really foresaw the maturer shape of the Tradition, and predicted "the end from the beginning," as that Isaiah or Micah actually prophesied the manner or the place of the birth of the Messiah. But we must not quarrel with the accomplished resuscitator of the Colossian bondsman for this. We can conceive no method of presenting the problem of Synoptic criticism more likely to convince the reader that the Gospel narratives have indeed gathered together, cohered, and grown after strict laws of mental evolution, than that so skilfully elaborated in the Third Book of these ingenious Memoirs. We have Onesimus, for example, listening to a discourse in which Hebrew prophecy is freely applied to the circumstances of the death of Christ.

and immediately bringing the speaker, "a man of some discretion," to book, and on questioning him whether all the details of the prophecy have corresponding details in the then recorded Tradition, wringing from him the answer, "It is not, indeed, so handed down in our Tradition; but it *may have been so*." But "an honest and illiterate leather-cutter," whom Onesimus puts through the same catechism, boldly declares that it *was so*,—not that he remembers anything of the sort in the Tradition, but "*because it must needs be that all things that are written in the Law and the Prophets should be fulfilled in Christus*." And Onesimus shrewdly surmises that, not the "discreet" speakers, but the "illiterate leather-cutter" and his kin will prove the progenitors of the Tradition held by the succeeding generation (p. 85).

Before the martyrdom of Onesimus, the Synoptics are fully formed, even to the prodigies of Matthew I., II. But when Onesimus would remove the after-growth from the Tradition received of the first disciples, and disabuse the minds of the people, Philochristus, from far-off Britain, then, it seems, as now, the native soil of the Broad Church theory, writes to him:—

"Be thou content. 'But,' sayest thou, 'they err in certain traditions concerning the Lord.' Well, then, they err. But which is better, that they should love the Lord and be in some error, or that they should be free from error and void of love? Better to have wheat with tares than no tares and no wheat. Let both stand till the harvest; and in the day of winnowing of the Master, a separation shall be made" (p. 285).

R. A. A.

DR. DAVIDSON'S 'INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE NEW TESTAMENT.' *

A VETERAN writer like Dr. Davidson does not wait for his reputation upon the verdict of critics less competent than himself. More than thirty years have elapsed since the appearance of his *Introduction to the New Testament*, and his qualities as a Biblical scholar have long been familiar to those who are interested in the studies which he has chosen as his own. During that considerable period he has not been content to rest passively in the results which he so carefully elaborated and defended in earlier days, but has kept his mind open to fresh investigations, and gradually changed his point of view, so that arguments on which he formerly relied are no longer able to convince him, and difficulties in the way of the traditional belief, which he once regarded as inconclusive, present themselves now with a magnitude and force which he is unable to resist. In process of time his opinions became so largely

* *An Introduction [to the Study of the New Testament, Critical, Exegetical, and Theological]*. By SAMUEL DAVIDSON, D.D., of the University of Halle, and LL.D. Second Edition, Revised and Improved. London: Longmans, Green, and Co. 1882.

modified, that it was undesirable to bring out a second edition of his original work; and accordingly, in 1868, he published a new treatise, entitled *An Introduction to the Study of the New Testament, Critical, Ezegetical, and Theological*, in which he sought to supply an acknowledged want by providing the English reader with a compendium suited to the existing state of knowledge. Of this work a second edition, "revised and improved," has just appeared, containing important modifications of some of the judgments previously expressed, and exhibiting the ripest fruit of the author's scholarship and thought. One could wish that the process of change had been brought before the reader, and that when Dr. Davidson discards as "traditionalism" an opinion maintained in the earlier edition he had marked the alteration, and distinctly explained why reasons, which at a comparatively recent date appeared insufficient, are now able to command his assent. This would add to the interest of the volumes, and afford a useful training to the critical faculty of the student; and if the frank acknowledgment of change left on the minds of the injudicious the impression of a vacillating judgment, or an uncertain critical method, the more discerning would appreciate the vigour of thought which even in advancing years refuses to stiffen into unalterable moulds, and the candour which abandons a position that, long defended, seems at last to be untenable.

We cannot in a short notice discuss any of the difficult questions raised by an Introduction; but it may be interesting to point out some of the more important differences of view which distinguish the two editions. The arrangement of the books in what is conceived to be their chronological order facilitates comparison, and serious variations are immediately apparent. In the first edition 2nd Thessalonians is placed at the head of the list, and Dr. Davidson holds strongly to its Pauline authorship, assigning it to about 52 A.D. He now introduces it after the Epistle of James; and though he still allows it a comparatively early date, about 69 A.D., he does not bring it within the Apostle's lifetime. He does not, however, absolutely reject its Pauline origin, but thinks "it may be called authentic, *with modifications*," the latter having been made in it by a Pauline Christian, ii. 1-12 especially being an addition. Carrying our eye down the list we are next struck by the disappearance of Colossians from its position between Philemon and Philippians. In 1868 Dr Davidson, though not unconscious of difficulties, still believed that the preponderance of internal evidence favoured the genuineness of the epistle, and that it was written at Rome in 62 A.D. We must suppose that the arguments of Baur, though dismissed as inconclusive, silently persisted in asserting their force, for our author now bestows upon this question a completely fresh treatment, and argues strongly against the authenticity of the letter. He relies especially on the developed Christology and the evidence afforded by the epistle of an active, if still incipient, Gnosticism, and arrives at the conclusion that the work proceeded from a Pauline Christian living in Asia Minor, probably about 120 A.D. Ephesians, which is so obviously related to Colossians, had been already rejected from

the list of Paul's genuine epistles, but still allowed a place upon the borders of the Apostolic age. In the first edition its author is supposed to be an inhabitant of Rome and a stranger to the Church at Ephesus, and the year 75 is fixed upon as the nearest approach to its real date. The arguments which induced Baur to bring it down to the Gnostic period are reviewed, and declared to be unsatisfactory. In the second edition all this is changed. We now learn, as though no competent and unprejudiced scholar had ever been of a different opinion, that "it is easy to see that it originated in the Gnostic period;" its composition is transferred from Rome to Asia Minor, and its date is fixed between 130 and 140 A.D. In the treatment of the Pastoral Epistles, Titus now comes between 2nd and 1st Timothy, instead of being regarded as the earliest of the three; but they are all assigned to about the same date as before, between 115 and 125 A.D.

If we pass to the Catholic Epistles, we find that that of James is placed a year or two later, and therefore after, instead of before, Revelation; but Dr. Davidson's view of it is substantially unaltered. His opinion of 1st Peter has undergone a more serious change, though even in the first edition its Apostolic origin is denied. A comparatively early date, between 75 and 80 A.D., is there accorded to it; and the opinion of Schweigler and Baur that it referred to the calamities in Trajan's reign is rejected because the trials alluded to "are too general to admit of restriction to one period in particular." This opinion is now accepted, and the epistle, believed to have been written by a Roman Christian, perhaps in 113 A.D., is placed in the list between the Gospels of Luke and Mark. Jude, which was formerly regarded as an authentic production of the Lord's brother, and referred to the year 80, is now set aside as supposititious, because "the description of the men who had crept in among the readers suits antinomian Gnostics only." It is supposed to be "not much later than A.D. 140."

In regard to the historical books, we need only observe that the old chronological order is retained,—Matthew, Luke, Mark, Acts, and John; and that, notwithstanding recent investigations, Mark is still represented as dependent on Matthew and Luke.

From this brief survey it is apparent that the work has been revised in both its form and its substance. Alterations are numerous, and many parts have been rewritten. The revision, however, sometimes betrays marks of haste. Thus we are told that a quotation in 1st Timothy is taken from Luke, and then follows the strange inference, "Hence Luke's gospel, which preceded the present epistle, was not written till the second century."* What is obviously intended is that the Epistle cannot be earlier than the second century, because it is subsequent to a Gospel which belongs to that century. The argument is correctly given in the first edition. On the next page it is stated, on the authority of Holtzmann, that the number of words occurring in the Pastoral Epistles, and nowhere else in the New Testament, is 171, and yet the words unknown

* II. p. 58.

to Paul's authentic Epistles are set down as only 183. Holtzmann's statement is perhaps misleading; but his lists show that the 183 ought to be added to the 171. In the first edition the numbers are not given, but instead there is a useful list of the words themselves, which is now omitted. A few lines further on the curious remark is retained that *εὐαγγέλιον* is "a post-apostolic production." It is meant, presumably that it is not found in undisputed Apostolical writings. That this circumstance is accidental may perhaps be inferred from the use of *εὐαγγέλιον* and *ἀγγελία* in Romans. It is amusing to find Dr. Davidson expressing a devout faith in the book of Tobit. He says, "if it was believed that angels appeared in the form of men, as we know they did from the book of Tobit."* Doubtless his real meaning would require the substitution of "it was" for "they did." The Epistle of Polycarp receives unequal treatment. As a testimony to 1st Thessalonians, and on many other occasions, it is cited as though it were genuine†; but when we come to 2nd Thessalonians we are informed that the Epistle is not authentic,‡ and the same statement is repeated elsewhere.§ When we seek for further information, we learn in one passage that Ritschl has shown that its date is between 160 and 170 A.D., after Polycarp's death,|| and in another that Ritschl "supposes interpolation in various places," and that its date is between 147 and 167.¶ These casual instances may show that the work would bear a little revision; but allowance must be made for the very condensed form in which the necessary matter has to be imparted, and for the inevitable occurrence of slight oversights in volumes replete with such a multiplicity of detail. We may not be able to acquiesce in all Dr. Davidson's judgments; but his work will be indispensable to the student who wishes to know the present state of the criticism of the New Testament and has not yet acquired facility in the use of German, and the more advanced scholar will weigh the author's conclusions with the care and respect which are due to the conscientious devotion of so many years to such important and difficult investigations.

JAMES DRUMMOND.

MR. BURGESS'S NOTES ON THE HEBREW PSALMS.**

THE writer of these volumes has carefully limited the scope of his work. He does not offer a treatise on the Psalm-book, regarded as a whole, and hence he takes no heed of the problems concerning the origin of its collections, or the circumstances and date of its completion. Nor does he attempt any full account of the separate poems, and he

* I. p. 256.

† I. pp. 9, 41, 85, 117, 157, &c.

‡ I. p. 387.

§ II. p. 207; see also II. p. 166.

|| II. p. 36.

¶ II. p. 928-9.

** Notes, chiefly Critical and Philological, on the Hebrew Psalms. By WILLIAM ROSCOE BURGESS, M.A. Vol. I., 1879; Vol. II., 1881. London: Williams and Norgate.

rarely drops any observations on their probable authorship. He has for the most part confined himself to annotations on difficult passages, chiefly of a grammatical and philological kind. These give ample evidence of long and devoted study of the text; and many of the suggested emendations have a probability about them which entitles them to respectful consideration, while they are certainly the fruit of laborious meditation. In some of his criticism he has, no doubt, been anticipated by other writers; but this need not lessen their independent merit, as it appears doubtful how far the author is familiar with the later exegesis of foreign scholars. His results are often announced with great modesty; but some of those about which he expresses a confidence almost amounting to demonstration seem unlikely to gain general assent. Thus in Ps. xl. 7, he proposes to read *asham* for *oznayim*. This suggestion is founded on several considerations, of which the two chief are—(1) That the word *asham* is needed to complete the list of sacrifices named in the verse; and (2) That it will, at least, explain, if not justify the rendering *σῶμα*, in the LXX., “adopted by St. Paul in Heb. x. 5.” These considerations touch two of the weak places in Mr. Burgess’s method. As for the LXX., to which he generally appears to ascribe a critical value far above its deserts, he does not notice that all the other Greek versions, and even many MSS. of the LXX. itself, read *ἑρτα*, while the Vulgate has *aures*, which implies that the word *σῶμα* is of very doubtful parentage (see Hupfeld’s note *in loc.*). The constant use of the LXX. without adequate critical safeguards, tends sometimes, we think, to lead Mr. Burgess astray. Next, however, and more seriously, the endeavour to vindicate a place for the word *asham* is connected with a theory of the Pentateuchal sacrifices which recent research cannot be said to sustain. Mr. Burgess treats the Levitical law as if it were undoubtedly Mosaic, and attaches to the narratives of patriarchal sacrifice a significance which we are convinced they will not bear. He attempts on this basis to establish a theory as to the meaning of certain Levitical ordinances, which he then applies to this and other Psalms (*e.g.*, Ps. li.); and this is regarded as a key to what the author represents as the complex relations between Yahveh and his people. The subject is a large one we can only express our total dissent from the author’s fundamental conceptions. The Pentateuch and the Psalms cannot be employed for mutual illustration until the innumerable questions attending the rise and form of the laws and the dates of the poems have been at least partially solved. Mr. Burgess finds the uncertainty all on one side. He is commendably free from undue adhesion to traditional titles; but he is content to support the claim advanced on behalf of Ps. xc. to Mosaic authorship by reference to the so-called Song of Moses, in Deut. xxxii. Mr. Burgess professes that he does not understand the “higher criticism” of Ewald; but till he has, at least, seen that it has a meaning, and must be answered, instead of peremptorily dismissed, we fear that much of his patience and labour will fail to win the success which they deserve.

J. E. C.

CANON KENNEDY AND SIR E. BECKET ON THE REVISED NEW TESTAMENT.

CANON KENNEDY'S Lectures* on the Interpretation of the Bible, the Revised Text of the New Testament, and the Revised Version, having been delivered before a cathedral congregation presumably ignorant of Greek and of the technical matters of Biblical criticism, have some features of their own which entitle them to a recognised place in the ever-increasing literature of comment and criticism of the Revised New Testament. While popular in style and treatment, and necessarily rather slight in structure, they have a solid foundation of sound learning and scholarship, and they set forth in a fresh and effective way some of the special points of interest in New Testament criticism and interpretation.

In discussing the merits of the Version, Canon Kennedy, being himself a member of the Company of Revisers, naturally selects for comment passages which he considers strikingly improved by the process which they have undergone. He gives, amongst other things, a detailed defence of the much-abused change of "charity" to "love" in 1 Cor. xiii. There is another piece of careful criticism in the Appendix, where he considers the different renderings of Rom. ix. 5, defending, as the only true and unobjectionable one, "And of whom is the Christ after the flesh. He who is over all is God, blessed for ever." The argument is an excellent specimen of the author's habitually candid and scholarly treatment of subjects into the discussion of which theological prejudices and heated partizanship are apt to be imported. Indeed, the calmness, moderation, and frankness which mark the whole volume are in refreshing contrast with the tone which is so often assumed in the severe course of criticism which the Revised Version is undergoing; and the modesty, amounting almost to diffidence, with which one of the most eminent of Greek scholars applies his learning, and avoids the very appearance of *ex cathedra* dictation, demands cordial recognition. The very full and carefully-compiled list of Select Textual Corrections, given at the end of the volume, containing all that are of any conceivable significance, will be a great convenience to the English reader who wants to know what the alterations in the text really amount to.

The answer of the Chancellor and Vicar-General of York to the question whether the Revised New Testament should be authorised,† takes the form of a resolute and emphatic renunciation of the revisers and all their works. In some respects Sir Edmund Becket has an

* *Ely Lectures on the Revised Version of the New Testament; with an Appendix containing the Chief Textual Changes.* By B. H. KENNEDY, D.D., Canon of Ely. London: Bentley. 1882.

† *Should the Revised New Testament be authorised?* By SIR EDMUND BECKET, Bart., LL.D., Q.C., L.R.A.S., Chancellor and Vicar-General of York. London: Murray. 1882.

advantage in coming into court after the first great outburst of theologico-critical wrath in the *Quarterly Review*. His style, always smart and incisive, often satirical, sometimes contemptuous, appears reasonable and polished by comparison. He goes nearly as far as the Reviewer in accusing the revisers of literary offences of the most heinous kind; but he refrains from charging them with ignorance, want of scholarship, absolute dishonesty, and even defective orthodoxy, being content with exposing what he considers their presumption and bad taste, their inability to write good English, and their general recklessness and wanton love of change. He contends that they have wilfully disregarded their instructions, and that the greater part of the alterations which have been made are unnecessary and injurious. He finds in the revision only "that kind of exactness of construing which is expected from schoolboys who have only to show their knowledge of Greek and have their words forgotten next minute; not to write an English book to last for ages, and be heard and read by everybody to whom the spirit and substantial meaning of the original is infinitely more important than the letter." There are some good remarks on the injurious results of attempting to apply a rule of "uniformity of rendering" which is based on the false assumption that the corresponding words in two different languages must cover the same meaning, or be used invariably in the same sense. No doubt this studied uniformity is less inconsistent with good and intelligent translation in the case of the New Testament writings than it would be in that of works of more purely literary quality, and with a wider intellectual range. But it must have a tendency to stiffen the more flexible elements of the original, while it is, at the same time, often fatal to a good English style; and it is far from being the necessary alternative to the studied variety which King James's translators aimed at. It must be allowed, also, that the revisers have shown a certain amount of pedantic grammatical precision where no such precision existed or was intended in the original. But, after making every reasonable admission of this kind, we feel that the relentless critic enormously and even ridiculously exaggerates the mischief done when he characterises the version as one "of exact verbal construing, sometimes into harsh and bald language, and such as no man ever used, literate or illiterate; with strange confusions of tenses, and articles, and phrases never heard before, and sometimes approaching and actually reaching nonsense." After thus opening his case, Sir Edmund Becket undertakes to prove it in detail by an examination of some of the chief changes made in three entire books, the Gospel of S. Matthew, the Epistle to the Hebrews, and the Apocalypse. As may be supposed, he is prepared to dispute almost every alteration, and he does it with much acute literary criticism; and although a large part of it is only the expression of a pure, unyielding literary conservatism, he certainly makes out a very good case as against many instances of changes which do not appreciably affect the sense, while they do spoil the rhythm and destroy the harmony of many a familiar phrase. His examination of the three books will be

of much service as a definite statement of the passages to which the conservative critics take exception. However far he may carry his readers with him, we think that very few impartial judges will admit that he has justified his final decision that there are from 1,000 to 1,200 distinctly bad alterations in the whole New Testament; and further (and worse) that "the Revisers' harsh, prosaic, uncomfortable, confused, undignified, pedantic, unidiomatic, and sometimes nonsensical English, is so ingrained into the whole book that it is impossible to treat the defects as occasional blemishes which might be picked out and cured one by one, as the infinitely fewer mistakes in the Authorised Version could be."

An attack so determined and elaborate as Sir Edmund Becket's challenges and requires a full and detailed defence. A vigorous rejoinder like that of Canon Farrar in the *Contemporary* serves its purpose as far as it goes. But, in the end, there will be nothing for it but to publish an authoritative, detailed statement of the grounds on which every substantial alteration has been made. Meanwhile, most Churchmen will acquiesce in Sir Edmund Becket's negative answer to the question, "Shall the Revised New Testament be authorised?"

We may mention in this connection a little book* which is the product of an enormous amount of laborious drudgery and of a certain kind of learning, and which may be described as a sort of caricature, or *reductio ad absurdum*, of the Revisers' rules for uniformity of rendering, and for marking the tenses, the article, and so on. Dr. Young has been hard at work for several years at the task of reducing the inconsistencies of the Authorised Version to a minimum, and he is not satisfied with what the Revisers have done in this direction. Amongst other things he finds that they have neglected the imperfect tense in five hundred cases; and recognising only one way of expressing the imperfect past in English, he tells us, for instance, that 1 Cor. xiii. 11, is *lit.* "As an infant I was speaking, as an infant I was thinking, as an infant I was reasoning; but when I have become a man I have made useless the things of the infant." (!) Dr. Young makes, when he can, an etymological analysis of the Greek words, and puts down what he calls the *literal* meaning. Accordingly we have, "*held together* by various diseases," "*setting ourselves together* to every conscience of men;" "the momentary lightness of our *pressure*," "*Superintendent, superintendent!*" (in Luke viii. 24); "*be easy minded*, O heavens," "God being over all, *well spoken of to the ages*." All this is seriously commended by the author "to the careful study of the children of God scattered abroad, in their researches into 'the oracles of truth,' as a help to a FUTURE REVISION."

* *Contributions to a New Revision; or, a Critical Companion to the New Testament.* By ROBERT YOUNG, LL.D. Edinburgh: G. A. Young and Co. 1881.

CANON WESTCOTT'S 'REVELATION OF THE RISEN LORD.'

THE "short studies" of which Canon Westcott's new volume* consists, are intended to serve as an Introduction or a Supplement to his previous work, *The Gospel of the Resurrection*. His aim in writing them was, he says, "to realise as distinctly as I could the characteristic teaching of each manifestation of the Risen Christ both in relation to the first disciples and in relation to ourselves." The result is, he thinks, "to place in a fuller light the circumstances under which the fact of the Resurrection was apprehended and the nature of the fact itself." This may be the result for those who share in the author's freedom from doubts or uncertainties as to the historical character of even the smallest details of the events and sayings here discussed. But no one who has appreciated the consequences of the application of the principles of historical criticism to the Gospel documents, and especially to those portions of them with which Canon Westcott is here dealing, need expect to find in these pulpit studies much help towards solving the difficult problems which they present. To the orthodox divine the different reports of the reappearance of Christ after his crucifixion are absolutely authentic and exact, and the various manifestations, so far from being in any way difficult to harmonise, or indeed to conceive at all, arrange themselves in well-ordered sequence, each being a special revelation, with a new lesson once given and never repeated.

It is impossible here to enter upon the difficult and far-reaching questions connected with the whole subject. We can only say that we agree entirely with Canon Westcott when he says that at the present stage in the progress of religious thought we need "to realise with a historical, no less than with a spiritual insight, what lessons [the Bible] conveys, and in what shape." While we fail to discover many signs of real historical insight in his present work, there is much of the spiritual sort; and any religious-minded reader may find food for thought, and spiritual lessons which do not depend on the authenticity of the events and sayings with which they are here connected. In successive chapters each recorded manifestation is made to yield a special lesson. The appearance to Mary in the garden is the Revelation through Love; the walk to Emmaus is the Revelation through Thought; the story of the miraculous draught of fishes gives the Revelation in the Work of Life; and on these and the other topics he treats of Canon Westcott has much that is wise and good to say. In one of his chapters he quotes the well-known beautiful legend of the appearance of Christ to Peter, who was hurrying along the Appian Way to escape from the death to which he had been doomed. "Lord, whither goest thou?" he asks [with the same absence in the narrative of "emphasis and surprise" which Canon

* *The Revelation of the Risen Lord*. By BROOKE FOSS WESTCOTT, D.D., D.C.L., Regius Professor of Divinity at Cambridge; Canon of Peterborough. London: Macmillan. 1881.

Westcott notes in the records of the Resurrection]; and the Lord replies, "I go to Rome to be crucified afresh for thee." Next morning the prisoner was found by the keepers in his cell, from which he was to go forth to his martyrdom. It seems to us that Canon Westcott's observation on this beautiful and significant story, that "the tradition may be, only a thought clothed in an outward dress," may be applied to some, at least, of the other traditions which he has been considering, and which lose little of their beauty or significance when they, too, are regarded as a thought, a faith, an inward spiritual truth, clothed in an outward dress.

MR. WALTER LLOYD'S ESSAY ON UNIVERSAL REDEMPTION.*

NOW that the Churches on all sides are beginning to wake up from the false and hideous dream of everlasting torment inflicted by a God of never-dying vengeance, every earnest and effective word which is spoken on behalf of the Gospel of love and hope is sure to gain a hearing. In the devout, earnest, and thoughtful pages of Mr. Lloyd's essay, the cause of a high and hopeful faith is pleaded in a spirit with which we find ourselves in entire sympathy. It betrays no sectarian bias, and the author's theological position is one which does not require him to exercise his ingenuity in reconciling the dictates of conscience and the spirit of the Gospel with the language of mediæval dogmas and ecclesiastical formulas, Anglican or other. He will not be listened to, indeed, as was Canon Farrar, whose glowing rhetorical descriptions and appeals were so stimulating, and whose preaching of what his hearers often must have found it hard to distinguish from Universalism, had the advantage of being delivered in a cathedral pulpit. Canon Farrar has since taken pains to explain, define, and qualify what he was popularly understood to have taught in his sermons on the Eternal Hope; and he has shown that in some respects he does not fully appreciate his own position, or measure the extent and depth of the convictions which his own teachings have done so much to awaken. Mr. Lloyd says, naturally enough, that Canon Farrar does not go far enough for him; and he is able to consider the great controversy and its issues in a much freer and more consistent way. His purpose, indeed, is not a controversial one, and he does not spend his time in attacking and exposing over again the immorality and impiety of what we may happily begin to hesitate about calling the "popular" doctrine of eternal punishment. He seeks rather "to advocate a definite and hopeful scheme of universal redemption." A *definite scheme*, however, is too much (or we might better say too little) for any one to attempt who is as alive as our author is to the danger of narrowing our view and materialising our conceptions of the unseen life. And we do not, in fact,

* *The Hope of the World: an Essay on Universal Redemption.* By WALTER LLOYD. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, and Co. 1881.

find that he has any definite scheme to propound, but rather a faith and a hope which are founded on our own spiritual experiences and moral convictions, and which reconstruct for us a future far less *definite* than that which is presented in the current creeds of Christendom, which are, in large measure, formed by the literalising of figure and parable, and the materialising of mystic visions of the New Jerusalem. The true hope of the world is in a future of spiritual order and happiness, of spiritual progress; and this, as Mr. Lloyd shows, is the hope which the Gospel gives to men when they enter into its spirit and the inner truth of its teaching. He forcibly contrasts the deadening effects of fear and despair, with the redeeming influences of hope and trust; and, in a thoughtful chapter on "The Judgment," he shows how we sit in judgment on ourselves now, and how, to one who knows what it is thus to arraign himself at the bar of conscience, the judgment which is represented as following death will be no strange experience, while it is "reasonable and pious to believe that it will be a starting-point for a new career under clearer light and with increased advantages." This is the natural conclusion to draw from our moral experience here; and on the same grounds we may conceive of conscience as still giving its warnings and its verdicts in the future state, in which case the so-called Last Judgment would certainly present itself to the mind in a different light from that in which it appears in the New Testament as ordinarily interpreted.

The value of Mr. Lloyd's thoughtful and earnest teachings consists less in his treatment of the Scriptural texts which are the centres of controversy on the subject of future punishment, than in his successful attempt to present the great question with which he deals in its relation to our actual moral experience, and in the sympathy and insight with which he discerns the essential grounds of the immortal hope. He shows what we may be allowed to call a sort of spiritual common sense and reasonableness which must gain the attention of the reader whom he may fail to entirely satisfy; and when he makes his appeal to reason and conscience as the final arbiters of the great momentous question, he happily does not draw back, as some less consistent and far-seeing teachers have been inclined to do from the consequences of his own appeal, but accepts frankly and enforces earnestly the decision which reason and conscience pronounce.

THE GREAT SCHOOLMEN OF THE MIDDLE AGES.*

A BOOK like the present can only claim notice here as a sign of the interest which the Protestant sects are beginning to take in forms of thought remote, if not alien, from their own. Some time ago the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge so far extended its horizon

* *The Great Schoolmen of the Middle Ages.* By W. J. TOWNSEND. Hodder and Stoughton. 1881.

as to produce a set of volumes describing "Non-Christian Religious Systems;" and now we have an Evangelical Nonconformist reopening a phase of Christian thought hardly more akin to the opinions he himself professes. He has even a more ambitious object. He wishes not only to enlighten us as to the development of the Scholastic system, but "humbly seeks to aid in the reversal of the general verdict of condemnation passed on the Schoolmen," and to show "that, as contributors to the philosophical thought of Christendom, they aided enormously the cause of human progress" (p. 18). More moderately expressed we have not a word to say against such a scheme, provided only that the author be himself a philosopher and a competent Latin scholar, not to say an Orientalist. Mr. Townsend, however, is a mere compiler, relying, with scarcely an exception, upon second-hand authorities; and when he attempts to be original, simply proving his unfamiliarity with the rudiments of scholarship. German he does not profess to know, and sad havoc is made of the common authorities on the history of philosophy written in that language, when the translation comes to be adjusted and decorated afresh, after the usual manner of unintelligent book-makers. From English authors Mr. Townsend draws liberally. Passage after passage is boldly diluted from Milman—all his rhetoric expanded into bombast, and every telling phrase altered, as though with the help of a dictionary of synonyms.

Yet, however faulty in style and—we may add—grammar, and however restricted the authorities on which it is based, such a book, if carefully manufactured, might do good service in opening a little-known chapter in the history of thought to a wider circle of readers. Mr. Townsend's book, however, can only serve as a warning to compilers. To take a single instance, Albertus Magnus is said (p. 167) to have been "summoned to attend the Council of Lyons, and to aid in the deposition of the Emperor Frederick II.," who had been dead by this time twenty-four years. Mr. Townsend is ignorant of the previous Council (of 1245), which has the dubious credit of this act. After this one is not surprised to read that in 1272 "the Chair of St. Peter had been vacant about fifteen years" (p. 189), the compiler having innocently confounded the fifteen cardinals with the three years during which their quarrels prevented any election to the see. But the real objection which makes this book worse than useless, is not its uniform inaccuracy, but the animus by which it is inspired. Regardless of the differing needs of society in different ages, perhaps hardly conscious of them, Mr. Townsend denounces everything Roman Catholic, and every State Church—root and branch. But his violence against both the parties in the great question of Ecclesiastical politics, which runs through the Middle Ages (p. 82), is a little indiscreet, since all his heroes took one side or the other in it; and when he shows an unmistakable admiration of some whose pantheism is, to him, commendable, solely because it was contrary to the religion of Rome, we cannot but be reminded of the Monophysites of Egypt, who betrayed their country to the Mohammadan invaders rather than combine with

their Christian rivals and co-heretics—the Monothelites. Mr. Townsend, in fact, for the same reason delights in exhuming the forgotten heresies even of men like St. Anselm; and, although he utters a passing warning against “the errors of Hegel,” makes no secret of the more energetic vitality of his own polemical Protestantism than of his Evangelical orthodoxy. But we are making too much of Mr. Townsend and his opinions. Let it only be added that the book contains the lives of the leading Schoolmen—starting from Alcuin, of all people, whose “scholastic” activity was strictly that of a schoolmaster—with an arid recital of their views, an eternal ringing of the changes on Universals and Individuals, Realism and Nominalism, with none of the life with which their teaching truly was animated, and treated without perspicuity or discrimination. It is, perhaps, a truism, but one of which the justice is repeatedly suggested by books like this, that only a master can make a difficult subject at once plain and popular.

As a contrast to this superficial performance, we may be allowed to point to three lectures on *Wyclif's Place in History* by Professor Montagu Burrows,* doubly valuable just now, both as containing a clear and interesting sketch of perhaps the greatest of the schoolmen, and as drawing attention to the importance of the publication of his complete works, a task for the execution of which we are happy to observe that a Wyclif Society is on the point of foundation. It is to be hoped that this society, which Mr. Furnivall (3, St. George's Square, N.W.) is organising, will meet with the wide and national support which it deserves.

R. L. P.

THE MAKING OF ENGLAND.†

THIS important book has a singular interest from its bearing upon the previous work by which Mr. Green exerted so astonishing an influence upon the popular appreciation of our history. Readers of his *Short History of the English People* are aware that its earlier portions represent the author's most careful researches, and, indeed, stand alone in the imagination and freshness with which they illuminate a period which we are accustomed to pass over summarily and with the baldest treatment. The life which Mr. Green kindled in his subject was so novel, that with many of our stricter scholars he provoked a strong prejudice against what he no doubt regarded as the best part of his book; and it is curious to note that when he enlarged the *Short History* to the compass of four volumes he stripped the earlier pages of not a little of

* *Wyclif's Place in History*. By MONTAGU BURROWS, M.A., Chichele Professor of Modern History at Oxford. W. Isbister, Limited. 1882.

† *The Making of England*. By JOHN RICHARD GREEN, M.A., LL.D., Honorary Fellow of Jesus College, Oxford. Macmillan and Co. 1881.

their remarkable individuality. The plan of the work did not allow of foot-notes, and Mr. Green perhaps came to feel that it was unfair to make such large demands on the confidence of his readers without detailed justification. This justification, indeed, he possessed, but ill-health prevented him from completing it in a shape fit for publication. At length, in the volume before us, we are offered an instalment, reaching as far as the union of the English kingdoms under Egbert; and if we are too often interrupted by symptoms of haste and want of care, it must not be forgotten that the old excuse unfortunately still holds good, and the date of the preface from Mentone may silence criticism of the trivial errors, discrepancies, and irregularities (for instance, in the spelling of proper names) which abound in the book.

Its relation to the *History of the English People* may be briefly pointed out. Seventy-two pages of the first volume of that work are now augmented six-fold; but the most striking difference is the copious apparatus of references by which the new book is supported. At the same time, though the bulk of the former is reprinted with little change, the arrangement, and, indeed, the whole scope, of the latter, however similar, is new and on a larger scale. It starts not from the English home in Schleswig, but from Roman Britain: it is not only a study of the growth of the several tribes of invaders into one "English People," but also a geographical history (if the term may be used) of the land itself.

This geographical treatment is one of Mr. Green's principal excellences. His power of grasping and reproducing the local situation and the local necessities of events reminds one constantly of Dean Stanley, with whom, however different his style, he has in common a delight in allusion and reminiscence, always suggestive if occasionally far-fetched. The course of the English immigration and the gradual settlement are worked out with exquisite skill. Mr. Green makes one see precisely the "lie" (as he would say) of the ground, how far progress was possible, the lines where it *must* have been arrested by natural obstacles, equally with those at which we know it to have been checked by the arms of the British. Such a reconstruction of the stages in the settlement, as lucid as it is sensitive, must once for all replace the bare catalogue of dates and names which has hitherto stood for our earliest history. But in other respects the book cannot claim so universal an acknowledgment. Mr. Green, as a thorough-going disciple of Mr. Freeman, refuses to allow any appreciable mixture between the British inhabitants and their German conquerors, at least until the period of the later overthrow of the natives of the West of England. He relies solely upon the very scanty records of the invasion, and leaves out of view the opposite and unanimous testimony of anthropology, to say nothing of the problems involved in the development of the national character, which is nearly inexplicable unless we consider its Celtic admixture. Even should we accept Mr. Green's conclusions, it is unpardonable that he should not even mention the existence of any other view of the question, and the frequent references to Dr. Stubbs should certainly be guarded by the

admission that he cannot be cited as an uncompromising supporter of the theory which Mr. Green advocates. Dr. Stubbs is far too learned to be a dogmatist, especially on such doubtful ground.

Important as is this question of the survival or extermination of the Britons, its decision does not influence more than a small fragment of Mr. Green's book. For the rest our admiration hardly needs qualifying. It may be said that the book would gain in unity if it were not so long and consequently had fewer repetitions. But it is a wonderful feat to have succeeded in such a task as Mr. Green set himself to, and to have sustained throughout his unflagging energy, which stirs the dulllest incident into life, and a charm of style, which not even his many affectations can seriously impair. If we were to single out passages (not in his former works) specially illustrative of his peculiar power, we would point to his account of the old civilisation and Christianity of Ireland (pp. 277—290), or to pieces of local exposition such as those relating to the Forest of Arden (pp. 347—351) and the British stronghold of Elmet (pp. 254—256).

R. L. P.

PROFESSOR BAIN'S STUDIES OF JAMES MILL AND JOHN STUART MILL.

IT would not be easy for any biographer to infuse much human interest into an authentic account of what can be known of the personal history of James Mill; and it is certainly no reproach to Professor Bain that he has failed to do this. While duly acknowledging the laborious and conscientious research of which we have the fruits in the first of the volumes before us,* we cannot help feeling that what we may call the personal, as distinguished from the literary and the social and political parts of the biography, have proved but a poor reward for the pains expended on them. There was not, after all, much that could be ascertained about Mill's career up to nearly his thirtieth year, and the story has to be eked out by "plausible conjectures" such as that "he must have been distinguished [at school] in the three R's," that he must have got on very rapidly, &c., &c. When we come to his college days we are chiefly told what he may be presumed to have done. Knowing who some of his fellow-students were, we may conjecture what friendships he may have contracted, and "may readily imagine his conversational encounters." What we do learn about him in his early Scotch home, and afterwards at the head of his own family in London, cannot be said to present him to us in a genial and attractive light. In fact, we grow indignant at what Dr. Bain very candidly reports of the demeanour of the philanthropist and reformer towards his wife and children, and we do not wonder that his biographer thinks it necessary to guard against the

* *James Mill, A Biography.* By ALEXANDER BAIN, LL.D., Emeritus Professor of Logic in the University of Aberdeen. London: Longmans, 1882.

inference that the children were made "entirely unhappy" by their father's system. At his best there is always something dry and pedantic about him. He was, as Professor Bain scientifically describes him, "chiefly a compound of Intellect and Will,"—a very effective combination, no doubt, for getting the work done which he and his fellow-Radicals set themselves to do, but forming a character which we may respect and admire, but certainly cannot feel any personal liking for.

The chief value of Professor Bain's study lies in the very full and detailed account which he gives of the thirty years or so of earnest, successful work which Mill did in London, and in the estimate we are enabled to form of the part he played in bringing about the first great effectual movements in the direction of reform in Education, Jurisprudence, Prison Discipline, Personal Liberty of Speech and Action, Parliamentary Representation,—and, in fact, in nearly every department of social and political life. Dr. Bain has not the art of presenting a very vivid or life-like portraiture of the men whose well-known names appear in his pages in connection with that of the hero of his story. But it is made evident that Mill was second to none of his associates in persistent energy, unswerving faith in his theories, and stiff adherence to principle; and he made his influence felt very effectually by some of his fellow-workers whose achievements fill a more conspicuous place in the literary and political annals of the time. We have a detailed account and analysis of all his more important articles in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, the *Westminster* and other Reviews, and of the books and pamphlets in which he promulgated his doctrines and defined the methods of giving effect to them. There were few of the burning questions of the time on which James Mill had not something to say, and his opinion was always a weighty one. There was a sort of dry intellectual enthusiasm about him, and a clear-headed intentness of purpose, which carried him through an immense amount of successful work. That work belongs essentially to a past stage in our national life, and though many of the principles so clearly laid down are permanently valid, the social and political writings in which they are embodied have not the intrinsic literary quality which would give them a continuous vitality. Dr. Bain, however, shows very clearly the historical interest they possess in connection with the movements which they influenced so much. It does not enter into Dr. Bain's scheme to give any detailed account or critique of James Mill's system of philosophy, though this would have been especially in his line. He says but little, therefore, of the *Analysis of the Human Mind*, giving a slight sketch of its contents, and a brief indication of what he considers its most signal merits and defects. It is curiously edifying to be reminded that "the section on the family affections is replete with the ideal of perfect domestic happiness."

It was well that the record of James Mill's strenuous life-work should have been made; and if in some respects it might have been set down with a more genial and picturesque pen than Dr. Bain usually wields, and if we might have desired in addition to the detailed information and

special criticism some more broad and general view of his work and estimate of his influence, we still cordially recognise the value of the book as it stands, and acknowledge our indebtedness for the service which no one else, perhaps, would have done for us with anything like the same conscientious thoroughness and accuracy.

The life and writings of John Stuart Mill are, in so many respects, of more present interest and lasting importance than those of his father, that Dr. Bain was bound in his case to undertake either a work on a more extensive scale, or else one with a more limited aim. He has chosen the latter course, and does not profess to give more than a criticism,* with some biographical details and reminiscences, designed to supplement the picture drawn in the Autobiography. A few minor additions and corrections to Mill's account of his early education are supplied, and in the pages which have more special interest, the author draws upon his own recollections of the second half of his friend's life. The last chapter is devoted to a critical estimate of Mill's character and influence, and there are some analyses of his mental composition, and observations (in relation to his marriage) on the causes of mutual attachment and other matters, which are very characteristic of the author of certain well-known class-books of mental and moral science. Professor Bain is a careful critic and by no means an indiscriminate admirer, and though we could wish, as in the case of his other study, for a greater breadth of view and living portraiture, he has given a contribution of considerable importance to the study of one of the representative thinkers of our time.

MR. COOKE'S 'LIFE AND WRITINGS OF RALPH WALDO EMERSON.'

MR. COOKE'S purpose in writing this very entertaining and serviceable account of Emerson† has been to furnish not so much a detailed biography as an introduction to the study of the works of this eminent essayist and poet. He has evidently given to his work much care and labour, and certainly not less love and enthusiasm.

The details of Emerson's connection during some years with the Unitarian ministry are very interesting, and naturally suggest the question whether he would have found it necessary to resign his pulpit if liberal Christian congregations had at that time entertained the views which are now widely prevalent among them as to what constitute the essentials of Christianity. The reason assigned for his giving up his congregational charge is that he and his people differed in regard to the celebration of the Lord's Supper. He was willing to conduct a com-

* *John Stuart Mill: a Criticism; with Personal Recollections.*

† *Ralph Waldo Emerson: His Life, Writings, and Philosophy.* By GEORGE WILLIS COOKE. London: Sampson Low and Co. 1882.

morative service, but declined to partake himself of the bread and wine. So many members in almost every Free Christian congregation now share Emerson's scruples on this matter, that it would probably not be necessary in the present day for congregations and ministers who were otherwise in cordial sympathy with each other to sever their connection on this ground alone. Still less would Emerson's rejection of physical miracle and of all essential difference of kind between Jesus and other men necessitate in the present day his withdrawal from the ministry. If that most eloquent address to the senior class of the Divinity School of Harvard University which in 1838 so startled and distressed Henry Ware, jun., Andrews Norton, and other conspicuous Unitarian divines were to be now delivered for the first time before an assembly of Unitarian students and teachers, it is probable that the preponderant emotions which it would awaken would be those of admiration and sympathy. At all events, the features in it to which some of us might still take serious exception would not be those which chiefly pained and alarmed the Unitarian mind of 1838. It would be the Pantheistic element which peeps out here and there which would now perhaps cause some Free Christians to doubt whether Emerson's mind is in hearty agreement with the essential idea and spirit of the teachings of Jesus. The liberal theologian of the present day would rejoice to be reminded that "the excellence of Jesus, and of every true teacher, is that he affirms the Divinity in him and in us—not Christ himself between it and us;" and he would heartily endorse Emerson's doctrine that true self-reliance is only another name for self-renunciation, seeing that it is the rejection of all selfish aims and purposes in reverent obedience to that Divine Self in each of us, which is the indwelling Father, the Universal Mind, the Oversoul, harmony with whom is the soul's true health and wealth. So far Emerson's teaching appears to be in perfect accord with the inmost heart of Christianity.

It is when we seek to ascertain his views on the nature of *Sin*; it is when we ask what account he gives of that act of free choice whereby the human spirit may voluntarily reject the guidance of the Oversoul, and knowingly and deliberately seek its own pleasure in conscious violation of the sentiments of purity and justice which are the felt presence and authority of the Father within us, that the utterances of the Concord sage appear to us to become eminently unsatisfactory, and no longer to harmonise with the teachings of Jesus, or with the facts of our own moral consciousness. No writer more eloquently and earnestly urges upon his readers the infinite importance of obedience to the moral law, and the infallible certainty of just retribution.

Life (he truly says) invests itself with inevitable conditions, which the unwise seek to dodge, which one and another brags that he does not know; that they do not touch him; but the brag is on his lips, the conditions are in his soul. If he escapes them in one part, they attack him in another and more vital part. If he has escaped them in form, and in the appearance, it is because he has resisted his life, and fled from himself, and the retribution is so much death.

Surely the sinful act of choice by which the soul thus deliberately alienates itself from the Universal Mind is of all the acts of the soul the most momentous and the most positive in its results, and yet Emerson tells us that "evil is merely privative, not absolute; it is like cold, which is the privation of heat." The same vein of thought shows itself in Emerson's agreement with Eckhart that the man who is tortured by self-reproach for some mean or dishonest act should not wish not to have sinned, for "man, though in brothels, or jails, or on gibbets, is on his way to all that is good and true." If this only means that the Universal Spirit of love and wisdom is ever over-ruling to good the effect of man's sinful choices, securing that the sin shall do uncompensated harm to no one save the sinner himself, and that for the sinner himself there will open out of the very desolation and agony that sin entails a renewed opportunity of reconciliation with the Indwelling Father, then we should say that this teaching is in harmony with the spirit of the Gospel of Jesus; but in such case we must add that Emerson's mode of expression is almost certain to mislead his readers, and not only to mislead them intellectually, but also to weaken that very consciousness of the infinite importance of right conduct which forms the burden of so many of his wisest and noblest writings. But we hardly think that Emerson's words are intended to have the above interpretation. Though he tells us that man can elect to obey or disobey the moral law, it would seem that he holds at the same time that the actual world of human society has passed through and is passing through the very best experience, and, indeed, the only possible experience; and though from the point of view of the Conscience it seems that very much which now is fearfully repulsive in society might have been, and would have been, absent if man had not, in the exercise of his free will, elected to obey his lower rather than his higher self, nevertheless, from the point of view of the Intellect (or, as we should rather say, from the point of view of a certain questionable metaphysical theory) every item in the life of individuals and nations is just as it should be, and the reflective man from this higher stand-point of the intellect may complacently look back upon his mean and selfish deeds as necessary rounds in the ladder whereby he is mounting Godward and heavenward. If this be Emerson's meaning—and this certainly is the meaning which many of his admirers attach to his words—then it would really seem that he is not wholly in accord with the inner spirit of Christianity, and it is hardly to be wondered at that religious associations, based on such principles, should speedily collapse for want of organic connection with the vital currents of Christian thought and feeling.

It is with great diffidence that we express dissent from so profound and honest a thinker as Emerson, but the present writer must make bold to say that, while the works of Emerson, and especially his poems, have been for thirty years among the books which he has most read and most loved, yet the conviction has grown upon him that Emerson is

mistaken in regarding sin when seen from the point of view of the Intellect as at all different from sin seen from the point of view of the Conscience. The unsophisticated intellect and the conscience give precisely the same verdict, and where the verdict appears to differ, it is because a false philosophical theory has supplanted the soul's intuitive perception and judgment. Neither from the stand-point of the intellect nor from that of the conscience is it other than absolutely bad and mischievous for the soul to choose a path which it knows to be forbidden by its higher self, and which can only be entered upon at the cost of conscious alienation from the Universal Mind. With very much of the mystical side of Emerson's teaching we thoroughly and thankfully sympathise. It is only when he carries his mysticism so far as to appear to obliterate altogether the independent causality, and therefore the true responsibility, of man that we are unable to follow him; for then he seems to us to leave the solid ground of healthy Theism, and to mount into the unsubstantial cloudland of a Pantheism as enervating as it is fascinating.

Mr. Cooke, however, gives a very different reading of Emerson's doctrine on this matter, and confidently classes him in the same distinctly Theistic category with Theodore Parker and F. W. Newman. Though we cannot agree with this opinion, we heartily recommend to our readers the careful perusal of the thoughtful chapters which form the conclusion of Mr. Cooke's treatise, and which treat successively of Emerson's views concerning Nature, Mind or the Oversoul, Intuition, Fate and Freedom, Immortality, and the Religion of the Soul. In these chapters ample materials are given for forming a judgment as to whether Mr. Cooke's or our account is most in accordance with the facts.

Mr. Cooke adverts to the report that Emerson has of late years drawn nearer to Orthodox Christianity, and, as a complete refutation of it, he cites a decisive letter from Emerson's son, Mr. Edward Waldo Emerson. There can be no doubt that the report is wholly groundless, but judging from the tone of Emerson's last utterance on religion, namely, the lecture on "The Preacher," printed in the *Unitarian Review* for January, 1880, we should be inclined to think that Emerson's hopes in regard to such religious societies as those of the Free Religious Association, which professedly dissociate themselves from Christianity, have undergone some such modification as that which Mr. O. B. Frothingham lately announced as the result of his experience.

We have taken up nearly all the space at our disposal in these thoughts concerning Emerson's attitude to Christianity, because it is on this point alone that serious difference of opinion can arise as to the accuracy of Mr. Cooke's representation. When he tells us of the stainless purity and beautiful simplicity of Emerson's character, of his unwearied diligence in the pursuit of truth, of his warm affection for his fellow men, of the marvellous synthesis in his nature of shrewd practical common sense with mystic insight into the deep things of the spirit, all must

admit the reality of these excellences so vividly depicted. It is pleasant, too, to read that amid all the ferment of novel schemes for the regeneration of society which characterised the state of New England thought during the decade which began about 1840, such as the establishment of Brook Farm, &c., Emerson is always found speaking the words of truth and soberness.

"While he saw," says Mr. Cooke, "much that was good in each of these reforms, gave to them his sympathy, fully entered into the spirit of the protest against old abuses and institutions that narrow and hinder, yet to him they were deficient and wrong. His demand was that men should trust in themselves, sit alone, and read the laws of their own natures. His method was the method of Jesus, making clean the inward life, seeking interior strength and renewal."

To the movement against slavery Emerson early gave his sympathies, and Mr. Cooke's readers will thank him for having culled for them many choice passages from his brave speeches on this exciting topic; nor will they be less grateful for having almost in full Emerson's admirable address on occasion of the assassination of Lincoln, in which he gives full expression to his thoughts about the war and the victory of the North, and his great love for the President whose loss he felt so keenly.

The chapter devoted to Emerson's poetry is very attractive, and the high praise given to this part of his literary creations does not seem to us excessive. Very interesting, too, is the description of Emerson's literary method, that is, the mode in which his spoken lectures were composed, and how these were afterwards condensed into the form in which they now appear in the printed volumes.

Taking Mr. Cooke's book as a whole, it is both carefully and attractively written, and will be found exceedingly useful both to those who have long been familiar with Emerson's thought, and also to those who feel tempted to make acquaintance with the thinker whom Carlyle so warmly loved, and to whom Professor Tyndall and other eminent men have expressed their deep indebtedness. The treatise we are describing is not a critical estimate of Emerson's true place as a thinker and writer (the time for such an estimate has not yet arrived), but it is what it aims to be, a genial and faithful guide and introduction to the study of Emerson's writings.

C. B. U.

VIGNOLI'S 'MYTH AND SCIENCE.'

THE Essay on 'Myth and Science'* is a noteworthy volume in *The International Science Series*. The author, an ardent Evolutionist, accepts in the main the views of Tylor and Herbert Spencer as to the genesis of primitive ideas of nature, but believes that he can trace the

* *Myth and Science; an Essay*. By TITO VIGNOLI. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, and Co. 1882.

operation of the myth-forming faculty to an earlier source than previous writers have been able to do. He claims for his Essay two original features—1st, the discovery that it is to the præ-human animal kingdom that we must look for the primal source of myth; 2nd, the doctrine that myth and science are in their origin fundamentally the same. The originality of the second of these views is open to question, and with regard to the former we do not see that the author has satisfactorily established it, though no doubt in his endeavour to do so he says much that is instructive and suggestive. His opinion is that every animal by its psychical constitution ascribes to the objects that affect its senses a conscious life of the same kind as its own. The following passage will give some idea of his position:—

The primitive and constant act of all animals, including man, when external or internal sensation has opened to them the immense field of nature, is that of *entifying* [to *entify*—to regard as a substance or entity] the object of sensation, or, in a word, all phenomena. Such *entification* is the result of spontaneous necessity, by the law of the intrinsic faculty of perception; it is not the result of reflection, but it is immediate, innate, and inevitable. It is an eternal law of the evolution of the intelligence, like all those which rule the order of the world. . . . The animal therefore accepts the idea, suggested by his spontaneous and subjective nature, that phenomena are alive. Grass, fruits, plants, water, the movement of material bodies, ordinary and extraordinary meteors, all are implicitly apprehended by him as subjects endowed with will and purpose after the manner of mankind.

The reasons alleged for ascribing to the lower animals this faculty of personifying the objects of nature are by no means conclusive. It is very true that animals

turn against any object which has chanced to hurt them, or which has annoyed them by regular and repeated motions, and that they start at the sudden appearance or oscillation of some unlooked-for thing, at an unusual light, a colour, a stone, a plant, at the fluttering of branches, of clothes, or weathercocks, at the rush of water, at the slightest movement or sound in the twilight or in the darkness of night.

But all this may be accounted for by the play of association, and does not, we think, necessarily imply any feeling or judgment that the objects are self-conscious beings. For a mental act of this kind *voluntary* attention appears to be indispensable, and the only attention of which animals seem capable is *involuntary* or automatic attention. Vignoli maintains the complete identity of animals and men; but adds, "I believe the superiority of man to consist, not so much in new faculties as in the reflex effect upon themselves of those he possesses in common with the animals." It is strange that the same writer, who contends for the mental identity of men and animals, should yet hold that man is differentiated from the lower animals by "his deliberate *will*, which does not only immediately command his body and his manifold relative functions, but also the complex range of his psychical acts." Surely, the exclusive possession by man of this self-determining *will* utterly overthrows the assumed intellectual identity of animals and men; and it is this very will, this power of voluntary attention and self-determination, regarded

by Vignoli as wanting in the animals, which appears to be the indispensable condition of the recognition of a power other than one's own, and therefore of that personification of external objects, which Vignoli believes to have its source low down in the animal scale. But if our author has not made good his contention that mythology begins in the pre-human stage, he has yet done good service in tracing the progress of this personifying tendency in man, through the various phases which pass ultimately into the monotheistic idea. Nor is there much to take exception to in the chapter in which he seeks to show the common origin of science and of myth. The soundness of his argument becomes far more questionable when he maintains that the reflective process which has led to our present scientific conception of nature gradually but inevitably annihilates the mythological or superstitious view that nature is the expression of will and intelligence. We should rather say that in the primitive period of human thinking the phenomena of nature impressed the human mind in a two-fold manner, awakening, on the one hand, the sense of awe and wonder in the presence of a power or powers which the mind could not but conceive of as personal; and, on the other, the impulse to learn the method of action of this personal but super-human energy. Out of the first of these emotions has grown Religion; out of the second has grown Science. But while these two tendencies have worked, side by side, and have reciprocally affected each other, neither has in the slightest degree shown itself competent to perform the other's function, so that this other might be dispensed with. In the history of thought there has probably never been a time when it was more widely and deeply felt than it is now, that nature is only comprehensible when referred to spirit or thought as its cause or substance; and this view is by no means confined to professional theologians, but is constantly gaining ground with profounder thinkers, in both the scientific and the philosophical field.

C. B. U.

JAMES HINTON'S 'PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION.'

READERS of the article on 'James Hinton as a Religious Thinker,' which appeared in our pages (*Modern Review*, October, 1881, pp. 661-687) will recognise in Miss Caroline Haddon's volume* the first instalment of the selection from Mr. Hinton's unpublished papers, which was there mentioned as in preparation. It can have been no easy task to go through the great mass of unclassified memoranda of thoughts on the deepest questions of religion, ethics, and philosophy, which, we are told, Mr. Hinton would jot down, wherever he might be, in the street,

* *Philosophy and Religion, Selected from the Manuscripts of the Late James Hinton.* Edited by CAROLINE HADDON. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, and Co. 1881.

in society, at a concert, at church, to be written out clearly in the evening. Whether this habit of constant self-inspection and thought-registering is altogether wholesome may be open to question; but it resulted, in this case, in the accumulation of an immense store of the materials out of which religions and philosophies are made. The selection which we have in the present volume is from the four large volumes (containing 2,500 closely-filled pages) which Mr. Hinton printed, but did not publish. The still more laborious duty remains to be fulfilled, of going through an equal mass of writings still in manuscript, which represent the later and more mature mind of the author in relation to those same questions which he was for ever looking at and turning over and over again; recording not merely the settled conclusions at which he arrived, but the mental processes by which he reached them.

A recently published criticism of one of the doctrines propounded in the volume before us, followed by some correspondence on the subject, suggests some doubts as to the judiciousness of selecting for publication, without any note or comment, passages which embody only a transient phase of the author's thought, while they put it in the form of the distinct assertion of a religious or philosophical doctrine. It may be a good mental discipline for an intent thinker and devoted seeker after truth to write down his daily reflections, and note the different stages of opinion by which he makes his way towards the truth; and if he is willing to place the entire register at our disposal *en masse*, he provides us with matter for a highly interesting psychological study. But when we have before us not the whole record but a particular portion chosen out and arranged for our convenience, we require some guide as to which are "processes" and which are "results," or, in other words, which are the opinions and speculations which were in the end modified or rejected, and which really express the writer's maturest conviction. No doubt we have such a guide in the Life of Mr. Hinton and in certain of his published writings; but this new representative book should speak for itself, and not require qualification and explanation from extraneous sources. It is not every reader who would understand all the bearings of the editorial remark in the preface, that "many of the things in these papers may seem at variance with the later utterances of the writer;" and Miss Haddon would have only done justice to the author if she had at least supplied a hint here or there as to which things these are.

The extracts given in the present volume are grouped under the titles—Metaphysics, Nature Known by the Moral Emotions, Mental Physiology, The Art of Thinking, The Self and Consciousness, The Bible, Holiness, Ethics. It would have been an additional help to the reader if the special subject of each passage had been noted in the margin, or at the head of the paragraphs, as well as in the list of the contents of each section. It requires considerable familiarity with Mr. Hinton's philosophy, and with the peculiar sense in which he uses certain words and phrases, to enable us to grasp his exact meaning, even when we *feel* the truth of what he says or

suggests. In what is most original and characteristic of our author there is a curious blending of the mystical with the scientific or rationalistic way of treating the problems of existence, which is likely enough to puzzle sometimes any one who comes to him fresh from the teachings either of the older mystics or the modern exponents of science. But he can seldom fail to set us thinking, putting old topics of debate in new lights, and boldly applying the principles of his philosophy to all the phenomena of Nature and of Life. It is essentially a religious philosophy, centred in the fact of a living God who is *known* by faith and love; and this inner vision and power of faith is insisted on with all the enthusiasm and fervent conviction of a mind fully possessed by the religious idea. The book is rich in the fruits of spiritual experience and moral insight, full of wise and noble teaching. No one whose faith has in it a vein of that mysticism which is inherent in Christianity, and is expressed in the beatitude, "Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God," can help being drawn into sympathetic communion, both spiritual and intellectual, with the mind which has been so frankly self-revealed. And no one who has this sympathy can fail to gain much by practising under such guidance "the art of thinking" on subjects of the highest interest and the greatest moment.

CAROLINE FOX'S MEMORIES OF OLD FRIENDS.

THIS singularly delightful and attractive book* is one which no longer needs any introduction to our readers. It has been received with the heartiest welcome, on all hands, and it would be superfluous now to undertake the pleasant task of describing or criticising it. We gladly take the opportunity, however, of mentioning with unqualified commendation the new edition which has lately appeared, in which the only improvement which seemed possible has been made. It is published now in two moderate sized volumes, instead of the original quarto, which, comely as it was to look upon, was not convenient to handle; and it would not fit into its proper place on the shelf with our other special favourites. It would be as difficult now to find a fault in its outward form as it has been from the first to find one in its fascinating contents. The editor could not have done his part with more skill or sympathetic tact. There are no indiscreet confidences, or harsh or unkind judgments; indeed, we do not believe any would have been found if the whole of the record had been published. All is so natural and genuine, so full of bright intelligence and keen appreciation of whatever is true and good, clever, genial, and amusing, that the charm is irresistible; and we find ourselves at once in that mood of thorough sym-

* *Memories of Old Friends; being Extracts from the Journals and Letters of CAROLINE FOX, of Penjerrick, Cornwall. From 1835 to 1871. Edited by Horace N. Pym. Second Edition. To which are added Fourteen Original Letters from J. S. Mill, never before published. In two vols. London: Smith, Elder, and Co. 1882.*

pathy with the writer, which makes reading such a book as this almost like forming a personal friendship. This gentle Quakeress, "joining to the fine purities of her sect," as Carlyle said of the family at Penjerriek, "a reverence for human intelligence of all kinds," was happily gifted with that sense of humour which seems almost essential to the appreciation of the varieties of character, and which is usually associated with a talent for making vivid and picturesque memoranda of men and things. Even when there is only a brief mention of some one she had seen or met, we have generally some cleverly-sketched portrait or characteristic saying; and the fuller records of nearer acquaintance and more intimate friendship, as in the case especially of John Sterling, John Stuart Mill, and Mr. and Mrs. Carlyle, are of real importance, as contributions to our knowledge of persons of whom everything authentic that we can hear is interesting.

The new edition contains, in an Appendix, fourteen additional letters from J. S. Mill to Mr. Barclay Fox. They have not so much in them of personal interest as has the one which had already been published; but they are well worth reading, and they help to complete the accounts of the writer's intercourse with the Fox family.

THE POET'S BIBLE. NEW TESTAMENT SECTION.*

MR. HORDER'S collection of poems, designed to set forth and illustrate the scenes and characters of the New Testament, is in many respects a beautiful and interesting volume. It appears in a very attractive outward form, and its contents are so chosen and arranged as to give a clear view of what our literature, with some comparatively unimportant contributions from foreign sources, can furnish in the way of poetical illustration and exposition of the Gospel history. The editor's rule of excluding from his pages anything that would "indicate the ecclesiastical preferences of the writers" has, of course, limited his choice very considerably in many quarters; and the pieces chosen from any writers (with one exception) before the present century, may almost be counted on the fingers. The exception is Crashaw, of whose Sacred Epigrams no less than forty-eight are included, a good many of them being the translations by Dr. Grosart and others, from Crashaw's Latin. The point of the greater number of these epigrams consists in nothing more than a "conceit," often a mere play upon words; and Mr. Horder might well have largely reduced his list by the omission of such specimens of sacred wit as this, on the Miracle of the Loaves:

Now, Lord, or never, they'll believe on Thee;
Thou to their teeth hast prov'd Thy deity.

* *The Poet's Bible*. Selected and edited by W. GARRETT HORDER, Editor of 'The Book of Praise for Children.' *New Testament Section*. London: W. Isbister 1881.

It is difficult to see how this sets forth or illustrates the scene it refers to.

It is not till he comes down to the last half-century, beginning with the publication of the *Christian Year*, that the editor finds any copious sources from which to draw the poetic material which exactly suits his purpose; and a large number of the names which appear in his pages are those of writers still living, or but lately dead. Amongst them there are few who are in the first rank among the poets. Tennyson is unfortunately absent, because the editor could not obtain permission to print the stanzas on Mary and Lazarus, from 'In Memoriam,' and those on Stephen, in 'The Two Voices,' to which might have been added the tragically pathetic song of the little maid, in 'Guinivere,' "Late, late, so late!" We have Mrs. Browning's 'The Virgin Mary to the Child Jesus;' the three fine sonnets on St. Peter's Betrayal; and the exquisite one which the editor has chosen to entitle, 'The Unchanging Christ,' instead of 'Comfort,' which is its title in the original. Robert Browning's wonderfully subtle study, 'Karshish, the Arab Physician,' appears in the Appendix, in company with two pieces translated from Jacopone da Todi, by Mr. J. A. Symonds, which also "travel a little beyond the limits of the sacred story." The great bulk of the poems which make up the volume are works, not of genius and the highest literary art, but of fine poetic faculty, religious feeling and insight finding utterance in expressive verse which has often much beauty and artistic quality. The names of Keble, Newman, Trench, Alford and MacDonald, Lynch, Moultrie and Mansell, are all, to some extent, representative names among the writers of sacred poetry; and another poet and divine, whose name appears frequently in this volume—Dean Plumptre—will certainly hold a conspicuous place among those who have contributed to the store of poetical illustration and interpretation of Scripture. Mr. Horder has been fortunate in having at his disposal Dr. Plumptre's collection of unpublished poems on the 'Gospels and Epistles;' and the pieces he has chosen from it are among the most striking specimens the volume contains, showing the touch of a skilled religious artist and thoughtful interpreter. We shall look with much interest for the appearance of the complete series. Almost as new to the majority of readers will be Dr. George MacDonald's series of poems on the Gospel women. The volume in which they were published some eighteen years ago has been, we believe, for some time out of print, and while placing them at Mr. Horder's disposal, the author has almost rewritten them. We think that Dr. MacDonald's literary power is most conspicuous in his best prose works; but many of these short poems are marked by a true poetic feeling and spiritual insight, which entitle them to a distinguished place in this collection.

The chief point in which we should be inclined to question the editor's discretion is the inclusion of a good many pieces which are somewhat weak and diffuse in expression—pretty rather than beautiful. A poetical version of a Scripture scene is apt, except in the most skilful

hands, to be a weaker expansion of the original text, taking its essential beauty and truth, and thinning and spreading it out over a certain number of verses. Such pieces as those of Mr. N. P. Willis, for instance, while they have an undeniable grace and delicacy of expression, have a prevailing element of diffuse pictorial fancy which distracts the attention from the central significance of the scene he describes, and directs it too much to accessories and multifarious details, many of which indeed are purely imaginary. We could have spared, too, some of the poems, which are mainly didactic, consisting chiefly in an "application" of the chosen text, and doing little in the way of actual illustration and interpretation of the original. Probably if the collection had been reduced by about one-fifth, the remainder would have made a more complete and harmonious whole. But as it is, it is full of interest and religious value, and the editor has thus far executed his pleasant task so successfully, that he has every encouragement to complete it in the volume which is to deal with the Old Testament.

MR. MORLEY'S 'ENGLISH LITERATURE OF THE REIGN OF VICTORIA.'*

IN publishing, as the two thousandth volume of his English series, Mr. Henry Morley's sketch of our modern literature, Baron Tauchnitz has done a service not only to the readers of the previous one thousand nine hundred and ninety-nine volumes, chiefly novels, but to all who can appreciate a very pleasant and readable account of the literary fruits of home growth during the last half-century. To no more thorough expert than Mr. Morley could the task have been committed of sorting out, describing, and appraising our rich and varied gains which have been accumulating since the accession of Queen Victoria; but it remained to be seen whether he could accomplish it with any satisfaction to himself and his readers within the scanty limits of a Tauchnitz volume. He has succeeded in producing a work of considerable permanent value, and of unmistakable present interest. Avoiding the danger of making his little book the mere catalogue of a long series of works which he has such scanty room to describe or criticise, he has selected for special notice the really important writers, and has managed to tell us enough of most of them to give a personal interest to his sketch, and to make his criticisms intelligible and suggestive. In certain cases, indeed, we think he has been led to devote too much of his limited space to a more detailed biographical account than his scheme required. For instance, Carlyle has twenty-two pages allotted to him, chiefly biographical; and a fifteenth part of the whole extent of Mr. Morley's canvas seems too much to devote to this one

* *Of English Literature of the Reign of Victoria. With a Glance at the Past.* By HENRY MORLEY, Professor of English Literature at University College, London. Tauchnitz Edition, Volume 2,000. With a Frontispiece. Leipzig: Bernhard Tauchnitz. 1881.

figure, strikingly picturesque as it is. Wordsworth's life, too, which (with Southey's) did not properly belong to the Victorian period, occupies a good many pages; and we would rather have had, in such cases, less narrative and more criticism. There is a disproportion between the three pages and a half given to Thomas Campbell, and the two dozen lines (ten of which are quotation) in which Mr. Ruskin is disposed of. James Montgomery, again, has nearly two pages, while Matthew Arnold is allowed four lines, Dante Rossetti two lines and a-half, and Swinburne still fewer. It is rather surprising that no attempt should have been made to give an estimate of any kind of Tennyson's genius and influence; and that Mr. Swinburne, the founder of a distinct school of poetry, and the centre of a host of imitators, should have been dismissed with the perfunctory remark, that "he has long since taken his place among the poets." No doubt it is difficult to decide what names have a claim to be included in a handbook of this sort, after those which are in the first ranks of our literature; but, considering how many of minor importance are to be found here, some of the omissions are rather strange. There are certainly some who have a slighter claim than Aubrey de Vere, A. H. Clough, Coventry Patmore, Charles Tennyson Turner, W. Bell Scott, Robert Buchanan, among the poets; and in the various departments of prose literature we might have expected to find the names, at least, of Leslie Stephen, Goldwin Smith, W. R. Greg, Max Müller, Adolphus Trollope, J. A. Symonds—to mention only the first half-dozen which occur to us. In the preliminary chapters the author gives a "glance at the past," with a brief account of the leading epochs of our literature, in connection with the course of our national history—a *résumé* which he is peculiarly qualified to make. The little book is very pleasant reading, from the first page to the last, and it may be cordially recommended to that large circle of readers to whom the chief names in our literature have a familiar sound, but who have a very vague idea, if any, of the personages and the works to which they belong.

MATABELE LAND.

MR. C. G. OATES need not have had the misgivings which he expresses in his Preface, as to the advisability of preparing this transcript of the brief opening chapter of his brother's work as a traveller and naturalist—the opening chapter, and, unhappily, the closing one too.* The book, in spite of the inevitable loss to the reader in not having the traveller's own completed record of his experiences, has many features of special interest. It is one in which we can read "between the lines;" and we should value it were it only for the introduction it gives us to the fine, manly young fellow—so frank, brave, and open-

* *Matabele Land and the Victoria Falls. A Naturalist's Wanderings in the Interior of South Africa.* FROM the Letters and Journals of the late FRANK OATES. Edited by C. G. OATES, B.A. London: Kegan Paul. 1881.

hearted, who is self-pictured in the unaffected pages from his letters and diaries. From these his brother has compiled such record as could now be given of the "little trip," as he called it, which was to have put him in training for future explorations beyond what is now the more or less beaten track of twelve hundred miles or so, between Durban and the Zambesi Falls. As far as the accounts of the expedition are concerned, the main interest lies in the impression they give us of the ordinary toils, difficulties, and annoyances, and occasional dangers of travel through the territories of the South African tribes who have been obliged to tolerate our presence, and allow us a right of way. We get a good deal of insight into the manners and customs and general character of the people, both natives and settlers, on whose good will and service the traveller has to rely. In every case of hindrance and threatened mischief, Mr. Oates displays all the best qualities of a plucky Englishman, and by patience, tact, and fair play, makes his way through difficulties that were often disheartening enough. Unhappily, there were various vexatious delays, and there were irresistible temptations to crowd too much into one journey, and to linger in the new fields of interest which opened out to the traveller as he went; and when he arrived, at last, at the goal of his long expedition—the Zambesi Falls—the unhealthy season had set in, and he fell a victim to the fatal malaria—a sadly premature ending of a career that had opened with so much bright promise. He was but thirty-five years of age when he died.

From the brief memoir of Mr. Frank Oates which his brother has prefixed to the volume, we get a clear and strong impression of his character. "There was something singularly winning about him," wrote a friend, upon his death; "that peculiar combination of courage and gentleness, which is one of the finest traits of character." "His name," the Dean of Christ-Church wrote, "must be added to the list of those devoted and enterprising Englishmen, who 'scorn delights and live laborious days,' who, by their frank love of truth and justice have made our name respected from one hemisphere to another." That our name is, among the tribes we undertake to civilise and govern, always respected for those particular qualities we may indeed, with some shame, confess to be doubtful. And we can only say that if among our explorers, settlers, and governors, there were more men of the stamp of Frank Oates, we should have better reason to pride ourselves on our national repute. There are few readers of the pages which show so clearly what he was, and make us think regretfully of what he might have accomplished, who will not, with Dean Liddell, "grieve to think that so much manly spirit has so soon been quenched."

We have not room for any more detailed account of Mr. Oates's journey and its fruits. His letters and diaries are simple, unstudied memoranda of his daily experiences, which would no doubt have been largely supplemented by his own recollections if he had prepared his work for the press. What we especially miss is any adequate account of his natural history observations. Indeed, this main object of his journey

occupies but a small proportion of his pages, and the copious detailed catalogue of the scientific results of the expedition, in a rich collection of birds, insects, and botanical specimens, comes upon us almost as a surprise at the end. The hundred pages of Appendix, in which this is contained, is the part of the book which will have the most permanent value. Dr. George Rolleston has done the Ethnology, Mr. Bowdler Sharpe the Ornithology, Professor Westwood the Entomology, and Professor Oliver the Botany. The birds and insects are especially commended as being excellent representative collections; and the reader cannot help regretting that such a diligent collector and accurate observer had not enriched his journals with more systematic accounts of this part of his work. The book is illustrated with numerous wood engravings, and some copies, in chromo-lithography, of water-colour drawings done on the spot. These latter give an idea of the kind of scenery which the traveller in those regions makes acquaintance with,—not often, it would seem, very striking, or even interesting, and not seldom dull and ugly. Mr. Oates had been on his way for eight months before he came to the spot where he could at last “fancy that South Africa may have much fine scenery.”

FOREIGN CLASSICS FOR ENGLISH READERS.

MR. SIME'S account of the life and writings of Schiller* forms one of the most acceptable and satisfactory of the volumes yet published in the series of 'Foreign Classics.' The successive periods of the poet's literary activity are clearly characterised, and there is a sufficient description of his chief works to give the English reader a very good idea of their quality. The chapters that treat of the plays which the young student of German generally makes his first acquaintance with as an exercise in translation and parsing, may be strongly recommended as an antidote to the dry grammatical treatment to which they must be subjected; and the whole forms an excellent introduction to the study of Schiller, the use of which will certainly not be limited to those “English readers,” for whose benefit the series is primarily intended. In describing the Prose works, Mr. Sime makes the very safe remark that “they are generally acknowledged to have sterling merits,” and that the author's endeavours “to make ordinary readers feel the charm of history” “were attended by considerable success.” He does, however, subsequently criticise and discriminate; and when he comes to the prose writings which are of the most permanent value—the essays and letters in philosophy and literary criticism—he gives a careful and instructive estimate of them. The little book shows throughout what good work a biographer and critic, who really knows his subject, can do, even when “cabin'd, cribb'd, confin'd,” within the limits of a hand-book.

* *Schiller*. By JAMES SIME, M.A., Author of 'Lessing: his Life and Writings.' Edinburgh and London: Blackwood. 1882.

Jean de la Fontaine and the French fabulists who were before and after him furnish matter for, at any rate, a very entertaining volume,* and Mr. Collins has told as much as the ordinary reader is likely to care to know about works which, after all, cannot be said to fill a very distinguished place among the Foreign Classics. The opening chapters contain much curious and amusing information about the earlier forms of some well-known fables, and the sources from which La Fontaine got his subjects. Those who desire a fuller and more accurate knowledge of the whole matter will go to the writers whose literary labours have relieved Mr. Collins from the trouble of making much serious research on his account.

SOME NEW BOOKS FOR SUNDAY SCHOOLS.

WE can cordially recommend to those who are in want of Sunday lessons for young children three little books recently published by the Sunday School Association.† Mr. Bartram has followed up his *Stories from the Book of Genesis* (noticed in the *Modern Review* last year) by a not less successful attempt to apply the same "rational" method of treatment to the traditions of the life of Moses, without too much disturbing the impressions of the *naïf* freshness and picturesqueness of the original stories. The little book will be, like its predecessor, of real service to those who are unable any longer to "teach the Bible" to their children or scholars on the old lines, and yet who wish them to feel the charm of its early pages, and to enter afterwards into the varied meaning and interest of the national history to which they are the introduction.

The short and very simple and practical sermons by three experienced Sunday-school teachers are excellent specimens of what such addresses to children, especially the younger ones, should be. They are directly concerned with the experiences and ideas of the average Sunday scholar, and if other young people hear or read them at home, they must not be too critical when they happen not quite to meet their own case.

Mr. Vizard has taken a number of the more frequent and striking similes and metaphors occurring in the Bible, and made a study of each of them, bringing together into one view the different truths suggested by the figure as originally used, and taking it as the text of a religious or moral lesson of present application. The idea is a good one, and is well carried out; and any intelligent teacher ought to be able to use the book as the author intends it to be used, not as a mere series of chapters to be read in class, but as notes of lessons to be given according to the teacher's own method and experience, in his own language and with his own illustrations.

* *La Fontaine and other French Fabulists*. By the Rev. W. LUCAS COLLINS, M.A. Blackwood. 1882.

† *Stories from the Life of Moses*. By RICHARD BARTRAM.—*Short Sermons to Children*. By THREE COUSINS.—*Sacred Similes; being Notes for Teachers of Bible Classes and Others*. By P. E. VIZARD. London: Sunday School Association, 37, Norfolk Street, Strand. 1882.